As Hezbollah Hastens Israeli Withdrawal It Integrates Itself Into South Lebanon’s Economic Life

Text and Photos by JoMarie Fecci

With Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Barak reaffirming his intention to withdraw Israel’s troops before his first year in office ends in July 2000, Hezbollah’s long struggle to force Israel out of southern Lebanon may be nearing an end. However, even as the organization looks to its post-liberation future, it is increasing the pressure on Israel through armed resistance actions.

Over the past year there has been a marked increase in incidents of what the group, which draws its support from Lebanon’s majority Shi’i Muslim community, calls “quality operations.” This means actions that hit the Israelis at close quarters and kill Israel Defense Forces (IDF) personnel, in contrast to the more common longer-range mortar attacks.

In fact, despite Barak’s debut in power, the violence in the south has been ratcheted up on both sides. The number of resistance attacks from all quarters, as well as the number of IDF air raids, has increased.

Recently Hezbollah has been placing renewed emphasis on wearing down the alliance between the IDF and their puppet South Lebanon Army (SLA).

Mahmoud Kummaty, deputy president of the Hezbollah political council, explains, “Attacks against the SLA are kept up apace with the attacks against the IDF. SLA men are being killed by roadside bombs. One was taken from his home—so they know they are not even safe at home in their beds. When we film the SLA men changing cars and following security precautions and then being assassinated, it makes the SLA live under constant fear.”

Hezbollah follows a multifaceted strategy to weaken and “disconnect” the SLA from the Israelis. The policy of filming the SLA men clandestinely sows fear as the men realize they are being monitored by Hezbollah supporters within the Israeli-occupied “security zone.” Hezbollah encourages desertions, making it clear that those who surrender to Hezbollah will not be punished.

Currently SLA men who desert to Hezbollah are kept for one or two weeks while they are debriefed, and then they are released. (They are also interrogated, but not confined, by Lebanese Army intelligence personnel.)

In fact, over a year ago a member of Hezbollah’s bloc in the Lebanese parliament proposed a bill to give amnesty to all SLA soldiers and officers if they would surrender voluntarily. The proposal was shelved and never put to a vote, although it was discussed again after SLA men who surrendered during the liberation of Jezzine were tried.

Hezbollah’s policy to encourage desertions makes no attempt to differentiate between forced conscripts and those who voluntarily joined the SLA. “Our goal is to eliminate this militia that is giving protection to the enemy. We are not talking about forgiveness and justice. We must weaken the Israelis,” says Kummaty, aware that the policy has allowed some notorious SLA members to “jump ship” and avoid prosecution for their actions while in the Israeli-funded militia.

Kummaty points out that the policy is working. “Now after every attack on the Israelis, they detain SLA people and interrogate them,” he says. “These people are seen as collaborators by the Lebanese, and now they are no longer trusted by the Israelis.”

Morale within the SLA is at an all-time low—particularly after their withdrawal from Jezzine.

The care with which Hezbollah treated the liberation of Jezzine—abstaining from entering the town with flags and jubilant fighters, coordinating with the Lebanese government in preparation for the enemy’s withdrawal, and having Hezbollah political leaders meet with the local residents—provides clues for the future.

Hezbollah, once viewed by the West as an unpredictable, Iran-backed terrorist movement, has grown into a mature political organization prepared to take on key roles in post-liberation Lebanon.

Social Services

While the group’s international reputation is based almost exclusively on its armed actions, in Lebanon Hezbollah is well known and respected for its extensive social welfare and development programs. Hezbollah-affiliated associations have a reputation for honesty that stands out in a place where many of its counterparts are believed to be corrupt and inefficient.

Hezbollah works outside the government, and in places where the government is absent. Yet Hezbollah cooperates with the various government ministries responsible for the sectors in which it operates. The party’s associations are involved in education, health care, assistance to victims of the conflict, and economic development.

Hezbollah’s focus on social services began in a coordinated fashion with the establishment of Jihad al Binna in 1988. The association was created in response to an explosion that partially demolished three buildings in Beirut’s southern Shi’i suburbs.

“We had to start rebuilding what Israel destroyed so the people would stay,” explains Ibrahim A. Ismail, general manager of Jihad al Binaa Association.

Jihad al Binna started not only rebuilding but also providing basic services for the people in an area that was neglected by the government at that time. What began in the southern suburbs spread to other areas of the country where Hezbollah had a presence and the people had needs that weren’t being met.

“The most important issue for Jihad al Binna right now is the agrarian sector,” said Ismail. “Forty percent of the Lebanese population works in agriculture, and since the government has never focused on agriculture we thought it was an important sector to work in.”

Laying a solid foundation for the future, Jihad al Binna has recently established two agricultural centers in the western Bekaa to formalize the assistance its fieldworkers have been providing to the farming population over the years. The centers have classrooms, labs for soil testing, and nurseries for experimenting with new plant varieties and growing seedlings.

Jihad al Binna’s mantra is to lower the costs per yield for the farmers. For example, since the government will only purchase 100 kilos of tobacco per hectare at $10 per kilo, farmers must find their own markets for any excess or destroy their crop. In this situation increasing the yield is not profitable, but cutting the costs of production is. One way the association does this is by providing credit for seeds, fertilizers and pesticides to the farmers.

In western Bekaa, Jihad al Binna stepped in to try to assist farmers hard hit by the government’s effort to eliminate the cultivation of hashish and opium. These “drug” crops had been very profitable for the farmers.

“There is no alternative crop that will benefit the farmers as much as drug agriculture,” says Muhammad Khansi, director of one of the centers. “The real solution for this area is development across a range of sectors including agriculture, tourism, and industry. We should concentrate on development as a whole, not just on replacing one crop with another.”

Khansi points to a field of potatoes left unharvested. The potato is one of the “alternative” crops, but the market is so poor that many farmers are just leaving the crop in the ground to rot.

“Our fieldworkers reach out to the farmers,” Khansi explains. “We try to lower their costs and teach them new ways to vary their output. For example, the Jihad al Binna has taught many farmers new techniques of beekeeping, which is not labor-intensive, and can provide income in addition to their regular crops.”

One farmer who has benefitted from the program is Ibrahim Muwad. He has been working with Jihad al Binna for five years and gets technical advice from the agronomists and pesticides on credit. He has a medium-sized farm, and the technical advice has enabled him to cut his costs greatly. “Before we only had contact with private companies—pesticide merchants—who would advise us to buy more pesticides just so they would get a commission. Now with the fieldworkers of Jihad al Binna I’ve been able to cut costs,” Muwad said.

According to the fieldworkers, there are no government statistics available to help them determine the area’s needs. They design and conduct their own surveys to guide their programs. “In agriculture, change is very slow,” Khansi explains. “It takes time to see results. At the farmers’ level they see results quickly, but on the country level it takes time. Theoretically our center will help about 200,000 people in five years.”

The Jihad al Binna has already helped restaurateur Abdeen M., who has learned to raise his own fish thanks to one of the center’s extension programs. “Before they came we had no help. I am not political, I am just a restaurant owner and I had nothing to do with the Jihad al Binna or Hezbollah,” he said. “But after they came and offered this course, I’ve really benefitted and I appreciate their presence.”

Political Plans for Peace

“Our support has increased beyond just the Muslim Shi’i community to include all others, including Christians,” says Kummaty, who believes that the political openness and interaction with other groups has led to greater acceptance.

When asked about the possibility of Hezbollah actually joining the government in the future, Kummaty said the answer would depend on the proposed composition of such a government and what its policy would be. The party currently refuses to participate in any government that has a policy of negotiating with Israel.

“If the Israelis withdraw in any way—as a result of negotiations or unilaterally—we consider it a victory and a direct result of the armed resistance,” Kummaty says. “Whether or not we will support the government’s decision on a ‘peace agreement’ depends on its contents. If it includes ‘normalization’ we will confront it. If it is for withdrawal, we are satisfied with that.”

JoMarie Fecci is a free-lance photojournalist based in the New York City area.