“Gus Dur” Wins in Cliffhanger Indonesian Presidential Vote; Megawati Sukarnoputri Is Vice President

By John Gee

The ballot papers were opened one by one and each vote was marked up on a board: “Megawati”; “Abdurrahman Wahid”; “Megawati.” Megawati led at first, then the contest became neck-and-neck. But, finally, Abdurrahman Wahid, popularly known as Gus Dur, pulled ahead of Megawati Sukarnoputri, daughter of Indonesia’s first president, the late Ahmed Sukarno, to become Indonesia’s fourth president. The vote was 373 for the victor and 313 for Megawati.

The campaign for the presidency had so many twists and turns that few commentators had dared to predict its outcome. In June, Megawati’s PDI(P) (Indonesian Democratic Party-Struggle) won over 34 percent of the popular vote and 153 of the 462 seats at stake in the Indonesian parliamentary election. Two Muslim parties with which the PDI(P) had a loose alliance—Gus Dur’s National Awakening Party (PKB) and the National Mandate Party (PAN)—won 51 and 35 seats respectively.

It appeared, therefore, that the presidential election by members of the country’s new parliament would be a contest between the incumbent, B.J. Habibie, from the scandal-scarred Golkar party, and Megawati.

With a majority of the elected members of the People’s Consultative Assembly (MPR) behind Megawati, speculation focused on the possibility that Habibie might yet win by marshalling votes from the 38 military nominees and 200 parliament members representing “functional groups” and Indonesian regions who were not popularly elected.

Between June and October, Habibie’s electoral prospects deteriorated. Golkar, his party, stood by him as its candidate, but some leading figures openly spoke of alternatives. As voting day came close, Habibie was hit by a series of hammer blows.

The Bank Bali corruption scandal, involving members of his party, exploded; the referendum in East Timor, which Habibie had proposed, went decisively in favor of independence from Indonesia; and the dropping of the corruption case against discredited former President Suharto, supposedly because of lack of evidence, was an unpopular move.

Another blow came after Habibie named the army chief, General Wiranto, as his vice-presidential running mate, only to have Wiranto reject the nomination two days before the Oct. 20 MPR vote. The general was believed to command 96 votes.

The final blow came early on Oct. 20, when the MPR rejected by 355 votes to 322 Habibie’s report on his 17 months in office. Bowing to the inevitable, Habibie pulled out of the presidential race, leaving members of his party to choose which of his rivals they would support.

Habibie’s losses were not necessarily Megawati’s gains. For months, she rested on her laurels, as if the president’s office was now hers by right and all she needed to do was wait. Her PDI(P) was frequently outmaneuvered in the struggle to secure provincial representatives by more politically experienced Golkar activists, who proved better at building alliances with other parties.

Megawati did little to cultivate support among the Muslim parties, which proved to be the main cause of her undoing. Both Gus Dur’s PKB and PAN decided to cooperate with an 84-seat alliance of seven Muslim parties, dominated by the United Development Party (PPP), formerly seen as loyal supporters of ex-President Suharto. This new Central Axis bloc brought together 170 elected MPR members.

Although the PKB’s official position was one of support for Megawati’s presidential bid, its frail, ailing leader, Abdurrahman Wahid, accepted on Oct. 7 the nomination of seven other Muslim parties to stand for the presidency. Widely respected, he was a formidable candidate, but there were rumors that he was only standing as a tactical move to rally the votes of the Central Axis parties, which he would then seek to commit to Megawati when he withdrew at the 11th hour.

As it turned out, however, his candidacy was serious. He had earlier expressed doubts about Megawati’s ability to handle Indonesia’s problems and her lapses of judgment. (A disproportionate number of PDI-P election candidates, for example, had been Christians. While the proportion was nothing like the 90 percent claimed by some Muslim organizations, this drew a very critical response from Muslim leaders generally.)

The final contest was between two reformist candidates, both determined to put the Suharto era to rest. Abdurrahman Wahid/Gus Dur rallied the great majority of Central Axis votes, but he also benefitted from the support of those who saw their priority as being to stop Megawati. Many Golkar members, for example, saw her as an old adversary of their party and would not back her.

The consequences of the election may be far-reaching. For the first time since it became independent, the country with the biggest Muslim population in the world is headed by a president who has a specifically Muslim political agenda—although definitely of a moderate nature.

Gus Dur has always been something of a bridge-builder. He defended the Chinese community against mob violence during the weeks around Suharto’s downfall and always maintained friendly personal relations with Megawati, jointly campaigning with her in some places.

He may be well-placed to seek a resolution of the conflict in the Aceh region of Sumatra, where a Muslim secessionist movement has considerable popular support, but he will need to conciliate the one in three Indonesians who voted for Megawati’s PDI(P) in June and now feel cheated of victory.

He made a first step toward doing so by supporting her candidacy for the post of vice president. Thus a day of rage following the presidential vote in which Megawati supporters rampaged through the streets of Djakarta protesting Gus Dur’s betrayal of their leader was followed by jubilation in Djakarta, Bali and other areas where her support is strong when Megawati easily won the vice presidency.

Given Gus Dur’s feeble health (he is nearly blind and, crippled by strokes, had to be assisted to the stage to accept the presidency), Megawati Sukarnoputri’s election to the vice presidency was far more than a mere consolation prize. She could become president by an act of God.

Meanwhile, the new president has good connections with the Arab world: he has a degree in higher Islamic and Arab studies from Al Azhar University, Cairo and also studied in the arts faculty of Baghdad University.

However, he is not averse to contacts with Israel. He was a member of an Indonesian academic delegation sponsored by the Hebrew University of Jerusalem in 1994. Gus Dur sees the development of relations with Israel as being linked to progress toward a comprehensive peace settlement in the Middle East, a stand which, in the past, led to Muslim extremists labeling him a “Mossad agent.”

In all the excitement over the presidential election, the MPR’s vote to accept East Timor’s separation from Indonesia attracted little attention. But it does mean that Gus Dur will begin his presidency without that particular albatross around his neck.

Singaporean Role in Building New Aden Container Terminal

The port of Aden first attained international importance in the 19th century as a coaling station for vessels on their way to and from the Suez Canal. Changes in shipping technology, the closure of the canal for seven years after the June 1967 war, and the Cold War political troubles of the Soviet-leaning former People’s Democratic Republic of Yemen (PDRY) all had a negative impact on the port. Since unification of the two Yemens in 1990, the revival of Aden’s fortunes has been regarded as one of the Republic of Yemen’s most important challenges.

Aden Container Terminal was officially opened on Sept. 11 by Yemeni President Ali Abdullah Saleh—although it had actually started operations in March. It is being constructed in three phases. In the completed first phase, a 700-meter quay berth was built, with a draught of 16 meters, allowing the world’s largest container ships to use the terminal. Four ship-to-shore gantry cranes will be able to handle vessels of up to 18 container rows across. On completion, the terminal will be more than double its present size and able to handle 1.5 million containers annually. It is hoped that Aden can be turned into the major transhipment hub for the region.

The construction of the container terminal is the fruit of a “South-South” partnership. The developer is Yemen Investment and Development International Ltd., a joint venture of Yemeni Holdings Limited, owned by the Saudi Arabia-based Bin Mahfouz Group, and PSA Corporation of Singapore. This is one of the biggest overseas projects in which PSA has been involved. It was awarded the engineering contract for the terminal in 1997 and will be responsible for managing and operating it for the next 20 years.

A Meeting, Yes: Historic, No

When ruling parties prepare for a general election, they normally try to avoid giving their opponents new sticks with which to beat them. It was therefore surprising that the Malaysian government did not anticipate what would happen when its foreign minister, Syed Hamid Albar, agreed to meet his Israeli counterpart, David Levy.

The two ministers were visiting the United Nations in New York at the same time. “Americans from outside the Clinton administration” were reported to have arranged that they should meet on Sept. 26. Next day, the Israeli press described the encounter as an “historic meeting,” the first one “officially” to take place between the two states. The Malaysian foreign minister was reported to have told Levy that Malaysian Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamed had sent a congratulatory message to Ehud Barak on his electoral victory in May.

When questioned by Malaysian journalists, Syed Hamid Albar sought to play down the significance of the encounter. He said that the meeting was informal and that Malaysian leaders and diplomats at the U.N. “often meet from time to time with fellow leaders and diplomats from a host of countries, including Israel, during the U.N. assemblies.” During such informal meetings, he said, they took the opportunity “to explain the reason for not having diplomatic ties, and to urge the Tel Aviv regime to implement its peace accord with Palestine.”

His words did nothing to head off an attack by the Islamist PAS (Islamic Party), the strongest opposition organization in Malaysia. A spokesman expressed “shock and regret” at the meeting, saying that it “disgraced Muslims and Malaysians.” His prepared statement declared, “PAS fears the move by the National Front government is part of a series of efforts to recognize this terrorist country.”

The PAS’s attacks induced Foreign Minister Syed Hamid to present a restatement of his government’s official position. He said that he had told Levy that Malaysia insisted on Israel’s need to comply with U.N. resolutions on Palestine and that Israel could not expect his government to change its position toward it unless this happened. The meeting, he said, did not amount to recognition of Israel or establishing diplomatic relations with it.

It was only because the story of the meeting at the U.N. was published in the Israeli press that it ended up being made public in Malaysia. Syed Hamid Albar had thought that he was agreeing to a low-key informal meeting which would not be publicized. Most Muslims in Malaysia, like most Muslims everywhere, feel strongly about the Palestine question and are very critical of Israel, even if they do not express themselves with the vehemence which often characterizes PAS statements on the subject.

On Oct. 17, Yasser Arafat and a 10- member Palestininian delegation visited Malaysia and met Dr. Mahathir for an hour. Later, Syed Hamid Albar told a news conference that Arafat had welcomed his meeting with David Levy, saying that it was good for Malaysia to put its views “directly, face to face with Israel’s ministers.” Yeah, right.

John Gee is a free-lance journalist based in Singapore and the author of Unequal Conflict: Israel and the Palestinians, available through the AET Book Club.