As Prospects for Regional Political Settlements Fade, Israel Still Party to Valuable Water-Sharing Pacts

By Mohammed Al-Kattan

As the period of hopeful negotiations between Israel on the one hand and the Palestinians and other Arabs on the other draws to an end, seemingly without lasting political results, the Islamic states would do well to look again. The Israeli government used the period to negotiate water-sharing agreements with far-reaching consequences.

In fact, future historians may conclude that the region’s water scarcity is the issue that most influenced Middle Eastern history in the final decade of the 20th century. This water scarcity is due to four factors: the region’s low precipitation rate of 250 to 400 millimeters (15.75 inches) per annum, with the exception of the mountains of Lebanon and the Maghreb¹; an extraordinarily rapid population growth rate; the increased demands of agriculture and agricultural production; and active industrialization programs.

In the late 1970s and early 1980s, Arab states began to set their economic development plans for the 21st century. In the process, they came face to face with the water scarcity crisis. The outcome of the crisis was an upsurge and acceleration of strategic water alliances in the Middle East, as well as aggressive campaigns designed to educate the populace on efficient ways to reduce consumption of this scarce resource.

The water alliances which were developed include: the Egypt-Israel North Sinai Agricultural Development Project (NSADP); the Southeast Anatolia Development Project (GAP); the Syria-Iraq reaction against the effects of the GAP; and the proposed Turkey-Israel “Peace Pipeline.” Such alliances, three of them involving or potentially involving Israel, have altered the balance of power and increased the already serious political tensions in the region. The results indicate that water is likely to be the catalyst for the next crisis in the Middle East.

The NSADP is a $1.5 billion land reclamation project whose objective is to divert a portion of Nile River water to the Sinai Peninsula, east and west of the Suez Canal, for agricultural development (Nile water will be pumped through three pipelines under the Suez Canal). In the final phase, the project will deliver water to El Arish, a city located 25 miles (40 kilometers) from the Gaza Strip border. In addition, credible rumors suggest that the NSADP will eventually connect with the National Israeli Water Carrier.

Historically, Zionists have been interested in the possibility of diverting Nile water to Palestine. At the turn of the century, Theodor Herzl, the founder of Zionism, commissioned a study on the feasibility of this plan.

Historically, Zionists have been interested in diverting Nile water to Palestine.

Later, Dr. Elisha Kally, former head of the Israeli water-planning agency, stated, “The Nile is the preferred foreign source for supplying the Gaza Strip with water because of physical and political reasons.”² Shortly afterward, former Egyptian President Anwar Sadat informed the Israeli public that he would divert a portion of the Nile water to the Negev. In a letter to Prime Minister Menachem Begin, President Sadat stated:

“As we embark on the comprehensive resolution of the Palestine issue, we shall make these waters a contribution from the Egyptian people and in the name of the hundred millions of Muslims, a monument to the peace accord. The Nile waters will become Zamzam wells to all believers.”³

The ultimate goal of the NSADP, according to Dr. Kally, is to exchange “Egyptian water to the Israeli Negev in return for the Sea of Galilee water to the West Bank.”⁴

There are many potential repercussions, however, for other users of Nile waters, especially for Sudan and Ethiopia. There also is a two-fold geopolitical danger for the Arab word: first, Israel may hold West Bank waters hostage for an increase in the Gaza water supply. In the future, Israel may also claim the right of a downstream user to increase its share of Nile River water. The U.N., through the Convention on the Law of Non-Navigational Use of International Watercourses, has given downstream users priority over those countries upstream.

The second strategic water alliance which is geopolitically shaping the region is Turkey’s Southeast Anatolia Development Project (GAP), which is restructuring the course of the Euphrates River and thereby severely diminishing water quantity and quality to both Syria and Iraq. Syria and Iraq have opposed, both at the regional and the international levels, the GAP project, which is to conclude in 2010.

The “Peace Pipeline”

In response to Syria and Iraq’s criticism, Turkey launched the “Peace Pipeline,” which would divert a large percentage of the Ceyhan and Seyhan rivers to Syria, Lebanon, Jordan, Iraq and Saudi Arabia, as well as Israel, for a fee. However, this still leaves Syria and Iraq dissatisfied, since they would be required to pay for pipeline water in place of Euphrates River water to which they used to have unlimited free access.

With the recent changes in the Turkish government, the ambitious “Peace Pipeline” has been amended to conclude at the Sea of Galilee, rather than continue down through Iraq, the Persian Gulf and Saudi Arabia. The revised “Peace Pipeline” has been dubbed the “Mini-Peace Pipeline.” This proposal continues to produce criticism from Syria and Iraq for the same reasons mentioned above.

In the final analysis, such strategic water alliances favor Israel. In order for Israel to continue its level of economic development, it must increase its access to water. It is achieving this through the NSADP, the Peace Pipeline and the Mini-Peace Pipeline.

With the U.N.’s May 21, 1997 adoption of the Convention on the Law of Non-Navigational Use of International Watercourse, Israel is identified as a downstream country in all of the above scenarios. In the future, therefore, Israel will be able to demand and receive a larger portion of the water.

As a result, countries such as Syria, Iraq, Jordan, the West Bank, Sudan, and Ethiopia will be at a disadvantage, since they fall within the middle of the water route. In addition, countries such as Egypt and Turkey will lose credibility in the region since they have abandoned the interests of Arab Islamic states for their own individual interests.

FOOTNOTES

1 Anderson, Ewan W., “Water: the Next Strategic Resource,” The Politics of Scarcity: Water in the Middle East , Starr, Joyce R. and Stoll, Daniel C. eds., Boulder, Westview Press, 1988, p. 1.

2 Bleier, Ronald, “Will Nile Waters go to Israel? North Sinai Pipelines and the Politics of Scarcity,” Middle East Policy , September 1997, p. 116.

3 Ibid., p.116-117.

4 Kally, Elisha, Water and Peace, Westport, Praeger, 1993, p. 105.

Mohammad AL-Kattan is a Washington, DC-based scholar on Middle East affairs.