Washington Report on Middle East Affairs, December 1998, pages 29, 98

Special Report

Bosnian Elections Did Nothing to Repatriate Refugees Displaced by “Ethnic Cleansing”

By Peter Lippman

September’s general elections in Bosnia to choose the parliaments of the two Bosnian “entities,” the Republika Srpska and the Muslim-Croat Federation, took place in an atmosphere of reduced tension, with no major incidents. A new president of the Republika Srpska was elected, as was the three-member presidency of Bosnia.

A dazzling 83 parties, coalitions, alliances and independents competed in the elections, and voter turnout was over 70 percent. Can the completion of this electoral round be considered a victory in the democratization of Bosnia?

The answer, as usual, depends on one’s definition of democracy. If democracy allows for a “single-ethnicity pluralism” such as exists in much of Bosnia today, then democracy is flourishing. But if confirmation of the ethnic homogenization that took place during the war is not a democratic act, then Bosnia has a long way to go.

During the 1992-1995 war two million people, or half of Bosnia’s population, were displaced or became refugees. While the number of those who have returned from other countries since early 1996 approaches half a million, hundreds of thousands of Muslims and Croats wait in refugee centers and abandoned apartments to return to their old homes in the Republika Srpska (RS). Return takes place only in fits and starts, and thousands of discouraged people are giving up and emigrating overseas.

The war resulted in the creation of three more or less ethnically homogenized territories. Bosnia was carved into a Serb entity (the Republika Srpska) and a Federation that is partially controlled by Croats, and partially by Muslims. The Dayton peace agreement ratified this arrangement, while calling for the return of refugees and displaced persons to their homes on either side of the inter-entity borderline. Thus, ideally, Bosnia would one day return to its former status of an ethnically mixed country, albeit with two entities.

The obstacles to implementation of refugee return have been formidable. Arrest of indicted war criminals in the Serbian- and Croat-controlled areas has been leisurely, leaving many of those directly responsible for ethnic cleansing still in power. Three strongly nationalist governments reign in their respective territories and, to varying degrees, discourage the return of minorities to their former homes.

Significant refugee return throughout the country would recreate a widespread multiethnic voter base. The question is how to overcome the obstacles to return. Voting the nationalists out of power is the most gentle, civilized option.

In the period between the end of the war and September’s elections, the highest executive organ of Bosnia, the three-member presidency, was a stalled, nearly useless body. Consisting of a Serb, a Croat and a Muslim member, the presidency was blocked in many functions by the hard-line Serb nationalist Momcilo Krajisnik, long-time associate of indicted war-criminal Radovan Karadzic.

During the same time, politicians in the Republika Srpska (RS) gradually switched from an extreme nationalist, obstructionist approach to a softer, apparently more moderate one. A turning point was the election of Milorad Dodik as prime minister of the entity, at the beginning of this year. From that point on, RS politicians quickly became adherents of the “moderate” position, in which they swore by the implementation of Dayton and cooperation with the West.

In response to this development, the international community lifted its near-blockade on donations to the Republika Srpska, and the dollars began flowing. The tense atmosphere between the two entities loosened up considerably. Freedom of movement increased, particularly in the northern half of the RS. However, in spite of Dodik’s promise to allow the return of 70,000 (out of several hundred thousand) Muslims displaced from the RS, fewer than 5,000 have been allowed to go home. But the West continued to place its greatest hopes on Dodik and the incumbent president of the RS, Biljana Plavsic.

The 1998 election campaign took place on two levels. The obvious level was the political one, with campaign posters, speeches, and literature recounting the virtues of the respective parties and their candidates. The other level was an unofficial “campaign of incidents” designed to sway people by means of violence and intimidation.

The official election campaign opened at the end of July. But the campaign for the hearts of Bosnians began much earlier. The “incidents” included attacks on the homes of returning refugees and assaults on opposition activists. Many varieties of low-intensity terror were employed to maintain a climate of fear, in which potential voters would adhere blindly to the nationalist solution.

In April Croats rioted in Drvar, a western Bosnian town, which had been 97 percent Serb before the war. Returning Serbs were attacked and the Serb mayor-elect was put in the hospital. During the same month a group of displaced Croats returned to the Republika Srpska town of Derventa to hold a St. George’s Day mass in their ruined cathedral. Serbs surrounded the church, prevented celebration of the mass, and tried to torch the building again.

On the opening day of the official campaign, five houses of returning Muslims were bombed in the Herzegovinan town of Stolac, in an area controlled by Croats. Around the same time a Catholic church was bombed in Kakanj, a central Bosnian town controlled by Muslims. These are just a few of dozens of ethnic-based attacks that have become a regular part of the news.

In many of these cases local police have been involved, sometimes not even bothering to conceal their official status. The resulting tension underscores the fact that while the war is nearly three years finished, the peace has yet to begin. The prevailing atmosphere is not conducive to the calm rationality necessary for a democratic electoral process.

The elections produced mixed results. The percentage of progressive, non-nationalist delegates to the parliaments has increased, though they have not acquired a majority. Krajisnik was removed from the presidency, replaced by the more moderate Zivko Radisic. The great shock was the election of Nikola Poplasen of the Serb Radical Party to the position of president of the Republika Srpska, removing Ms. Plavsic from office.

The Serb Radical Party is the affiliate of a party of the same name in Serbia, headed by the notorious Vojislav Seselj. Both Seselj and Poplasen participated in vicious ethnic cleansing activities in the Bosnian war. In his office in Banja Luka, Mr. Poplasen keeps a large photograph of himself in full “chetnik” regalia, with a skull-and-crossbones insignia and a large knife in his belt. He has stated that Dayton is a “pause between two wars,” and that he never would have signed it himself.

Poplasen’s victory could signal the defeat of the “moderate” type of politics in the Republika Srpska, as represented by Plavsic and Dodik. Poplasen will appoint a new prime minister who could very well be rejected by the less hard-line RS parliament. If this happens, the RS government could be stalled, a situation which would not bother the more extreme nationalist elements in the Serb entity.

The Bosnian presidency, on the other hand, appears to be entering an era of greater cooperation. If the inaugural meeting of Chairman Zivko Radisic, Muslim member Alija Izetbegovic, and Croat member Ante Jelavic was any indication, soon all will be sweetness and light in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Chairman Radisic said that Bosnia has entered into a new phase of implementation of Dayton, stabilization of peace, and strengthening of democracy. Mr. Jelavic stated that the presidency “will work for peace, tolerance, and cooperation.” He promised consistent implementation of Dayton, especially Annex 7, which provides for the return of refugees to their homes.

These are all beautiful words, and they have been eagerly affirmed by U.S. envoy to the Balkans Robert Gelbard, who announced after the elections that Bosnia is moving toward democracy. But soon after the elections, at the beginning of October, displaced Muslims returning to the Herzegovinan area of Capljina were attacked by Croats, and one was killed. This area is under the control of the HDZ (Croat Democratic Union), Jelavic’s party and the ruling power in the areas of the Federation under Croat control. Annex 7 has a long way to go in Herzegovina, the Republika Srpska, and for that matter, most of the area under Muslim control.

As for Poplasen, there is not much that the international community can do about him for the time being. Gelbard valiantly declares that they are watching him closely, and that he will be removed “upon his first mistake.” But the people of the Republika Srpska have spoken, and fear and hatred were their guides in selecting Poplasen, if not all their other representatives.

What will it take to create democracy in Bosnia? Arrest of the indicted war criminals, some of whom still hold considerable power, should be expedited. In addition to this, a lesson can be taken from the recent elections. If Bosnians continue to vote as Serbs, Croats, and Muslims rather than as Bosnians, they will elect nationalist politicians.

The international community has the power to change the rules of the Bosnian elections so that no official can be elected purely on the strength of an ethnic vote. It should use this power to require that in the future, candidates must receive a minimum percentage of votes from each ethnicity. This will go a long way toward putting officials in place who work for a united, democratic Bosnia.