Washington Report on Middle East Affairs, December 1997, Page 116.

Book Review

Egypt's Road to Jerusalem: A Diplomat's Story of the Struggle for Peace in the Middle East

By Boutros Boutros-Ghali, Random House, New York, 1997, 366 pages, List: $27.50, AET: $20

Reviewed by Shawn L. Twing

Egypt's Road To Jerusalem is an insider's view of the first Arab-Israeli "peace process" from the perspective of a participant in those historic negotiations. Written by Boutros Boutros-Ghali, who later became secretary-general of the United Nations, it begins with Egyptian President Anwar Sadat's decision in October 1977 to deliver a speech before the Israeli Knesset in Jerusalem. Sadat's controversial initiative started Egypt's rapprochement with Israel that culminated eventually with the signing of the first Arab-Israeli peace agreement—the Camp David accords. Egypt's Road to Jerusalem continues through the tumultuous four years that followed Sadat's speech, ending with his assassination on Oct. 6, 1981 by Egyptian militants opposed to Arab-Israeli peace.

From an academic post at Cairo University, Boutros-Ghali entered the maelstrom of international politics as a minister of state just prior to the most difficult period of international diplomacy in the history of modern Egypt. Based on more than a thousand diary pages written by Boutros-Ghali during the four years that followed, Egypt's Road to Jerusalem sheds light on Sadat's motives for the Camp David accords and illustrates the way in which international reaction to Camp David from the Arab world, members of the Non-Aligned Movement, the Western powers and the Soviet Union complicated Egyptian-Israeli peace efforts. It also provides valuable insights into Israel's negotiating tactics with the Arabs as relevant today as they were during the Camp David negotiations.

Sadat's motives for negotiating with Israel are clear from Boutros-Ghali's descriptions of numerous encounters with the Egyptian president. Sadat wanted Sinai returned to Egypt. His concern for Palestinian rights in the West Bank and Gaza, at the time occupied by Israel for a decade, was clearly secondary. By entering into negotiations with Israel to fulfil his primary objective, Sadat broke ranks with the Arab League policy forbidding bilateral negotiations with Israel and set the stage for an Egyptian crisis with the Arab world.

In Sadat's opinion, however, none of that mattered. Following a briefing by an exasperated Boutros-Ghali, Sadat opined: "I do not wish to underestimate the magnitude of the problems and the worries that Egyptian diplomacy is facing. But all these problems and the worries pale in comparison with this land we have regained. They are not worth one square meter of this land, which we have regained without spilling the blood of my children. Boutros, I don't want to belittle the efforts you are making, but I assure you that a square meter of this Egyptian land is far more important than your diplomatic difficulties. I am not afraid of condemnations. I am not afraid of countries severing diplomatic relations with us. And I am not afraid of the provocation and trivia of the Arab countries" (pg. 282). After hearing President Sadat's remarks the ever-skeptical Boutros-Ghali admitted that "when the meeting was over, I was fully convinced by Sadat's argument [that] the political isolation would end after a while, but the regained land would remain forever ours" (pg. 282).

Egypt's negotiations with Israel, however, did not progress rapidly or easily. Boutros-Ghali describes several difficult rounds of negotiations in Egypt, Israel and the United States. During each session it was clear that only Sadat and Israeli Prime Minister Menachem Begin had real authority to make decisions. Secondary actors, like Boutros-Ghali, were confined to the periphery and their role was limited to advising their respective leaders. And on the Egyptian side, Boutros-Ghali shows that their influence on Sadat was limited.

Further complicating Egyptian-Israeli negotiations was Israel's strategy of indefinite stalling on certain issues, particularly those related to Palestinian self-determination. Since the Camp David framework required that discussions take place on these problems, Israel followed the letter of the agreements requiring negotiations, but without any intention that they accomplish anything.

International pressure also was a significant factor in Egyptian-Israeli negotiations. Much of Egypt's Road to Jerusalem is devoted to Boutros-Ghali's diplomatic visits to African, European and Latin American capitals to try to garner support for the Egyptian peace initiative, or in many cases to try and head off diplomatic initiatives by Arab and African countries aimed at isolating Egypt. During his detailed accounts of these visits, Boutros-Ghali offers valuable and sometimes comical insights into international diplomacy.

After a visit to Burundi during a tour of African countries prior to a meeting of the Organization of African Unity (OAU), Boutros-Ghali notes: "I was learning that all over the world the concern for protocol is in inverse proportion to the power of a country" (p. 94).

Demonstrating his verbal acuity and sense of humor at an OAU meeting where several members were trying to get Egypt suspended, Boutros-Ghali responded to a harsh attack from the Algerian representative: "Algeria wants to fight Israel to the last Egyptian soldier...The zeal of the Algerian brothers toward the Palestinian question is in proportion to the distance that separates Algeria from Israel. The farther away...the greater the zeal" (p. 246).

Following a diplomatic trip to Argentina that included a visit with playwright Arthur Miller and his photographer wife Inge Morath, Boutros-Ghali poked gentle fun at his chosen field of diplomacy, saying, "It was pleasant to return to the kind of intellectual atmosphere I had abandoned for foreign affairs" (p. 334).

Egypt's Road to Jerusalem is an important book for many reasons. As an historical narrative from one Egyptian perspective, it illuminates a great deal about Anwar Sadat's unprecedented initiative in making peace with Israel. Particularly useful to historians is the ongoing dialogue between Sadat and Boutros-Ghali meticulously recorded by the book's author. It also remains timely given recent events in the Middle East and in the United States.

In the Middle East, Israeli intransigence, provocations and unilateral actions seemed aimed at dismantling the fragile Palestinian-Israeli peace process, while the response from Palestinian militants only makes a terrible situation worse. And in the United States, Congress has exacerbated these tensions with misguided and provocative legislation that makes it difficult for any Arab country to negotiate with Israel, and impossible to regard the United States as an "honest broker." All parties involved in these ongoing negotiations would benefit from a careful reading of Egypt's Road to Jerusalem, particularly those interested in what it would take to create a just and lasting peace in the Middle East.