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Washington Report on Middle East Affairs, December 1997, Pages 28, 132

Defense & Intelligence

Lack of Regional Military Balance Motivates Clandestine Iranian Medium-Range Missile Program

By Shawn L. Twing

"All military art then changes itself into mere prudence, the principal object of which will be to prevent the trembling balance from suddenly turning to our disadvantage, and the half war from changing into a complete one."

—Carl Von Clausewitz, On War (1911).

Five Russian defense and aerospace firms, including Russia's space agency, are helping Iran develop a medium-range ballistic missile capable of carrying conventional and unconventional warheads in excess of 1,200 miles by 1999, according to Israeli intelligence reports which have been confirmed in large part by the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency. The Israelis charge that for the past 18 months the Russians, along with one Chinese company, have been aiding in the development of Iran's medium-range Shahab-3, and may be aiding Iran in developing the long-range Shahab-4 that could target much of Europe, and possibly the eastern United States.

Israel, therefore, is using its considerable influence in Washington to persuade the United States to suspend economic aid to Russia if the alleged cooperation continues. In response, during his Sept. 22-24 meetings in Moscow with Russian Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin, U.S. Vice President Al Gore urged Russia to halt any support for Iranian missile development. Chernomyrdin replied, as have Russian officials periodically since similar allegations surfaced nearly two years ago, by denying that Russia provides assistance to Iran's missile programs, despite overwhelming evidence to the contrary.

Aside from the obvious importance of Iranian missile proliferation to the United States and its allies in the Middle East and elsewhere, there are four other areas of critical importance that have been almost entirely overlooked by the mainstream American press. These include the effect of Israel's military superiority on Iran's own sense of national security, recent diplomatic overtures by Israel toward Iran, Israel's reaction to Russia and China in the wake of these allegations, and the way in which the lack of military and diplomatic balance in the region is driving an arms race that threatens to spiral out of control.

Israel's conventional military superiority in the Middle East is unquestioned, and the maintenance of Israel's "qualitative military edge" over any combination of its potential adversaries has been a cornerstone of U.S. Middle East policy for more than a decade. Of crucial concern to Iran is Israel's demonstrated ability to conduct long-range bombing attacks with advanced American aircraft. Highlighting that capability was Israel's 1981 attack on Iraq's Osiraq nuclear reactor (located less than 100 miles from the Iranian border) that demonstrated beyond a doubt that Israel can, and will, attack its neighbors if it feels threatened.

Israel can, and will, attack its neighbors if it feels threatened.

Iranian worries were triggered by repeated Israeli warnings that it may soon attack Iran's nuclear complex in Bushehr. Despite assurances by the International Atomic Energy Agency, the U.N. body that inspects declared nuclear facilities worldwide, that Iran's $800 million nuclear complex is designed for civilian energy use, Israel has sought to convince the United States, and through it Iran's neighbors, that Iran may be using Bushehr to develop nuclear weapons. For their part, however, Russian officials point out that U.S. opposition to the facility, which employs an estimated 9,000 Russians in Bushehr, is hypocritical. The United States has helped North Korea build an almost identical nuclear reactor despite ongoing tensions on the Korean peninsula. Both reactors are capable of producing weapons-grade missile materials.

Israel's growing military arsenal, particularly its mix of advanced F-15 and F-16 strike aircraft armed with precision munitions, combined with aerial refueling capabilities, adds weight to Israel's threat to strike Bushehr. Although there would be substantial difficulties to overcome, far greater than those encountered when Israel bombed Osiraq, an Israeli military strike against Bushehr is possible.

On the other hand, Iranian threats of retaliation are hollow so long as Iran lacks an adequate missile delivery system. Iran cannot strike back at Israel with its aging and obsolete aircraft, armed with equally obsolete weaponry. Therefore, in current military parlance, the attempted development of ballistic missiles by Iran capable of hitting targets in Israel is Iran's asymmetrical response to Israel's military superiority. Because Iran is barred (by the U.S. embargo) from engaging in a conventional military arms race with Israel, it has responded with its only viable alternative.

A Clandestine Relationship

An extraordinary aspect of this quiet but intense arms race between Israel and Iran is the clandestine relationship between the Jewish state and the Islamic Republic of Iran. While encouraging the United States to take the hardest line possible with the Iranian government, Israel itself has opened a secret dialog with strategically placed Iranians.

Israel's Jerusalem Post reported Sept. 20 that "Iran and Israel are forging contacts in a secret effort to resolve military tensions and settle Israel's debt of $1 billion to Tehran." The article goes on to describe Israeli efforts to initiate contacts with Iran, and attempts at mediation between the two governments by Kazakhstan's oil minister, Nurlen Balgimbaev (who has excellent ties with Tehran and was approached by Israeli officials during a December 1996 medical visit to Israel). The Post also outlined joint meetings between Iranian and Israeli academics, and the possible repayment of Israel's debt to Iran through private investment and the creation of civilian infrastructure projects.

Israel's obvious eagerness to negotiate with Iran, while simultaneously insisting that the United States wage a virtual diplomatic war against the Islamic republic, is frustrating to U.S. diplomats. It is occurring as U.S. policymakers openly complain that American policy toward Iran is misguided and ineffective, particularly U.S. secondary sanctions against foreign companies investing more than $20 million in Iran's oil and gas industries.

That effort, one-half of the Clinton administration's "dual containment" policy aimed at Iran and Iraq, is led in large part by New York Republican Senator Alfonse D'Amato, and is openly referred to within the executive branch as a creation of the American Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC), Israel's powerful Washington, DC lobby.

Israel's insistence on a tough and unyielding U.S. stance against Iran is understandable given Israel's national security interests. Israel's insistence, however, that the United States not negotiate at all with Iran, while Israel does, is duplicitous, at best.

Another significant aspect of current Russian-Chinese-Iranian missile development has been Israel's own reaction to the countries allegedly aiding its mortal enemy. Despite the Netanyahu government's announcement that it would suspend Israeli commercial contacts with Russia until firm action was taken to prevent further Russian assistance to Iran's missile programs, Israeli officials were quick to point out that this does not include Russian-Israeli military cooperation. Earlier this year Russia and Israel teamed up to provide (ironically) China with a $1 billion airborne early warning system similar to the AWACS system used by the United States. This, and numerous other examples of Russian-Israeli military cooperation in research, development and production remain unaffected by Prime Minister Netanyahu's suspension of trade.

Also adding a considerable degree of irony is China's alleged role in aiding Iran's development of missiles capable of hitting targets in Israel. In the past, and presumably at present, there has been extensive Israeli cooperation with China's military industries, including a substantial and growing body of evidence of illicit transfers of sophisticated American technology to China.

During a Feb. 22, 1996 hearing before the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence entitled "Current and Projected National Security Threats to the United States and its Interests Abroad," the Senate asked the following questions: "Does the China-Israel relationship include the sharing of technology related to weapons of mass destruction and missile technology? Does the China-Israel relationship raise concerns that U.S. state-of-the-art technology provided to Israel may be transferred to China through Israel?"

The U.S. intelligence community responded with a prepared statement that read: "In December 1991, a former Chinese senior missile scientist claimed that 'Israel sold the PRC [People's Republic of China] cruise missile technology and was of great help in developing the Chinese ballistic missile program.' The information, though not yet confirmed, was revealed at an international symposium on arms proliferation held at the University of Wisconsin. In addition, the U.S. government has alleged publicly that Israel has transferred missile weapons systems to China containing U.S. technology. Among the systems cited were the Patriot and Python missiles."

If China is aiding Iran's drive to produce medium-range ballistic missiles, it appears that, as has happened in the past, Israel's willingness to sell arms to virtually anyone has come back to haunt it and that it is looking to the United States to solve a problem of Israeli making.

In fact, it is the current balance of power in the Middle East which is tilted dramatically in Israel's favor, and the political instability resulting from Israeli Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu's refusal to continue with the Oslo agreements's land-for-peace solution to the Arab-Israeli conflict, that is fueling an arms race in the region. The most important lesson of the Cold War was that a relatively even balance of power (or balance of terror as some called it) helped prevent conflict because each side knew that aggression against the other could result in a devastating response. The end game of that theory culminated in mutually assured destruction (MAD), where both the former Soviet Union and the United States were forced to refrain from direct military confrontation with one another.

Israel's position as the sole regional military superpower proves this theory. Without a serious counter-balancing power in the region, Israeli governments do not feel the overwhelming restraint that comes from the fear of military counterattack. Israel's military strength, combined with its protection from international diplomatic isolation because of the tremendous influence it has in the United States, has made Israeli leaders willing to bear the relatively low costs of military adventurism.

Without access to high-technology conventional weapons, and without the means to pay for them if they were to become available, Iran has opted for a relatively low-cost solution to Israel's regional military dominance. For Iran, medium-range ballistic missiles, particularly nuclear-armed missiles, will be the great equalizer in the balance of power in the Middle East and will provide Iran's "ace in the hole" to forestall a long-range Israeli attack against the Islamic republic. By raising the costs of such an Israeli military action against Iran to an unacceptably high level, Iran believes it is building a substantial deterrent to Israeli military action.

It is difficult for Americans to accept this rationale for Iran's military buildup because of U.S. animosity dating back to Iran's 1979 seizure of the U.S. embassy staff in Tehran. Nevertheless, Americans must recognize that the U.S. commitment to sustain Israel as a regional military superpower, regardless of the quarrels it picks with its regional neighbors, is having the unintended consequence of making the region extremely hazardous not only for all who live there, but also for the thousands of U.S. government civilians and military personnel in the region, and the tens of thousands of U.S. technicians, educators, and businesspeople employed there. Until a meaningful balance of power is restored in the region, making the costs of military aggression too high for all parties involved, widespread proliferation, like Iran's Shahab missile programs, will remain a central and permanent feature of Middle Eastern instability.


Shawn L. Twing is the news editor of the Washington Report on Middle East Affairs.