Washington Report on Middle East Affairs, December
1997, Pages 28, 132
Defense & Intelligence
Lack of Regional Military Balance Motivates Clandestine
Iranian Medium-Range Missile Program
By Shawn L. Twing
"All military art then changes itself into
mere prudence, the principal object of which will be to prevent
the trembling balance from suddenly turning to our disadvantage,
and the half war from changing into a complete one."
—Carl Von Clausewitz, On War (1911).
Five Russian defense and aerospace firms, including
Russia's space agency, are helping Iran develop a medium-range ballistic
missile capable of carrying conventional and unconventional warheads
in excess of 1,200 miles by 1999, according to Israeli intelligence
reports which have been confirmed in large part by the U.S. Central
Intelligence Agency. The Israelis charge that for the past 18 months
the Russians, along with one Chinese company, have been aiding in
the development of Iran's medium-range Shahab-3, and may be aiding
Iran in developing the long-range Shahab-4 that could target much
of Europe, and possibly the eastern United States.
Israel, therefore, is using its considerable influence
in Washington to persuade the United States to suspend economic
aid to Russia if the alleged cooperation continues. In response,
during his Sept. 22-24 meetings in Moscow with Russian Prime Minister
Viktor Chernomyrdin, U.S. Vice President Al Gore urged Russia to
halt any support for Iranian missile development. Chernomyrdin replied,
as have Russian officials periodically since similar allegations
surfaced nearly two years ago, by denying that Russia provides assistance
to Iran's missile programs, despite overwhelming evidence to the
contrary.
Aside from the obvious importance of Iranian missile
proliferation to the United States and its allies in the Middle
East and elsewhere, there are four other areas of critical importance
that have been almost entirely overlooked by the mainstream American
press. These include the effect of Israel's military superiority
on Iran's own sense of national security, recent diplomatic overtures
by Israel toward Iran, Israel's reaction to Russia and China in
the wake of these allegations, and the way in which the lack of
military and diplomatic balance in the region is driving an arms
race that threatens to spiral out of control.
Israel's conventional military superiority in the
Middle East is unquestioned, and the maintenance of Israel's "qualitative
military edge" over any combination of its potential adversaries
has been a cornerstone of U.S. Middle East policy for more than
a decade. Of crucial concern to Iran is Israel's demonstrated ability
to conduct long-range bombing attacks with advanced American aircraft.
Highlighting that capability was Israel's 1981 attack on Iraq's
Osiraq nuclear reactor (located less than 100 miles from the Iranian
border) that demonstrated beyond a doubt that Israel can, and will,
attack its neighbors if it feels threatened.
Israel can, and will, attack its neighbors if it feels
threatened.
Iranian worries were triggered by repeated Israeli
warnings that it may soon attack Iran's nuclear complex in Bushehr.
Despite assurances by the International Atomic Energy Agency, the
U.N. body that inspects declared nuclear facilities worldwide, that
Iran's $800 million nuclear complex is designed for civilian energy
use, Israel has sought to convince the United States, and through
it Iran's neighbors, that Iran may be using Bushehr to develop nuclear
weapons. For their part, however, Russian officials point out that
U.S. opposition to the facility, which employs an estimated 9,000
Russians in Bushehr, is hypocritical. The United States has helped
North Korea build an almost identical nuclear reactor despite ongoing
tensions on the Korean peninsula. Both reactors are capable of producing
weapons-grade missile materials.
Israel's growing military arsenal, particularly its
mix of advanced F-15 and F-16 strike aircraft armed with precision
munitions, combined with aerial refueling capabilities, adds weight
to Israel's threat to strike Bushehr. Although there would be substantial
difficulties to overcome, far greater than those encountered when
Israel bombed Osiraq, an Israeli military strike against Bushehr
is possible.
On the other hand, Iranian threats of retaliation
are hollow so long as Iran lacks an adequate missile delivery system.
Iran cannot strike back at Israel with its aging and obsolete aircraft,
armed with equally obsolete weaponry. Therefore, in current military
parlance, the attempted development of ballistic missiles by Iran
capable of hitting targets in Israel is Iran's asymmetrical response
to Israel's military superiority. Because Iran is barred (by the
U.S. embargo) from engaging in a conventional military arms race
with Israel, it has responded with its only viable alternative.
A Clandestine Relationship
An extraordinary aspect of this quiet but intense
arms race between Israel and Iran is the clandestine relationship
between the Jewish state and the Islamic Republic of Iran. While
encouraging the United States to take the hardest line possible
with the Iranian government, Israel itself has opened a secret dialog
with strategically placed Iranians.
Israel's Jerusalem Post reported Sept. 20 that
"Iran and Israel are forging contacts in a secret effort to
resolve military tensions and settle Israel's debt of $1 billion
to Tehran." The article goes on to describe Israeli efforts
to initiate contacts with Iran, and attempts at mediation between
the two governments by Kazakhstan's oil minister, Nurlen Balgimbaev
(who has excellent ties with Tehran and was approached by Israeli
officials during a December 1996 medical visit to Israel). The Post
also outlined joint meetings between Iranian and Israeli academics,
and the possible repayment of Israel's debt to Iran through private
investment and the creation of civilian infrastructure projects.
Israel's obvious eagerness to negotiate with Iran,
while simultaneously insisting that the United States wage a virtual
diplomatic war against the Islamic republic, is frustrating to U.S.
diplomats. It is occurring as U.S. policymakers openly complain
that American policy toward Iran is misguided and ineffective, particularly
U.S. secondary sanctions against foreign companies investing more
than $20 million in Iran's oil and gas industries.
That effort, one-half of the Clinton administration's
"dual containment" policy aimed at Iran and Iraq, is led
in large part by New York Republican Senator Alfonse D'Amato, and
is openly referred to within the executive branch as a creation
of the American Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC), Israel's
powerful Washington, DC lobby.
Israel's insistence on a tough and unyielding U.S.
stance against Iran is understandable given Israel's national security
interests. Israel's insistence, however, that the United States
not negotiate at all with Iran, while Israel does, is duplicitous,
at best.
Another significant aspect of current Russian-Chinese-Iranian
missile development has been Israel's own reaction to the countries
allegedly aiding its mortal enemy. Despite the Netanyahu government's
announcement that it would suspend Israeli commercial contacts with
Russia until firm action was taken to prevent further Russian assistance
to Iran's missile programs, Israeli officials were quick to point
out that this does not include Russian-Israeli military cooperation.
Earlier this year Russia and Israel teamed up to provide (ironically)
China with a $1 billion airborne early warning system similar to
the AWACS system used by the United States. This, and numerous other
examples of Russian-Israeli military cooperation in research, development
and production remain unaffected by Prime Minister Netanyahu's suspension
of trade.
Also adding a considerable degree of irony is China's
alleged role in aiding Iran's development of missiles capable of
hitting targets in Israel. In the past, and presumably at present,
there has been extensive Israeli cooperation with China's military
industries, including a substantial and growing body of evidence
of illicit transfers of sophisticated American technology to China.
During a Feb. 22, 1996 hearing before the Senate Select
Committee on Intelligence entitled "Current and Projected National
Security Threats to the United States and its Interests Abroad,"
the Senate asked the following questions: "Does the China-Israel
relationship include the sharing of technology related to weapons
of mass destruction and missile technology? Does the China-Israel
relationship raise concerns that U.S. state-of-the-art technology
provided to Israel may be transferred to China through Israel?"
The U.S. intelligence community responded with a prepared
statement that read: "In December 1991, a former Chinese senior
missile scientist claimed that 'Israel sold the PRC [People's Republic
of China] cruise missile technology and was of great help in developing
the Chinese ballistic missile program.' The information, though
not yet confirmed, was revealed at an international symposium on
arms proliferation held at the University of Wisconsin. In addition,
the U.S. government has alleged publicly that Israel has transferred
missile weapons systems to China containing U.S. technology. Among
the systems cited were the Patriot and Python missiles."
If China is aiding Iran's drive to produce medium-range
ballistic missiles, it appears that, as has happened in the past,
Israel's willingness to sell arms to virtually anyone has come back
to haunt it and that it is looking to the United States to solve
a problem of Israeli making.
In fact, it is the current balance of power in the
Middle East which is tilted dramatically in Israel's favor, and
the political instability resulting from Israeli Prime Minister
Binyamin Netanyahu's refusal to continue with the Oslo agreements's
land-for-peace solution to the Arab-Israeli conflict, that is fueling
an arms race in the region. The most important lesson of the Cold
War was that a relatively even balance of power (or balance of terror
as some called it) helped prevent conflict because each side knew
that aggression against the other could result in a devastating
response. The end game of that theory culminated in mutually assured
destruction (MAD), where both the former Soviet Union and the United
States were forced to refrain from direct military confrontation
with one another.
Israel's position as the sole regional military superpower
proves this theory. Without a serious counter-balancing power in
the region, Israeli governments do not feel the overwhelming restraint
that comes from the fear of military counterattack. Israel's military
strength, combined with its protection from international diplomatic
isolation because of the tremendous influence it has in the United
States, has made Israeli leaders willing to bear the relatively
low costs of military adventurism.
Without access to high-technology conventional weapons,
and without the means to pay for them if they were to become available,
Iran has opted for a relatively low-cost solution to Israel's regional
military dominance. For Iran, medium-range ballistic missiles, particularly
nuclear-armed missiles, will be the great equalizer in the balance
of power in the Middle East and will provide Iran's "ace in
the hole" to forestall a long-range Israeli attack against
the Islamic republic. By raising the costs of such an Israeli military
action against Iran to an unacceptably high level, Iran believes
it is building a substantial deterrent to Israeli military action.
It is difficult for Americans to accept this rationale
for Iran's military buildup because of U.S. animosity dating back
to Iran's 1979 seizure of the U.S. embassy staff in Tehran. Nevertheless,
Americans must recognize that the U.S. commitment to sustain Israel
as a regional military superpower, regardless of the quarrels it
picks with its regional neighbors, is having the unintended consequence
of making the region extremely hazardous not only for all who live
there, but also for the thousands of U.S. government civilians and
military personnel in the region, and the tens of thousands of U.S.
technicians, educators, and businesspeople employed there. Until
a meaningful balance of power is restored in the region, making
the costs of military aggression too high for all parties
involved, widespread proliferation, like Iran's Shahab missile programs,
will remain a central and permanent feature of Middle Eastern instability.
Shawn L.
Twing is the news editor of the Washington Report on Middle East
Affairs. |