Authentic Kashmiri Freedom Fighters Must Close Ranks to Expose Provocateurs

By Suroosh Irfani

The beheading of Norwegian tourist Hans Christian Ostro on Aug. 13 by Al-Faran, a hitherto unknown militant group in the Indian-administered state of Jammu and Kashmir, sums up the complexity of a freedom movement forced into armed struggle, and the desperation of an occupation force unable to crush it—the deployment of one armed Indian for every three males in the Kashmir valley notwithstanding.

Al-Faran, the shady group whom Kashmiris disown, abducted Ostro along with an American, two Britons and a German tourist in the mountains of Kashmir early in July. It demanded the release of 15 militants in Indian jails in return for the Western hostages.

Since 1989, when a mass freedom movement gripped this disputed northern Himalayan state, repression by Indian forces has triggered a groundswell of armed groups of Kashmiri freedom fighters. Often operating in isolation from each other rather than under a single command, these militant outfits have helped sustain the freedom movement despite the heavy losses it has suffered. Even so, proliferation of such groups has made the freedom struggle vulnerable to infiltration by local criminals, intelligence agents, and non-Kashmiris. Al-Faran symbolizes this vulnerability.

New Delhi's accusation that Pakistan is masterminding Al-Faran's excesses at a time when Islamabad itself is faced with the spectre of fundamentalist extremism reflects Indian desperation in the face of a Kashmiri freedom movement that refuses to ebb. With an eye on the international media and points to score against Pakistan, New Delhi cashed in on the kidnapping by refusing to play by its own rules. After all, successive Indian governments in the past have negotiated a trade-off with militants by accepting some of their demands, especially when such militants kidnapped high-ranking Indian officials or their family members.

New Delhi cashed in on the kidnapping by refusing to play by its own rules.

However, in Al-Faran's case, it was not until Aug. 24 that an Indian government spokesman finally confirmed that the hostage crisis was about to be resolved as "negotiations were moving in the right direction"—implying that a trade-off seemed possible. New Delhi's delay in starting serious negotiations made it as much responsible for Ostro's death as Al-Faran. That point was not lost on the Pioneer , a leading Indian daily. In its lead story on Aug. 14, the day following Ostro's beheading, the Pioneer termed the tragedy a "major embarrassment for government and the militants as well." It further noted that Al-Faran "had even called some local journalists" before Mr. Ostro's death to stress that "the government was not sincere about the release of hostages and wanted them to kill the tourists." The call ostensibly was an attempt to break the stand-off between the kidnappers and the government. Failure in breaking this stand-off precipitated the killing.

Al-Faran's killing of an innocent tourist confronted Kashmiris—victims of Indian crackdowns and custodial killings—with a role reversal: a group that claimed to be fighting for Kashmir's freedom beheaded a tourist in its custody. The outrage this murder triggered appears to be generating a new solidarity among Kashmiris, aptly demonstrated in the virtual shutdown of the Valley on Aug. 17 following a strike call by a coalition of political and militant groups condemning the murder and calling for the hostages' release.

In mourning Ostro as a "martyr of Kashmir," Kashmiris brought out the universality of a Sufistic and pluralist Islam lying at the heart of a Kashmiri ethos. The grim episode has alerted Kashmiris to the damage that dubious militants and extremists could inflict on their struggle against Indian occupation of Jammu and Kashmir.

Rafique A. Khan is the executive director of the Kashmir Human Rights Foundation, P.O. Box 36120, Los Angeles, CA 90036. Suroosh Irfani is a senior research fellow at the Institute of Strategic Studies of Islamabad, Pakistan