Reading Clinton's Mideast Crystal Ball: Where Realities May Prevail

By Leon T. Hadar

Monitoring the Israeli and Arab press these days, one gets the impression that Middle Easterners believe that the recent U.S. presidential elections were a referendum on American policy in the Middle East. Most Americans, however, including many Jewish and Arab Americans, made their choice on the basis of many factors, with foreign policy issues, including the Middle East, relegated to the bottom of their agenda.

Hence, Jewish-American supporters of Peace Now, who had applauded President George Bush's pressure on the government of Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir, but had been appalled by the Christian right's show of force in the Republican convention in Houston, probably ended up voting for Clinton. Similarly, unemployed Arab-American auto workers in Detroit, notwithstanding their sympathy toward Bush's evenhanded policy in the Middle East, probably gave more weight to pocketbook issues and voted for the Democratic ticket.

The Game of Expectations

Both Arabs and Israelis are trying now to decode Clinton's foreign policy and Middle East statements and study the makeup of his close-knit group of aides and personal friends in order to gain insights into the new administration's approach to the region. For example, a week after the election, the Israeli daily Yediot Ahronot carried a front-page story quoting Hillary Clinton as having said she "loves Israel."

Israeli pundits predict high-level appointments for such pro-Israel figures as former Rep. Stephen Solarz and Rep. Les Aspin, based upon the presence around Clinton of such former or current AIPAC officials as former AIPAC executive director Morris Amitay, current AIPAC general counsel David Ifshin, and AIPAC board member Mickey Kantor, who served as Clinton campaign manager. Based on Clinton's associates, his statements, and the strongly pro-Israel Senate record and rhetoric of Vice President-elect Al Gore, they conclude that the White House and the State Department will supplement Capitol Hill as a bastion of pro-Israel action.

The confidence of AIPAC leaders was apparent in press reports published a few days after the election concerning the Israel lobby's efforts to place some of its own people in top positions in the Clinton administration, while at the same time trying to sabotage the possible nomination of more mainstream characters.

That, of course, is what worries advocates of a more evenhanded Middle East policy, who wish that former President Jimmy Carter would be selected to replace Jim Baker as the new Middle East peace envoy, and that Carter's emphasis on human rights would dominate the new administration's foreign policy, leading it to adopt a more sympathetic attitude toward the Palestinian struggle for self-determination. The presence on Clinton's team of such advisers as Warren Christopher and Anthony Lake, both of whom served in top foreign policy positions in the Carter administration, and of Rep. Lee Hamilton, the chairman of the House subcommittee on Europe and the Middle East, who in a recent Foreign Affairs article called for cutting aid to Israel, would produce a sense of optimism among traditional friends of the U.S. on the Arab side.

But trying to figure out the foreign policy direction of a new administration is in many ways a mission impossible. The campaign rhetoric of a presidential candidate, or superficial analyses of either the foreign policy principles or the personal and professional contacts of the future president can be misleading indicators of an incoming administration's diplomatic and national security agenda.

Both Woodrow Wilson and Franklin D. Roosevelt ran on election platforms opposing American entanglement in the wars and crises of Europe, only to propel the U.S. into both world wars and leading roles in their aftermaths. It was difficult for anyone to imagine that relatively moderate and peace-oriented Jimmy Carter would end his term with the United States preparing for a revival of the Cold War with the Soviet Union, or that Ronald Reagan, the staunch and militant opponent of the Soviet Union (the "Evil Empire"), would preside over the warming of the U.S.-Soviet relationship and the beginning of the last chapter of the Cold War.

Similarly, American public figures, including presidential candidates, when selected to foreign policy positions, have occasionally surprised both Arabs and Israelis, when they adopted policies that ran contrary to the opinions they had previously articulated in speeches and articles.

Hence, when George Shultz replaced Alexander Haig as secretary of state, Jewish-American leaders contended that the former Bechtel executive, with a record of strong business ties in the Arab world and criticism of Israeli policies, would adopt Arabist-style Middle Eastern policies. Instead, Shultz turned out to be the most pro-Israel secretary of state in U.S. history, playing into the hands of Israel's Likud party hard-liners by, for example, torpedoing efforts by Israel's dovish Labor Foreign Minister Shimon Peres to reach an agreement between Israel and Jordan.

Pointing to the presence of AIPAC activists in the entourage of a president-elect, as both elated Israelis and concerned Arabs seem to be doing now, is not a sure way to predict the candidate's Middle East policies. Jimmy Carter's political court was dominated by Jewish Democrats, some with strong ties to the Israel lobby. That did not prevent the former governor of Georgia from applying strong pressure to the Israeli government during negotiations with Egypt, although it may have inhibited him from pursuing the Palestinian aspect of the Camp David accords on the eve of the 1980 presidential campaign.

Jewish-American policymakers dominated the top positions of the Bush-Baker Middle East policy team and were very instrumental in devising and implementing the tough American stand against the Shamir government, including the original idea of tying U.S. Loan guarantees to Israel to a cessation of settlement buildup in Israeli-occupied territories.

Strange Coalitions

Indeed, one can question whether the standard "pro-Arab"/"pro-Israeli" dichotomy did not confuse public understanding of the attitudes of the Israeli and the American players toward George Bush and his Democratic challengers during the election campaign. Strange coalitions developed in this context, pitting extremists on both sides against moderates on both sides. Proof is in the fact that Saddam Hussain, Yitzhak Shamir, the mullahs' regime in Tehran, Jewish settlers in the West Bank and Islamist opponents of the peace process throughout the Middle East all gloated over Bush's defeat.

All of the members of this "rejectionist camp" felt a sense of personal animosity toward Bush, whom they rightly perceived as being antagonistic toward their interests. All believed that the American-led peace process and the new world order Bush wanted to establish did not fit in with their nationalistic agendas.

Shamir announced immediately after the election that Bush's defeat had put an end to American policies aimed at returning Israel to the pre-1967 lines. The Jewish settlers in the West Bank, who proudly wore yarmulkes with "Clinton" sewn on them, hope that America's new president will treat with benign neglect continued expansion of Jewish settlements in the Israeli-occupied territories. Both Iraqis and Iranians may expect that, unlike Bush, the less-experienced Clinton will be less prepared to come to the rescue of oil-producing Gulf Cooperation Council member states.

Rabin was elected to "deliver" Washington.

At the same time, Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin, Syrian President Hafez Al-Assad, and leaders of such moderate Arab regimes as Egypt and Saudi Arabia did not hide their skepticism, if not concern, over the possibility of a Clinton victory. No mushy sentiments determined those observations. They were more a product of cold Realpolitik calculations.

All of the members of the informal Middle Eastern pro-Bush club shared the common perception that continuing American efforts to reach peace in the region would help them secure their particular national and political interests.

Rabin is aware that it was Bush's pressure on Shamir that helped Rabin to come to power. The feeling among the Israeli electorate that Shamir's "Greater Israel" agenda was fraying the financial lifeline to Washington helped to tip the political balance in Israel in favor of Labor.

Rabin believed that in order to secure Bush's approval of at least the first installment of $10 billion in U.S. Loan guarantees, Israel must lie low and not oppose the F-15 package for Saudi Arabia, which Bush needed in order to win voters employed in the defense industry. Moreover, Rabin was elected to "deliver" Washington and manage the peace process.

Rabin's concern has been that with Clinton in the White House, the peace process might be put on hold, leading to renewed tensions in the region. Also, a Clinton administration, preoccupied with domestic economic issues, could be less inclined to continue with the huge entitlement program to Israel. In that environment, the chances for the more militant Likud to return to power improve.

Nor did Rabin and Clinton hit it off during their meeting in the midst of the election campaign last August. Rabin told close aides that he found Clinton to be very weak and inexperienced in foreign policy.

Rabin was worried that Clinton's emphasis on the need to contain the spread of nuclear weapons might result in American pressure to place the Israeli nuclear arsenal on the agenda of the peace talks. Rabin also expressed concern that a Clinton administration's possible preoccupation with human rights issues could put Washington on a collision course with Israel over Israeli treatment of the Palestinians.

Ironically, the expected Clinton focus on human rights issues is also of great concern to Assad. He is probably aware of the conventional wisdom in Washington that a Clinton administration would be less inclined to ignore the alleged Syrian relationship with terrorist groups.

Some analysts suggested that Israeli-Syrian efforts in the few weeks before the elections to produce the impression that they are close to a deal stemmed from a mutual interest in creating the perception of American success on the peace front and, as a result, helping Bush. Interestingly enough, while the incumbent Syrian and Israeli leaders were projecting a sense of possible rapprochement between their governments, pro-Likud activists and columnists in the United States, such as A.M. Rosenthal, were expressing their hope that Clinton would place Assad on the top of the new administration's enemy list.

Syndicated columnists Rowland Evans and Robert Novak suggest that some of the pro-Likud activists around Clinton are interested in seeing the end of the Israeli-Syrian discussion, and eventually the collapse of the Arab-Israeli talks. That development, they believe, would weaken Rabin and play into the hands of the "Greater Israel" opposition.

More of the Same?

It is doubtful, however, that the new administration will make any major change in U.S. policy in the region. President-elect Clinton made that point clear in his first statement to the press after the election, indicating that he would place continuation of the Arab-Israeli talks at the top of his foreign policy commitments.

Indeed, despite the expected focus on domestic economic issues, Clinton's Washington will still be committed to American protection of the Gulf's oil resources. In that context, achieving an Israeli-Arab peace is seen as a way of drastically reducing the costs of maintaining an American role in the region. Any Israeli attempt to stand in the way of the Clinton administration to achieve that goal can be expected to produce Israeli-American tensions not very different from those that occurred during the Bush era.

Similarly, it is doubtful that efforts by Likud leaders in Israel and AIPAC leaders in the U.S. to revive the idea of Israel as a post-Cold War strategic asset in the region against, for example, the spread of "Islamic fundamentalism," will ignite any more positive response from a Clinton administration than it did from Bush's team.

Aware of that reality, Israel and its supporters have been trying instead to play the "democracy card," suggesting that Washington should continue to subsidize Israel as America's "democratic friend" in the Middle East. Pro-Israel historian Bernard Lewis admitted in a recent article in Foreign Affairs that the Israeli-American strategic alliance is dead, but suggested that "Americans would be prepared to add Israel to a democratic nations list, recognizing stronger links, mutual loyalties and commitments and a more enduring relationship."

Such wishful thinking within America's "Israeli establishment" aside, AIPAC is facing a new Congress which has lost many of its staunch pro-Israel figures. Its new members, many of whom are women or members of ethnic minorities, were elected with a mandate that will compel them to divert resources from defense and foreign aid to domestic programs. In this environment, there will be less backing on Capitol Hill for protecting the current levels of aid to Israel and Egypt, which together receive about two-thirds of worldwide U.S. foreign assistance.

According to Israeli press reports, Clinton emissary and Jewish activist Stuart Eizenstat, who was Jimmy Carter's domestic affairs adviser, arrived in Israel a few days after the elections to warn the government to expect major cuts in its American aid package. He also said he expected that Clinton's and Israel's ideas of territorial compromise are bound to diverge and the future of Jerusalem and the issue of Israeli control of the Golan Heights could therefore become very prickly.

Leon T Hadar is the author of Quagmire: America in the Middle East.