Turkey's New Coalition Government: Traditional Goals, New Style

By Sami Kohen

The new Turkish government led by Prime Minister Suleyman Demirel is expected to pursue the same foreign policy objectives as its predecessor, but it may adopt a different style and approach on certain issues.

One immediate result of the late November shift in power as a result of the recent parliamentary elections may be the diminishing of the role and influence of President Turgut Ozal in foreign affairs, as in domestic matters.

Ozal has directed Turkey's foreign policy for the last eight years, first as prime minister and lastly as president. His pro-US stand, particularly during the Gulf crisis, won him sympathy in Washington and in the West.

Demirel, an opponent of Ozal, has formed a coalition government composed of Demirel's own right-of-center True Path Party and the left-of-center Social Democratic Populist Party led by Erdal Inonu.

With the defeat of his conservative Motherland Party, which now becomes the main opposition group in Parliament, Ozal will no longer enjoy the large powers he was using as president. Both Demirel and Inonu campaigned against what they regarded as Ozal's misuse of his presidential authority, as the Turkish constitution gives him only ceremonial functions.

Thus, the job of shaping Turkey's foreign policy at a time when major events are taking place in the neighboring Soviet republics, the Balkans and the Middle East, will rest mainly with the government—and the two parties that now are sharing power.

Demirel, who has been prime minister six times previously, is pro-Western. During the Gulf crisis, however, he was critical of Ozal's way of handling Turkey's policy—perhaps more in terms of personal style than on substance.

Inonu also was critical of Ozal's Gulf policy, but more on substance. In fact, he visited Baghdad during the crisis and met Saddam Hussain, after which he advocated a "more neutral" policy towards Iraq.

The new government's program nevertheless leaves no doubt about the continuation of Turkey's traditional pro-Western policy. It stresses its intention to develop close ties with the US in all fields, and to continue efforts to become a full member of the European Community. The program also indicates that the new government will seek to strengthen ties with Islamic countries.

While this represents the broad lines of Turkey's foreign policy, the government's program emphasizes that Turkey's national interests will be given priority in all international relations. It says, for example, that Turkey will resist all foreign pressures for the settlement of the Cyprus problem.

The general feeling here is that the new government will adopt a more independent and nationalistic line on such problems as Cyprus—which directly concern Turkey—as well as on its dealings with its allies and friends on such issues as the Gulf or Middle East policy.

The new foreign minister is Hikmet Cetin, secretary-general of the party. He has no foreign policy experience, and is known generally as a moderate.

The Demirel administration will, of course, give priority to domestic matters for the coming weeks. These include democratic reforms and economic measures. Urgent foreign policy issues, however, inevitably will force the government to make decisions.

These include the Cyprus problem, the situation in northern Iraq, the Kurdish issue in general, relations with the newly emerging independent nations in the Soviet Union, and the Middle East peace talks.

The US and the UN have been pressing Turkey for a settlement of the Cyprus question. Ozal has shown some flexibility and, prior to the elections, the hope was that talks would start soon. Both Demirel and Inonu have been critical of Ozal's flexibility on the issue, however, and their recent statements, as well as the government program, give little hope of a softening of their attitude.

The new government's policy on Iraq might also differ from the hard position of the previous administration. Already there is talk that Turkey might reopen its embassy in Baghdad, which was closed during the crisis. Ankara might also explore the possibilities of reopening the oil pipeline to enable Iraq to collect funds to buy food and to pay compensation in accordance with the UN Security Council resolutions.

A Two-Track Policy

The new administration will follow a two-track policy regarding the Kurdish problem (of 55 million Turkish citizens, some 12 million are Kurdish). The government will fight energetically against the attacks of Kurdish guerrillas belonging to the PKK (Kurdish Communist Party). Demirel has said recently that Turkey will not hesitate to bomb and destroy their bases wherever they are—inside Iraq or in the Bekaa Valley in Lehanon. Concerning the Kurdish population living mainly in Turkey's southeastern provinces, however, the government has pledged to grant them wider rights, such as the publication of Kurdish-language newspapers and books, and ending repression in that region.

Local municipal councils also will be given the status of regional assemblies, with more authority on self-rule. The government, however, has made it clear that there is no question of granting any autonomy or permitting secessionist tendencies. The Turkish language will remain the only official language, and the country will preserve its unitary character.

As for the new sovereign republics in the Soviet Union, the Demirel government will pursue the policy of establishing close contacts with them. Already Turkey has become the first foreign country to recognize Azerbaijan. Other Turkic republics now expect a similar gesture from Turkey, which they regard as a source of inspiration and support. Even Armenia is interested in winning Turkey's official recognition. This may not come so soon, although friendly contacts and exchanges are now taking place between the two nations, which share a common border. This is a remarkable development, in view of the tension prevailing in the past between Armenians and Turks over Armenian allegations of a Turkish genocide during World War I.

On the Middle East problem, the government is likely to pursue an even-handed policy and support the peace talks between the Arabs and Israelis. Ankara will insist on participating in the third round of the negotiations regarding such regional matters as water, environment and disarmament. Ozal's "peace water pipeline" project might not be pursued by the new government with the same enthusiasm that the president has displayed. Both Demirel and Inonu have been critical in the past of Ozal's desire to share Turkey's water with neighboring Mideast countries.

The question of normalizing relations with Israel by upgrading diplomatic relations which were downgraded in 1980, also will have to be decided by the new government. The outgoing administration had come close to that decision, but the elections interfered with it. The Israelis now expect that the new government will go ahead with that move. Demirel is known to be sympathetic to this idea, although this would probably not be high on his priority list. Such a decision most likely would be coupled with a decision to give the PLO mission in Ankara full diplomatic status.

The government will have to watch closely the developments in Europe regarding defense, political and economic integration and its overall relations with the US.

Ozal lately has expressed disappointment with the attitude of the Europeans towards Turkey—particularly the EC's reluctance and the Western European Union's hesitation to admit Turkey to European ranks. That was an additional reason why Ozal relied more on the US than on Western Europe, and followed an unreservedly pro-US policy.

The new government might attempt to get closer to the Europeans and become less engaged with the US. This would be particularly in line with the Social Democrats' thinking. As on all goals, however, it remains to be seen how successful the new coalition government will be in achieving them.

Sami Kohen is an editor of Milliyet newspaper in Istanbul.