December/January 1991/92, Page 16

Words To Remember

Middle East Peace Conference Positions

"Our homeland has never ceased to exist in our minds and hearts, but it has to exist as a state on all the territories occupied by Israel in the war of 1967, with Jerusalem as its capital in the context of that city's special status and its non-exclusive character. . . However, we are willing to accept the proposal for a transitional state, provided interim arrangements are not transformed into permanent status . . . The issue is land, and what is at stake here is the survival of the Palestinian people on what is left of our olive groves and orchards, our terraced hills and peaceful valleys, our ancestral homes, villages and cities. International legitimacy demands the restoration of the illegally occupied Arab and Palestinian lands to their rightful owners. Israel must recognize the concept of limits—political, legal, moral and territorial—and must decide to join the community of nations by accepting the terms of international law and the will of the international community. No amount of circumlocution or self-deception can alter that fact. Security can never be obtained through the acquisition of other people's territory, and geography is not the criterion for security. We, the people of Palestine, hereby offer the Israelis an alternative path to peace and security: Abandon mutual fear and mistrust, approach us as equals within a two-state solution and let us work for the development and prosperity of our region based on mutual benefit and well-being. We have already wasted enough time, energy and resources locked in this violent embrace of mutual destruction and defensiveness . . . We have already declared our acceptance of transition phases as part of this process, provided they have the logic of international coherence and interconnection, within a specified, limited time frame and without prejudicing the permanent status. During the transitional phase, Palestinians must have meaningful control over decisions affecting their lives and fate. During this phase, the immediate repatriation of the 1967 displaced persons and the reunion of separated families can be carried out. On these grounds, we hereby publicly and solemnly call upon the co-sponsors of the conference, directly or through the United Nations, to place the whole of the occupied Palestinian territories under their trusteeship, pending a final settlement . . . We wish to directly address the Israeli people with whom we have had a prolonged exchange of pain: Let us share hope instead."

—Palestinian Representative Haidar Abdel-Shafi, Nov. 1, 1991

"We're a very, very small land. Why have we to give up our small land? Where will we live. . . on the moon? . . . It's my land. It's our land . . . How could we give up this land? . . . There is a conflict between us and the Arabs. They say this land belonged to them. I think they are wrong."

—Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir, interview with Dan Rather on "CBS Evening News,"Oct. 29, 1991

''I appeal to the Arab leaders, those who are here and those who have not yet joined the process: Show us and the world that you accept Israel's existence. Demonstrate your readiness to accept Israel as a permanent entity in the region. Let the people in our region hear you speak in the language of reconciliation, coexistence and peace with Israel. In Israel there is an almost total consensus for the need for peace. We only differ on the best ways to achieve it . . . We hope that Arab consent to direct, bilateral talks indicates an understanding that there is no other way to peace . . . It will be regrettable if the talks focus primarily and exclusively on territory. It is the quickest way to an impasse . . . To this day, Syria is the home of a host of terrorist organizations that spread violence and death to all kinds of innocent targets, including civil aviation, and women and children of many nations. I could go on and recite a litany of facts that demonstrate the extent to which Syria merits the dubious honor of being one of the most oppressive, tyrannical regimes in the world. But this is not what we have come here for . . . We have no designs on Lebanese territory, and in the context of a peace treaty and the removal of the Syrian presence, we can restore stability and security on the borders between our two countries . . . In many respects we have a situation of de facto non-belligerency with the Kingdom of Jordan. We sincerely believe that a peace treaty with Jordan is achievable. . . We have presented the Palestinians a fair proposal, one that offers them a chance to improve their lot immensely...I appeal to the Arab leaders, those who are here and those who have not yet joined the process: Show us and the world that you accept Israel's existence.”

—Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir, Nov. 1, 1991

"It makes no sense for our region to remain a perpetual hotbed of tension when the world is moving toward security, peace and stability under the new international order."

—King Fahd of Saudi Arabia, Oct. 31, 1991

"The Arab citizen should not expect quick solutions. This is the first meeting of its kind that will attempt to tear down a big wall that was erected over a very long period of time."

—King Hussein of Jordan, Oct. 28, 1991

"I didn't come here to win or to score points. I came here, and my government came here, with the attitude of trying to reach a peaceful settlement that is honorable. . . I put my heart on my hand to take peace. I took the risk for peace, because it does take courage to make peace. But we can't do it alone. The other side must reciprocate. "

—Jordanian Foreign Minister Kamel Abu Jaber, Oct. 30, 1991

"If we can't talk about territory, if we can't talk about the vision of the future of peace, if we cannot talk about Jerusalem, if we can't talk about withdrawal, what on earth are we doing here? This is a new page . . . We hope the hatred and the animosity of the past is going to be changed. . . Our vision is not merely an end to hostility—another truce—but a comprehensive, just and permanent peace."

—Jordanian Foreign Minister Kamel Abu Jaber, Oct. 31, 1991

"Israel exploited the signing of its peace with Egypt in 1979 to then proceed to annexing Jerusalem in 1980, the Golan in 1981 and invading Lebanon in 1982. It is clear that Israel perpetrated this series of aggressive acts at a pace that exceeds the pace of its withdrawal from the Egyptian Sinai . . . Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338, on the basis of which the peace conference is being convened, were adopted as a compromise between the permanent member states of the Security Council. As is well known, the majority of those states have been sympathetic to Israel since its creation. Hence, the implementation of these two resolutions should not be the subject of new bargaining during the bilateral negotiations. Rather, they should be implemented in all provisions and on all fronts. Resolution 242 emphasizes in its preamble the principle of the inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by war. This means that every inch of Arab land occupied by the Israelis by war and force—the Golan, the West Bank, [East] Jerusalem and the Gaza Strip—must be returned in their entirety to their legitimate owners."

—Syrian Foreign Minister Farouk Charsa, Oct. 31, 1991

"Cooperation between the two powers and other members of the UN Security Council was indispensable in order to stop the aggression against Kuwait and to reaffirm the viability of our new criteria in international relations. Directly after that, just as was agreed between President Bush and myself in September 1990 at our Helsinki meeting on the subject of the Gulf war, vigorous joint efforts began, aimed at achieving a Middle East settlement. All that we and the Americans have undertaken to that end signifies the right conclusions have been drawn from the Gulf war."

—Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev, Oct. 31, 1991

"The Soviet Union and the United States, as co-chairmen, see their task in having this page of war turned as soon as possible. That was the logic that motivated our joint action during preparations for the conference and at the conference itself."

—Soviet Foreign Minister Boris D. Pankin, Nov. 1, 1991

"We come to Madrid on a mission of hope to begin work on a just, lasting and comprehensive settlement to the conflict in the Middle East . . . By real peace I mean treaties, security, diplomatic relations, economic relations, trade, investment, cultural exchange, even tourism . . . What we envision is a process of direct negotiations proceeding along two tracks, one between Israel and the Arab states, the other between Israel and the Palestinians. Negotiations are to be conducted on the basis of UN Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338. . . Throughout the Middle East we seek a stable and enduring settlement. We've not defined what this means. Indeed, I make these points with no map showing where the final borders are to be drawn. And nevertheless, we believe that territorial compromise is essential for peace.''

—US President George Bush, Oct. 30, 1991

"That old taboo that Arabs and Israelis cannot meet and cannot talk is now something that we want to relegate to history . . . The road to peace will be very long and it will be very difficult. We have to crawl before we walk and we have to walk before we run, and today I think we all began to crawl."

—US Secretary of State James Baker III, Oct. 30, 1991

"I will sit down with any of the parties that wants us to sit down with them, and indeed the co-sponsors will sit down with any of the parties that want us to sit down with them, including Israel, and work as hard as we know how for a comprehensive settlement for the Arab-Israeli conflict on the basis of UN Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338. That happens to be the terms of reference of this process that we have initiated, and we will continue to do everything we can to serve as a catalyst to move that process forward, and that, of course, would involve implementations of those resolutions . . . We are in favor of seeing bilateral negotiations on the issue of peace, and multilateral negotiations on regional issues such as economic development and that sort of thing, arms control, economic development. We're not suggesting any formal linkage between those two processes . . . There is no change in United States policy with respect to 242 and 338, which we think means land for peace."

—US Secretary of State James Baker in Nov. 1, 1991 press conference

"When we negotiated with Israel, we negotiated on the basis of land for peace, on the basis of total withdrawal from our territory in exchange for peaceful relations . . . This is exactly our position, and we wish it to be applied also in the negotiations between Israelis and Syrians, Israelis and Palestinians. We have not changed our position at all."

—Egyptian Foreign Minister Amr Moussa, "MacNeil/Lehrer Newshour," Oct. 31, 1991

" The holy city of Jerusalem has its special status. It should be free, accessible and sacred for all followers of Islam, Christianity and Judaism . . . So the occupying power should not exercise a monopoly or illegal sovereignty over this holy city. It should not persist in unilateral decision to annex the holy city . . . The status of the holy city should be subject to negotiation."

—Egyptian Foreign Minister Amr Moussa, quoted in The Christian Science Monitor, Oct. 31, 1991

"No Palestinian, no Arab, no Christian, no Muslim can accept the Israeli slogans concerning Jerusalem."

—PLO Chairman Yasser Arafat, ABC "Nightline," Oct. 30, 1991

"Any Palestinian anywhere is a representative of the PLO . . . The PLO is not an organization. The PLO is the identity of the Palestinian people."

—PLO Chairman Yasser Arafat, Oct. 25, 1991

"This is not yet the kind of forum we have been hoping and waiting for. I want to hope that the eyes that were today glued to the sponsors will subsequently be glued to the interlocutors."

—Shamir aide Yossi Ben Aharon, Oct. 30, 1991

"Throughout this first day of the conference, in fact, one of the most asked questions was whether anyone shook hands with anyone else. Mr. Charaa said two weeks ago that he would not shake hands with his Israeli counterpart. And he apparently kept his word."

—Journalist Alan Cowell, The New York Times, Oct. 30, 1991

"Everyone is so obsessed with the idea of shaking hands. You come back again and again to this question of kissing Mr. Shamir. Why should I kiss him, for God's sake? We came here to bury a hatchet, not to invent new hatchets, and we hope that the Israelis will abide by that rule. We understand what the Israelis are doing now and we understand they are trying to distract from the whole process, but I don't think we will let them do so."

—Jordanian Foreign Minister Kamel Abu Jaber, Oct. 30, 1991

"I think we should talk. I have even talked with Israeli journalists, but there is a wall between us."

—Omani journalist Fahmi Al-Harthi, Oct. 30, 1991

"Here the wall will not come down overnight. But it is indeed possible to begin today. Because the world order has changed . . . No side can fulfill all its dreams and satisfy all its appetites. But all parents on all sides can raise their children instead of burying them."

—Israeli writer Amos Oz, Yediot Ahronot, Oct. 30, 1991

"The Israelis see this as a volleyball game where they are playing the Arabs, and the US is supposed to be the referee. Lately, when the ball is about to hit the floor on the Arab side, the referee steps in to pop it up."

—Dore Gold, Tel Aviv University, quoted in the The Christian Science Monitor, Oct. 31, 1991

''While the tone was generally positive on the eve of the conference, Israelis were clearly uneasy about the way the US has handled decisions on procedural matters as well as over US-Israeli relations more generally."

—Journalists Howard LaFranchi and Jane Lampmann, The Christian Science Monitor, Oct. 31, 1991

"[Shamir] wasn't talking to me. He wasn't even talking to Likud. He was talking to Herut [the most extreme faction within Shamir's Likud bloc]."

—Israeli defense analyst Zetev Schiff, Oct. 31, 1991

"Many [Israelis] still suspect that the Arab states have come to Madrid under American duress, not to make peace but to posture. And many suspect the same of their own leader."

—Journalist Glenn Frankel, The Washington Post, Oct. 31, 1991

"What we heard today from all sides had a familiar ring to it. But it's very comfortable for the Israeli right because it enables them to say nothing's really changed. If Jordan or the Palestinians had said something really challenging, it would have made a difference. . . The trouble is that Sadat remains our only role model of how Arabs make peace—and that's a tough act to follow."

—Israeli journalist Ze'ev Chafets, Oct. 31, 1991

"The issue of fears is crucial. There is a peace movement in Israel. It needs help. And we want to be helpful.''

—University of Chicago Prof. Rashid Khalidi, adviser to the Palestinian delegation, Oct. 31, 1991

"It is true that we who live in occupied territories are participating now in the decision-making process. This actually began with the intifada, and it is more so now. But it is the unity of those inside with those outside that has made this day possible . . . Today I feel that by being here, in Madrid, we have placed the foundation stone for the Palestinian state.''

—Palestinian delegate Sami Kilani, Oct. 31, 1991

"When I packed my luggage to come here, I knew that no matter what happens here I will not be the same man again. None of us will. "

—Bir Zeit University Prof. Saeb Erakat, Palestinian delegate, Oct. 31,1991

"Palestinian representatives here have PLO written all over them."

—Palestinian adviser Daoud Kuttab, Oct. 31, 1991

"Our priority is to stop any new settlements. This includes freezing existing ones where they stand now, and putting a stop to the movement of Israeli settlers into empty houses that stand on any of those settlements. If we cannot do that, the talks will be pointless. What land would we talk about if Israelis take it all?"

—Bethlehem Mayor Elias Freij, Palestinian delegate, Oct. 31, 1991

''The mainstream of the Palestinians is with us and they are for these talks. Still, it is very important to have dissenters because it helps us stay the course. We do not claim to have a monopoly on truth."

—Anis Kassem, legal adviser to the Palestinian delegation, Oct. 31,1991

"[Shamir] didn't say 'I will not give up territory.' He didn't say there will be no Palestinian state, no settlement freeze. There were no 'noes' in the speech. It met the minimum conditions of the Americans. He didn't close the door. He only said it would lead to an impasse if Arabs focused on territory."

—Stephen P. Cohen, Center for Middle East Peace and Cooperation, Montreal, Oct. 31,1991

"At the moment, Syria represents the only significant military threat to Israel, and fear of Damascus's intentions cuts across the very divided Israeli electorate. If Syria maintains its harsh tone, it may well provide Mr. Shamir with the pretext many Israelis believe he is looking for to abandon or stall the peace process."

—Journalists Geraldine Brooks and Tony Horwitz, The Wall Street Journals, Nov. 1, 1991

"Although some Palestinians and Israelis shook hands as they met before the opening session, there has otherwise been no informal contact between the Israeli and Arab delegations. On the first day, they were all kept together in an anteroom for 30 minutes before being bidden into the conference room. On the second day, they all arrived late."

—Journalist Peter Ford, The Christian Science Monitor, Nov. 1, 1991

"The only thing that can be said on behalf of Syria is that by the famous Woody Allen criterion that 90 percent of life is showing up, they showed up, and they didn't walk out."

—Journalist Strobe Talbott, CBS "Inside Washington," Nov. 1, 1991

"Perhaps the week's most dramatic demonstration was the Syrian display of aggressiveness toward Israel and of ambitions for Arab leadership...In addition to lambasting Israel, Syrian Foreign Minister Farouk Charaa signaled Syria's hardball tactics by unexpectedly balking at Baker's plans to start bilateral talks with Israel on Sunday. Charaa's move, US diplomats said, reflected the policy of Syrian President Hafez Assad, who would like to extract a pay-off from the United States—in the form of pressure on Israel—for every procedural step he takes."

—Journalists Jackson Diehl and David Hoffman, The Washington Post, Nov. 3, 1991

"Shamir and Assad are leaders who owe their positions in part to Arab-Israeli hostility. Peace would require each to make changes that each would prefer to avoid. Peace might well make each irrelevant in a future in which hope and trust is at least as important as fear and violence. It is not surprising then that each felt more comfortable stepping back into the desert of harsh rhetoric. An Israeli official I ran into as [Syrian Foreign Minister] Charaa completed his first fire-breathing speech on Thursday did not bother to hide his feeling of reassurance that the Syrian once again had played the heavy. Here was the Arab that Shamir's Likud party has come to know, hate and rely on."

—Journalist Jim Hoagland, The Washington Post, Nov. 3, 1991

"[Regarding] the whole role of the Syrians, I want to deny the rumor that we paid them to help our information effort."

—Israeli Ambassador to the US Zalman Shoval, "This Week With David Brinkley," ABC, Nov. 3, 1991

"Mr. Shamir's performance raised serious questions about whether he or his generation of the Likud party can ever bring themselves to reach a lasting accommodation with the Palestinians . . . A joke going around the conference hall was that the note Mr. Shamir slipped to an aide as Dr. Abdel-Shafi spoke on Friday read: 'We made a big mistake. We should have let the PLO come. "'

—Journalist Thomas L. Friedman, The New York Times, Nov. 3, 1991

"The events in Madrid surprised the Israeli government by shattering some old Middle Eastern political myths—of the Palestinians never missing an opportunity to miss an opportunity; of Syria being in sole control of the peace process and dictating the other Arab participants' moves; and of the Arabs rejecting direct negotiations with Israel until they got guarantees to give back the territories for peace. "

—Journalist Arye Golan, Israel Radio, Nov. 3, 1991

"Experts here say Syria is maneuvering with its traditional politics in a different Arab world from the one it used to inhabit. The Persian Gulf states have been freed from Syrian and Iraqi intimidation by the Gulf crisis. Palestinians, who never had much affection for Syria, have appeared to win enormous publicity points here, and they see these talks as their last chance to win a measure of autonomy. Iraq, because of the Gulf war, has been wiped out as an Arab force for years to come. All these changes affect the mix."

—Journalist Youssef M. Ibrahim, The New York Times, Nov. 3, 1991

"The Madrid peace conference started off with kicking and screaming, but it ended with about as much as Secretary of State James A. Baker III could have hoped for: the beginning of the first viable negotiating process between Arabs and Israelis since the Camp David talks in 1978. The negotiations begun here will undoubtedly take much time to bear fruit. But there is no question that the prospects for a peaceful settlement between Israelis and Palestinians in particular have been vastly improved as a result of the Madrid process. If Syrians and Israelis can ever get beyond polemics, there may even be hope for them as well."

—Journalist Thomas Friedman, The New York Times, Nov. 4, 1991

"Behind all the nice words, the hand-shaking and the smiles for the cameras, the truth is that the first direct talks showed that the Israelis are not inclined to treat us any better than they have over the past 24 years . . . Their idea is that we may be allowed to supervise garbage collection and the distribution of mail, but nothing that resembles control over our destiny, our land, our water and our lives."

—Nabil Kassis, Palestinian delegate, Nov. 4,1991

"Through tireless diplomacy, Secretary of State James Baker has gained the acceptance of the parties to a series of understandings. US pressure has created this process. No party, except possibly the Palestinians, feels deep compulsion at this time to change the status quo. Each side, therefore, is coming to the conference in part because it does not want to say 'no' to pressure from the US."

—Former Undersecretary of State David D. Newsom, The Christian Science Monitor, Oct. 23, 1991

"The Arabs now see that there is more divergence between the interests of the United States and Israel . . . Israel cannot assume the United States will support everything and anything they want. . . More impressive to the Palestinian side was how Bush . . . tackled the Israel lobby [over loan guarantees] in a very strong way never seen before. . . He had his Iraqi face on. "

—Nabil Shaath, adviser to PLO Chairman Yasser Arafat, Oct. 24, 1991

"This administration has some credibility with moderates. Bush has proved, up to now, to be very persistent, and so did Baker. . . I don't see anybody on this earth, other than maybe half of the [Israeli] lobby, who would accept what Shamir keeps advocating and implementing. This is the only thing on our side—the international will."

—PLO Executive Council member Assad Abdulrahman, Oct. 24,1991

"Secretary of State James A. Baker III's diligent, patient diplomatic efforts, which brought him to the region eight times in seven months, added to Arab confidence. They note with satisfaction that he did not break off talks with Palestinian representatives Faisal Husseini and Hanan Ashrawi even as their coordination with the Palestine Liberation Organization became overt."

—Journalist Caryl Murphy, The Washington Post, Oct. 24,1991

"There is a limit to the American position in the direction of pressure on Israel. There is a line that the United States cannot cross . . . and we are realistic enough to recognize this. "

—Gulf Cooperation Council Secretary-General Abdallah Bishara, Oct. 28, 1991

"More than anything else, concern for reducing the long-term risks to oil explains the commitment of President Bush—himself an oil man—to prosecute Arab-Israeli peacemaking. Indeed, the traditional US motives for trying to unravel the world's most complex diplomatic problem are now absent. There is currently no threat of Arab attack on Israel or of Soviet expansion into the region. Like it or not, the continuing dispute over Jerusalem and the fate of the Palestinians is the touchstone of Arab politics, a critical factor in regional stability and the single most important long-range determinant of US standing in the region. At the moment, that standing is at its all-time peak, as is America's pre-eminence as the sole great power in the Middle East, to a degree unmatched by any other country for at least the past two centuries. By going to Madrid, George Bush is thus exploiting America's unusual position and committing an act of rare statesmanship: building for the long-term rather than responding to the moment."

—Former Carter administration Middle East specialist Robert E. Hunter, Los Angeles Times, Oct. 29, 1991

"Bush is not Reagan. There is no visceral commitment to Israel. These are different people than formerly, and Israel has put itself in a very, very vulnerable position."

—Rep. Larry Smith (D-FL), Oct. 29,1991

"I think that in the Arab world there is an expectancy today that the US will be the one to pressure Israel to return to the 1967 borders."

—Israeli Defense Minister Moshe Arens, Oct. 29, 1991

''There is room for optimism. Everyone is talking about peace—but on his own terms. For that reason, the Americans come into the picture, to intercede between the sides . . . If the Americans were only to play the role of a 'Greek chorus' expressing astonishment over situations they cannot change, then they might regret having convened the conference."

—Former Israeli Foreign Minister Abba Eban, Oct. 30, 1991

''The only yardstick dominating Israeli strategy and diplomacy is how it will be seen in Washington and how the US public will react to it. The same is true of almost all other participants, in particular Syria. Those trekking to Madrid are not going because they are eager to make peace or to speak to each other. They are going because George Bush and Jim Baker told them to."

—Israeli newspaper Ma'ariv editor Ido Dissentshik, The Washington Post, Oct. 30, 1991

"Arabs clearly are looking to the Americans to do just what Israel fears; step in to arm-twist its ally, or at least to offer its own solutions when inevitable impasses develop. Some Arabs expect America to buy peace as it did at the 1979 Camp David talks between Israel and Egypt, when the US greased the agreement with promises of billions of dollars of aid for both parties . . . Both Israel and its Arab neighbors are broke. Traditional patrons, such as the Soviet Union and Gulf Arab states, have tightened their purse strings. And without peace, defense budgets will continue to cripple economic development."

—Journalists Geraldine Brooks, Tony Horwitz and Gerald F. Seib, The Wall Street Journal, Oct. 30, 1991

"We are here as an act of faith in the American administration's commitment to bring peace to the Middle East.''

—Harvard University Prof. Walid Khalidi, member of the Jordanian delegation, Oct. 30, 1991

"Bush shaped the short-term strategy of both sides at the conference by linking the talks to Israel's request for $10 billion in loan guarantees for Soviet immigrants—an aid package that Israel wants and Arabs hope to block. . . Baker reportedly also has been trying to coach both the Israelis and Arabs on their speeches, asking them to make verbal gestures of goodwill and warning against provocations that could cause the conference to break down."

—Journalist Jackson Dichl, The Washington Post, Oct. 31, 1991

"President George Bush used the word Palestinians eight different times in his speech. You can be skeptical all you want, but I saw theUnited States president sitting around the same table with our people.''

—Sorbonne Prof. Camille Mansour, adviserto Palestinian delegation, Oct. 31, 1991

"This initiative is an American initiative, and it is due to the efforts of the United States that we are all meeting here, including Palestinians and Israelis. Their presence, the administration's presence, is a must."

—Egyptian Foreign Minister AmrMoussa, "MacNeil/Lehrer Newshour," Oct. 31, 1991

"The basic reason for our continued role as the main mediator is that we have gotten in too far to get out. We will not be able to do the whole job, but no one can substitute for us. Our withdrawal would condemn the area to deteriorating security."

—Former Asst. Secretary of State Richard W. Murphy, The New York Times, Nov. 1, 1991

"President Bush and Mr. Baker can exert what the secretary called 'quiet, behind-the-scenes influence and persuasion.' They can privately propose formulas or pieces of formulas, though that is riskier because it can undermine the honest broker's role they seek for themselves. They can promise financial aid for good behavior and threaten isolation for bad behavior."

—Journalist R.W. Apple Jr., The New York Times, Nov. 2, 1991

"There will be enduring difficulties, occasional disruptions, some dramatic abortions, but in the end I think there will be a peace treaty. It will involve both the Syrians and Palestinians. It could conceivably happen within a year. What no one has fully seized is that . . . this is the first time in the modern age that only one power is dominant in the Middle East—the United States. The Arabs have nowhere to go. Israel has to take American views extremely seriously, especially since the president has demonstrated over the housing loan guarantees that he will not be jerked around . . . This time we know exactly what the outcome will be, though we are not sure how to get there. There will probably be some arrangement on the Golan Heights that is similar to the arrangement in Sinai. And some sort of arrangement in the West Bank that is similar to Camp David. Above all, the United States has to keep the pressure on, and make it clear that there are definite penalties for any party that disrupts the process."

—Former National Security Adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski, The New York Times, Nov. 3, 1991

"The US role already has been the subject of an intense tug of war between Israelis and Arabs, and Baker and President Bush used the conference to introduce a finely calibrated response. To preserve the confidence of both sides, the Bush administration staked out a relatively neutral position while acting as the conference sponsor. At the same time, Baker made clear that the United States will stick to its long-standing views on the conflict and, when necessary, press them forcefully behind the scenes."

—Journalists Jackson Diehl and David Hoffman, The Washington Post, Nov. 3, 1991

"If this conference demonstrated anything, it was that these parties, when left alone, will accomplish nothing. The only way Mr. Baker could get agreement on even the shape of the table was by simply deciding what he thought was fair and imposing it. So it will be when it comes to making peace as well."

—Journalist Thomas Friedman, The New York Times, Nov.3, 1991

"The parties to the conflict enjoy the role of victim too much and are too fearful of taking the risks necessary without mediation from the United States and the Soviet Union. It will require powers of persuasion, new ideas, incentive, threats, the whole basket of instruments available—not a specific plan, but for the United States to suggest ideas when the parties reach a deadlock.''

—Brookings Institution analyst Judith Kipper, The New York Times, Nov. 3, 1991

"We have to help them learn how to talk to each other. The president has done just right. He saved himself for the big issues, as a court of last resort. He has not adopted the Carter approach of getting in there. But he has full confidence in Secretary of State Baker and everyone knows that."

—Former US Ambassador to Pakistan Robert Oakley, The New York Times, Nov. 3, 1991

"The pressures that brought them to the conference table are thesame pressures that will keep them there. Neither side wants to affront the United States, which is at the zenith of its power in the area. And everyone knows that the route to Jerusalem is throughWashington."

—Former Asst. Secretary of State Joseph Sisco, The New York Times, Nov. 3, 1991

"It is clear and obvious that we are looking at the new order now which is the responsibility of the one superpower . . . President Bush and the American administration. We have full confidence; we trust them as an honest broker and we are sure that they will carry on in this peace process . . . for all of us, so that our children and their children can live peacefully in the land of peace."

—PLO Chairman Yasser Arafat, interviewed by Bryant Gumbel on NBC's "Today," Nov. 4, 1991

"Over the longer term, Shamir's Likud is now irrelevant to the peace process. An inexorable process toward settlement is now underway that will make Shamir's position untenable. Only if he is prepared to compromise his essential principles and relinquish most of the territories will he have a role in the process . . . The plain fact is that the strategic importance of Israel to Washington is diminished. A firm American call for a return to the classic land-for-peace formula—that has always dominated Israel's own concept of peace—is not to abandon Israel, but only to abandon its right-wing extremists . . . That is what is new in Madrid. . . It is up to the Arabs to put the offer that can't be refused on the table; if they do, they will shift the balance of power in Israel in favor of a majority that will seek—and trust in—an unprecedented peace, Shamir and the Likud notwithstanding."

—Former CIA analyst Graham Fuller, Oct. 27, 1991

"Shamir told one of our reporters that he could not accept the idea of giving up territories but that others who follow him might. I think that might be what happens. For Shamir, it is a matter of conviction not to give up territory, but for others, who knows?"

—Le Monde (Paris) Foreign Editor Jean-Pierre Langellier, Oct. 28, 1991

"Generation after generation will focus on the holy places. The religious fundamentalists are working the issue now to accelerate this. It is going to create a hell of a lot of problems, especially with the difficult economic situation in the Muslim countries. There will be no shortage of volunteers ready to die for this cause . . . We concluded the Camp David frameworks with Mr. Begin. He was a hard-liner and a member of Likud. Mr. Shamir is a hard-liner, and much tougher, but I tell you I am optimistic. We may conclude something with Mr. Shamir."

—Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak, Oct. 29, 1991

"Israel's refusal to meet with representatives of the Palestine Liberation Organization has pushed a new Palestinian leadership into the limelight, one that may ultimately prove a more formidable force than the guerrilla fighters who have dominated the Palestinian struggle for 30 years. Instead of the gun-toting, unshaven Yasser Arafat, the face of the Palestinians now is a group of soft-spoken academics and professional men and women. Although they still seek an independent Palestinian state, this group . . . is willing to talk about small as well as big demands."

—Journalists Geraldine Brooks, Tony Horwitz and Gerald F. Seib, The Wall Street Journal, Oct. 30, 1991

"It is inconceivable that President Bush and Secretary Baker have called this conference without knowing . . . the crunch points. One suspects that autonomy definitions, maps and dowry promises arein their briefcases. The conference in Madrid is certainly not a lovematch among the parties, but it is beyond doubt leading to arranged marriages."

—Former American Jewish Congress President Arthur Hertzberg, The New York Times, Oct. 30, 1991

"Israel, however bellicose its rhetoric, cannot sustain a prolonged confrontation with its only friend."

—Former US Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, Oct. 31, 1991

For the Palestinians the continuing occupation and building of Israeli settlements are urgent, and intolerable. Many Israelis, for their part, want to be free of the burden of controlling another people in their midst. Possibly, just possibly, these first public meetings between two peoples so long embattled could start them on a road to interim accommodation."

—Columnist Anthony Lewis, The New York Times, Nov. 1, 1991

"Diplomats said they believe the talks could lead to an interim agreement between Israel and the Palestinians on self-rule in the occupied West Bank and Gaza Strip before the deadline of a year set as a goal by Secretary of State James A. Baker III. Progress between Israel and Syria, in contrast, is seen as more remote."

—Journalists Jackson Diehl and David Hoffman, The Washington Post, Nov. 3,1991

"It was striking that at the Palestinians' news conference, their spokesman, Albert Aghazarian, pointedly called on Israeli reporters, and he did so by name...Whether the Israelis and Palestinian representatives hold bilateral negotiations in Madrid or Washington, in public or in secret, it seems that they will find each other, and they will start to talk."

—Journalist Thomas L. Friedman, The New York Times, Nov. 3,1991

"The Israeli delegates rejected all the requirements for peace; the Israeli head of delegation talked about everything other than the land that has been occupied for 24 years. The equation in our region is very clear. The Syrian delegate spoke about both land and peace. The Israeli delegate dropped the land, kept it under the feet of their soldiers, and spoke only empty rhetoric about peace. . . Our delegates will continue to resume the bilateral talks, and, of course, we are waiting for the co-sponsors to come up with a proposal for the next venue. We don't think our presence in the peace conference or ensuing negotiations is a waste of time."

—Syria Foreign Minister Farouk Charaa, Nov. 4,1991

"Of all the delegations in Madrid, the Syrians were the least experienced in dealing with the public and the press. They tried to avoid calling on Israeli reporters during news conferences and often issued handwritten statements, while the Israelis, Palestinians, Jordanians and Lebanese were running off copies in several languages."

—Journalist Thomas Friedman, The New York Times, Nov. 3, 1991

"Everyone is inside the peace cage and the door has been closed. It's an American cage from which Syrians, just like Israelis and Palestinians, cannot really get out. Anyone who thinks otherwise is engaged in wishful thinking."

—Egyptian delegate Lutfi Al-Khouli, The New York Times, Nov. 3, 1991

"Mrs. Ashrawi and Mr. Husseini have had more conversations with Secretary Baker than any Palestinians in history, in order to bring this meeting about. Clearly, they have been affected by him, and particularly his argument that nothing is more important than sitting down face to face with the Israelis—no matter how many of their symbols and flags they have to temporarily abandon. They took big risks in doing that, and Mr. Baker is now morally committed to, as he would put it, helping them help themselves. But then, Israelis, Syrians, Jordanians and Palestinians all feel that Mr. Baker coaxed them all across certain red lines."

—Journalist Thomas Friedman, The New York Times, Nov. 4, 1991

"The Israelis, in their discussions with the Egyptians in 1980,  agreed to turn over to the Palestinian self-governing authority the power for 25 very important areas. I believe almost everything in the autonomy plan is still relevant and applicable . . . The 1980 plan had provided for Palestinian administration of, among other things: justice, agriculture, commerce, education, transportation, housing, health, taxes, tourism and local police. This would have given the Palestinians very substantial control over their own lives and moved to eliminate the presence of Israeli military in the area. I believe an outline of what might be a deal between the Israelis and the Palestinians already exists."

—Former Carter administration Middle East mediator Sol M. Linowitz, Nov. 4, 1991

"Those who have undertaken the extensive talks with the United States leading to the peace conference say that while they are loyal to the PLO, they inevitably form their own vision of what is possible and prudent and what is reckless and harmful. That vision may be at odds with that of the Palestinian leadership in Tunis, and the influence of the new Palestinian voice could increase with time at the PLO's expense."

—Journalist Youssef M. Ibrahim, The New York Times, Nov. 4,1991

"It will take months, perhaps years, to see whether Mr. Baker's efforts will yield the prize of a comprehensive settlement. But 'Madrid' has already become part of the lexicon of modern Mideast history, along with UN Resolution 242, Camp David and intifada. Madrid now denotes the end of the stereotype of 'the Arabs' as a hostile, unreasoning monolith. That change may not be a sufficient, but is a necessary, condition for peace."

—The New York Times editorial, Nov. 5, 1991

"The predicament of the Middle East is that two families claim the same house. The solution is that they must live together. If Baker can get both sides to agree to that, he will be deserving of more than the Nobel Peace Prize. Like others who have toiled in that region, he will lay claim to a miracle."

—Columnist Richard Cohen, The Washington Post, Nov. 5, 1991