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Washington Report, December 1988, Page 15

Special Report

The US Stake in Good Relations With Baghdad

By Paul Findley

It seems only yesterday that the United States, along with Western Europe and much of the Middle East, agonized over the dire consequences certain to follow if the military forces of Iran's Khomeini should defeat Iraq in their long struggle over disputed territory.

For months, the prospects were bleak. Iranian forces captured Fao, a peninsula of Iraq jutting into the northern part of the Persian Gulf. And Iranian artillery and "human waves" threatened Basra, Iraq's second largest city, as well as the highway linking Baghdad with the Persian Gulf.

With enormous oil reserves, second only to Saudi Arabia's, Iraq could quickly become the leading economic and military power in the region.

Many observers feared that the fall of Basra could lead to the replacement of the Iraqi government of Saddam Hussein by a radical religious regime like the one in Tehran. After all, Khomeini had overthrown the militarily powerful shah just a few years earlier.

Even more frightening, such a victory would likely inspire Islamic revolutionary ferment far beyond Iraq. In its wake, none of the pro-Western governments of the Persian Gulf and Middle East could feel secure.

The revolution could reach across the Islamic world and cause shock waves threatening the economic, political, and strategic interests of all Western nations, including the United States. As evidence of US interest in preventing an Iranian victory—as well as keeping oil shipments moving an armada of US warships was sent at great cost to the Persian Gulf.

Stopping Iran in its Tracks

Then suddenly the Khomeini revolution was defeated, demoralized, stopped in its tracks. Iraq had won, but, in a real sense, so had the United States and many other Arab and Western governments. A grateful salute from Washington to Baghdad would have been appropriate.

But public memory is often short. Today, instead of expressions of gratitude, Washington echoes with hostile epithets against Iraq. Unsubstantiated charges of the use of chemical weapons against Kurdish rebels by Iraq after the cease-fire with Iran led the US Senate, without even a word acknowledging that the United States gained significantly from Khomeini's defeat, to charge Iraq with "genocide" against its Kurdish population. A resolution making that charge and ordering sweeping trade sanctions passed the House with only a handful opposing.

On a weeklong visit recently to Iraq, I found Iraqi officials deeply distressed and offended at the charges. Iraq denies using chemical warfare but admits driving out of the country rebellious Kurds of several tribes who had collaborated with Iran throughout much of the eight-year war.

US diplomats in Iraq, although inclined to believe that Iraq used tear gas to scatter the rebellious Kurds, admit that proof is lacking and, moreover, are convinced that Iraq—responding partly to US diplomatic pressure—is not using chemical weapons at present. Iraqi officials say that most Kurds living in Iraq were loyal to the government, not the rebellion, and about 70,000 of the rebels, responding to an offer of general amnesty, have returned to Iraq.

While everyone should deplore the use of chemical warfare, the rush to judgment against Iraq is unfortunate. At this date the State Department's "incontrovertible evidence" has not been produced, and the genocide charge is without foundation. Voting to cut off trade with a country that has suffered so much in a common cause is excessive, to say the least. It will hardly improve our ability to influence Iraqi behavior in the future. (it should be noted that several unarmed Palestinians have died from the effect of tear gas used by Israeli troops, who have killed nearly 300 other Palestinians in recent months. No one on Capital Hill, however, proposes that US aid to Israel be halted, that trade sanctions be imposed, or that the US government ban further purchases of American tear gas by the Israeli army.)

Israel's Interest in Bad US-Iraq Relations

The anti-Iraq flap, to a great degree, is an offshoot of the Arab-Israeli conflict. Much of it is inspired by pro-Israel activists who have a vested interest in painting Iraq in the most offensive hues possible. Israel wanted the war between Iraq and Iran—both hostile to Israel—to continue indefinitely with neither side winning. Now that the conflict is over, Israel is eager to keep Iraq from establishing cordial relations with Washington. Most of the data on which Washington bases its charges of chemical warfare come from Israeli intelligence, information that is ambiguous to say the least.

Iraq is still numb from the war's toll. Nearly 100,000 Iraqis were killed—a staggering loss for a country of only 14 million. During my tour, a senior government official told me that he could not name a single family which escaped a fatality or serious injury.

And the war was catastrophic for Iran, where the death toll may have reached nearly one million—over 2 percent of its population. A young Iraqi who had served on the battle lines recalled helping to defend Basra one day by firing his machine gun from dawn until dusk into wave after wave of Iranians, who, he said, had been told that the military front was on the "edge of the world" with paradise just beyond. With sadness in his voice, he reported that nearly half of the attackers seemed to be 12 years or younger. "They fell by the hundreds before our guns, and still they came. Dying for nothing. But we had no choice. We had to protect Basra from capture."

Iraq today is a bustling, substantially westernized society built on closely knit family life. Twenty-five nations recently helped Iraq stage a brilliant 10-day festival in a new amphitheater in aficient Babylon. New highways, schools, and hospitals seem to be popping up everywhere. Iraq now has 12 universities, and education is free through that level.

With enormous oil reserves, second only to Saudi Arabia's, Iraq could quickly become the leading economic and military power in the region. Its streets are jammed with cars, but only a few well-worn ones are US made. Construction—dominated by French, Japanese, and German firms—is underway at all points of the compass, and, with the war ended, this activity will increase.

Iraq is a booming market for almost everything—consumer goods, technology, manufacturing plants, manpower training, and support. English is the second language taught in schools, and the United States, with its great resources, logically should fill most of Iraq's shopping list. But the outlook is bleak. Even the billion dollar market US farmers enjoyed last year is in jeopardy.

Unappreciated for its historic victory over Iran, offended by America's unfounded charges of genocide and our close collaboration with Israel, Iraq is turning elsewhere. On Baghdad's busy streets, US cars will likely remain scarce, and US firms will be screened out as Iraq buys the tools, supplies, and training its development requires. Still worse, the United States will retain few avenues of influence in an important capital.

Paul Findley served in the US House of Representatives from 1961 to 1982, and is the author of They Dare to Speak Out: People and Institutions Confront Israel's Lobby (Lawrence Hill and Co.). He resides in Jacksonville, IL.