Washington Report on Middle East Affairs, December 1987, page 11

WHAT THEY SAID

These are Middle East-related excerpts from an interview of presidential candidate Jesse Jackson by Michael Lerner, editor of Tikkun, a bimonthly critique of politics, culture, and society. The interview appeared in the November/December issue. Subscriptions to Tikkun are $25 per year, and can be sent to 5100 Lenoa Street, Oakland, CA 94619.

Lerner: It is the perception of many in the Jewish world that before the 1984 elections you spent a lot of time criticizing Israel and supporting the causes of various Arab nations. More recently you appear to be more evenhanded...

Jackson: Nothing has changed...My position to support Israel's right to exist within secure boundaries is a consistent position. My position to support a homeland or a state for Palestinian people...is a key to peace in the Middle East and to the stability of other Arab nations as well as the security of Israel...I supported Camp David, and I support Camp David accords being revived now. Although there were missing elements from that accord, Camp David was a step in the right direction, and it was a mistake for Reagan to let the Camp David accords collapse and not expand upon them.

Lerner: How do you mean to expand upon them?

Jackson: To expand to include the elements that were left out—to include other Arab nations, to include the representative of the Palestinians, because the accords would be incomplete until all the Arab nations, or as many as possible, are in it and a permanent place for Palestinians is resolved.

Lerner: Is it your sense that the Arab nations—Syria, Saudi Arabia, Iraq, Iran, Libya—would accept the existence of the state of Israel now?

Jackson: They already accept the state of Israel as a fact. They negotiate now in relation to that fact...They know that their relationship to America is in some measure conditional upon their acceptance of Israel's right to exist...So what you have there is a de facto acceptance of Israel's right to exist.

Lerner: So you think that de facto acceptance could be made de jure?

Jackson: Yes, if we were aggressive in our diplomatic efforts.

Lerner: Could you tell me what you think are "our interests" in the Middle East?

Jackson: Well, our interests are, first, human interests. Approximately one hundred and twenty-two million human beings live in the Middle East. There are twenty-two nations in the Middle East. And we have geopolitical interests in the Middle East.

Lerner: By that you mean...?

Jackson: The geography, the politics, where it is located are of interest to us. The Persian Gulf as a transportation artery through which oil is transported is of interest to us. So our interests are moral, they're human, they are geopolitical, they are national security interests. Right now we are becoming less able to protect those interests. We are becoming isolated in the region, so much so that now we're having to try to protect the Persian Gulf unilaterally in a situation that is very delicate.

Lerner: Do those geopolitical interests you cite involve an international struggle with the Soviet Union to prevent them from expanding their influence?

Jackson: That's one feature. Certainly we would be in a substantially weaker position in the world if the Soviets were occupying the Middle East. On the positive side, we are much stronger if we have a Middle East in which we have substantial influence..

Lerner: It is the perception of many Jews that this is not a time in which Syria or Iraq or Libya are willing to make peace with Israel. They would read your words to mean that in order to have more influence, the United States should tilt away from a special relationship with Israel and be more evenhanded, where evenhanded means, to some extent, abandoning the special protection that the United States has offered Israel.

Jackson: America has a special interest with Israel. That relationship must continue. America helped to found Israel. America helps to sustain it with outright annual grants. America's interest and will to protect Israel is substantial and seems unequivocal. America has an interest, a special interest, with Saudi Arabia that likewise must be protected, and you can see, as the relationships have become more exposed now, just how fragile those interests are. America has a special interest with the Gulf states and keeping the Straits of Noruz open, so much so it is willing to flag Kuwaiti tankers to keep it open. So America has several interests in the region...If we cannot protect our other interests...we cannot protect Israel's interest.

Lerner: Doesn't what you're saying amount to a tilt away from Israel and toward giving more military support to the enemies of Israel?

Jackson: No...Our needs can be reconciled with Israel's needs, its need to exist within internationally-recognized boundaries. America would be hard put to do without the Saudi Arabia relationship. America needs Saudi Arabia. America needs bilateral and multilateral relationships with the Gulf states.

Lerner: Doesn't what you're saying lead in the short run to giving more military and/or economic support to forces that may be willing to accommodate some of America's economic needs for oil but that simultaneously want to destroy the state of Israel?

Jackson: We need them because of their geopolitical position relative to the Soviet Union. We need them because of the role they occupy in the Middle East. We need them because in many instances they have proven to be dependable to us. We need to stabilize oil prices in the crunch, and their helping to stabilize oil prices has been an immense asset to American security and the American economy...But there's also an understanding between this country and the Saudis. They will not abuse our relationship to attack the state of Israel, and they have not.

Lerner: And you think that same kind of understanding could be made with Syria, for example?

Jackson: I think we should try. It's a challenge, and it's necessary, and even possible if we work at it. We have not in the last seven years worked diligently on developing more favorable relations with Syria. My point of view is simply this: The more that our country can neutralize adversaries or win friends, the more it is capable of protecting our allies' interests. The less able we are to communicate with our adversaries, the less able we are to protect ourselves or our allies against them. So it is wholly irrational to have a country as militarily powerful as Syria with its contiguous borders with Israel, feeling no constraints if it chose to attack.

Lerner: And what kind of constraints could they be convinced to accept by the United States?

Jackson: Well, the constraints could be economic considerations, trade, and mutual development. The constraints could be military, because we are committed to supporting Israel and its borders. The constraints could be diplomatic in terms of free movement of their people, and so if we have enough of a relationship to have diplomatic constraints that make a difference, and economic and trade constraints that make a difference, then we are able to improve relations.

A classic case would be Egypt. If we had maintained the same attitude toward Egypt that we had in 1967, if we had not gone through a transformation and some redemption, then the Camp David accords would not have been possible...Now, let's go a step further. The most significant act to protect Israel's right to exist in the Middle East was not a military act. It was a diplomatic act. It was Camp David. To get the largest nation in the Middle East to agree not to take up arms against Israel, that diplomatic agreement was the biggest military agreement in the history of the region. That's why I stress aggressive diplomacy and economic, cultural, and trade ties...

Lerner: Is there anything in your experience in Syria, or subsequent to your visit to Syria, that leads you to believe that the Syrian dictatorship, which is perceived by many Jews as ruthless and irrational, would actually be rational and suspend its desires for the destruction of Israel, and/or respond to the kinds of initiatives you're talking about?

Jackson: Frankly, we don't know what's possible diplomatically with Syria in the last seven years, because we have not worked on trying to improve relations diplomatically in the last seven years...If we employ more dialogue, and more diplomacy, and more trade, perhaps we will increase our influence.

Lerner: Let me turn to the Palestinians. Let's start from some of the history. What right do you think the Jews had to return to Palestine at the end of the nineteenth and beginning of the twentieth century? Was that return, in accord with the Zionist vision, a righteous act, or was it, as the Palestinians claim, either an extension of European colonialism or, at the very least, an unjustified usurpation? In other words, was the Zionist vision legitimate from the start, or is it only justified now because it succeeded an it's an existing fact?

Jackson: Let me answer it in this way. The Jews had a need for a homeland, and the political settlement was reached. I accept the political settlement as reality without getting into the religion of the matter. The incomplete work at that time was the failure to finally work out an accord on getting a homeland for Palestinians as well. It is precisely that crisis that lingers.