The Facts Didn't Matter: A Year-End Review

By Dennis J. Wamsted

"But ... the facts don't matter." With those words, a Congressman dismissed a Pentagon official who had just finished briefing him on the merits of the Reagan Administration's proposal to sell a package of advanced U.S. weaponry to Jordan. And so it was with the attitude of the entire, recently-concluded 1st session of the 99th Congress toward Middle East issues: the facts just didn't matter.

Foreign Aid Bill Ups the Dole for Israel

One of the year's most important developments was Congress' successful enactment of a foreign aid authorization bill—the first since 1981. The House did enact an authorization bill in 1984, but the Senate's failure to follow suit forced the U.S. foreign aid program to stumble from one Continuing Resolution to the next for funding. [Congress passes Continuing Resolutions to maintain funding for a program when it is unable to complete the regular authorization and appropriation process.) Earlier this year, however, Senator Richard Lugar's (R-IN) press spokesman told the Washington Report that the Senator was "committed to get a (separate) foreign aid bill this year." True to his word, Lugar garnered Senate approval for a foreign aid authorization bill for fiscal years (FY) 1986 and 1987. Several provisions of this bill, signed into law by President Reagan August 8, will have a significant impact on U.S. Middle East policy for years to come. They also illustrate all too clearly that—for our representatives, at least—the "facts don't matter."

The bill's single most important provision was the allocation of "not less than" $3.0 billion in grant aid to Israel in each of the next two years. This $3.0 billion—$1.8 billion in Foreign Military Sales (FMS) credits and $1.2 billion in Economic support funds (ESF)—represents a $400 million increase from the 1985 Continuing Resolution allocation and accounts for approximately 33 percent of the regular foreign aid program. Moreover, Congress approved a $1.5 billion supplemental aid package for Israel last summer, with half to be distributed in FY 1985 and half in FY 1986. All told, therefore, Israel will receive $3.75 billion in U.S. aid during the current [1986] fiscal year—a full 37 percent of the entire U.S. foreign aid budget. Put into other terms: The U.S. Congress has allocated more than $1,000 each for every Jewish man, woman and child in Israel for the current fiscal year alone. By contrast, Egypt—the second most favored recipient of U.S. aid—will receive something in the neighborhood of $52 per capita.

Not satisfied with this largesse, a number of Congressmen—led by Senators Robert Kasten (R-WI) and Daniel Inouye (D-Hl)—proposed a one-year reduction of the interest rate on Israel's U.S. military loans from the current rate of 11.4 percent to 5 percent—a proposal which would have effectively, albeit indirectly, added another $531 million to total U.S. aid to Israel. Congress shelved the proposal for this year, but its supporters say they will reintroduce the measure in 1986, when they are confident it will receive favorable consideration. After all, next year is an election year.

Indeed, Kasten and Inouye may already have won their battle. Shortly after their plan was postponed in December, one Administration source stated: "It is inevitable that the United States will have to lower interest rates for a number of aid recipients." One thing is certain: If any country is granted lower interest rates on its loans from the United States, it will be Israel.

Congress Thwarts Lucrative Arab Arms Deals

A second important development this year involved U.S. arms sales to the Middle East—in particular the Administration's planned sales to Saudi Arabia and Jordan. Under the threat of stiff opposition from Congress—coordinated by the American-Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC), the principal pro-Israel lobby in the United States—the Administration backed down from even introducing the sale of an additional 40 F-15 jet fighters to Saudi Arabia. Not surprisingly, the Saudis subsequently signed a $4.5 billion contract with Great Britain to purchase 132 aircraft, including 48 Tornado interdiction /strike planes and 24 Tornado air defense craft. Aerospace officials privately estimate the deal ultimately could be worth more than twice that amount.

Here again, the facts just didn't matter. U.S. officials estimate that the loss of the Saudi contract could cost U.S. industry upward of 150,000 jobs. Furthermore, the U.S. has lost its ability to influence where the Saudis will base their new Tornado squadrons—a development, one presumes, of major concern to AIPAC and Israel's Congressional supporters. Previous U.S. sales had expressly forbidden the Saudis from basing U.S.-built F-15 and F-16 jet fighters at the Tabuk Airbase, less than 100 miles south of Israel. Now, however, no such restrictions will apply. The Tornado is considered one of the best ground attack planes in the world. Based at Tabuk, it would certainly constitute more of a threat to Israel than F-15s based elsewhere in the Kingdom.

Although the Administration went ahead and submitted the proposed Jordan arms sale to Congress, the sale's status is uncertain at present. Following the Administration's announcement, Senator Edward M. Kennedy (D-MA) introduced a measure, co-signed by 74 Senators (45 Democrats and 29 Republicans) saying: "No sophisticated weapons whatever should be sold to Jordan unless and until that nation accepts the existence of Israel and begins direct negotiations with Israel for peace." Senator Alan Cranston (D-CA) went even further, arguing that the United States should only sell advanced U.S. weaponry to Jordan after the actual signing of an Israeli-Jordanian peace treaty. Similar sentiment was expressed in the House where a resolution opposing the sale quickly gathered 273 supporters. Caving in under this Congressional barrage, the Administration agreed to a compromise postponing the sale at least until March 1, 1986.

As with so much else on the Hill this year, if the sale is ultimately concluded it will have little to do with the facts supporting it. For example, lost in the uproar over the sale and its presumed threat to Israel is the fact that the U.S. and Jordan have had a close bilateral defense relationship for the past 28 years. Indeed, many U.S. State and Defense Department officials have expressed their concern that failure to proceed with the sale could seriously endanger the traditionally close U.S.-Jordanian military relationship. Likewise, Congressmen have almost totally overlooked the sale's military justification—as demonstrated in the U.S.-prepared Middle East Arms Transfer Study—in their headlong rush to avert the disfavor of AIPAC. Defense and Foreign Affairs quoted a number of Congressional sources saying that the political and military advantages accruing to the U.S. from the proposed sale of F-16s or F-20s to Jordan were simply never discussed during the entire time that Representatives and Senators were adding their names to resolutions opposing the sale.

Free Trade Agreement Boosts Israeli Export Prospects

Still a third area where Fancy triumphed over Fact was the U.S.' decision to conclude a Free Trade Agreement (FTA) with Israel. Interestingly, no major business organization spoke out in favor of the FTA, while a number of organizations—including such stalwart friends of Israel as the AFL-CIO—spoke out against the accord. In testimony before a House subcommittee on trade, an AFL-CIO spokesman said: "It is our firm belief that the Israeli free trade area proposal is not in the interest of the U.S. and can only contribute to the further decline of the U.S. industrial structure by increasing imports from Israel." The agreement was also opposed by representatives of the American Textile Manufacturers Institute, the Leather Products Coalition, Roses Incorporated, the California Avocado Commission, Manufacturing Jewelers and Silversmiths of America and the California-Arizona Citrus League, among others.

Another legitimate concern for those groups opposed to the U.S.-Israeli FTA was the possibility that, having concluded an FTA with Israel, the U.S. would be "forced" to concluded similar agreements with other countries close to the U.S. Elaine Abbott, an economist with Sunkist Growers in California, expressed this concern to a number of Administration officials, cautioning that the enactment of the FTA with Israel would lead to similar "concessionary agreements" with countries such as Egypt, Mexico and Brazil. Such agreements, she warned, "could be devastating to California agriculture." [Abbott's concerns are based upon precedent. Numerous other concessions first devised solely for Israel—such as long-term, concessionary rate military loans and "cash flow financing," which allows countries to order weapons systems before Congress has actually authorized and appropriated the money to pay for them—have subsequently been granted to other countries.] Despite these concerns and lack of business support, Congress overwhelmingly approved the FTA and President Reagan signed it into law on August 19, 1985.

In truth, the Congressman who spoke so frankly to the Defense official was right: The facts just didn't matter in 1985. Given the recently-adopted balanced-budget law, there is a chance that reality will reassert itself, particularly with regard to U.S. aid to Israel, next year. It is, however, a slim chance. Congress began 1985 by unsuccessfully attempting to trim upward of $50 billion from the federal budget, which is approximately the amount that would have to be trimmed next year under the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings initiative. Even while Congress searched desperately for programs to cut, aid to Israel soared to new heights.

Dennis J. Wamsted, of Washington, D.C., has lived and studied in the Middle East and writes frequently on it.