U.S.: The Lebanon Dilemma

By Richard B. Parker

The question of what to do about Lebanon will be a continuing preoccupation of Washington administrations, whoever is in power. It is a problem which is unlikely to go away on its own, and which has defied resolution by a series of would be deities ex machina, notably the Israelis, the Americans and the Syrians. In the final analysis, the problem can be solved only when the Lebanese factions decide to lay down their arms and stop killing each other. So many of them have been steeped in the agony of paranoia and revenge, and so manipulated by outsiders, that neither they nor anyone else has been able to call a halt that lasts for long. (Recent visitors from Beirut report, however, that fatigue has set in and the fighters are beginning to respond to civilian demands for an end to the disorder. If true, this may be the miracle we have been waiting for, but it may already be too late to restore Lebanon to anything resembling its former self.)

There are three theoretically possible ways out of this crisis. One is that, in a latter day Pentecost, the divine spirit will descend upon all the politicians and militia leaders of Lebanon, who will then rise above their tribal loyalties and start speaking the tongues of national reconciliation. The inspiration for this is unlikely to come from Washington, which seems to be fresh out of new ideas. It is also unlikely to come from the Israelis or the Syrians, both of whom have their own games to play and little in the way of divine capabilities in any event. If it is to come, it must be from the Lebanese themselves, but someone or some event will have to disintoxicate them first.

The second possibility is that a solution will be imposed by outside powers. That is what we thought had happened in 1976, when the Syrians intervened, but the act of imposition was aborted before it got started. The clumsiness of the Syrians, the slackness of the other Arabs, the interference of the Israelis, and the paralysis of the Americans, prevented the states concerned from doing the very difficult job before them, the first and most essential step of which would have been to disarm the militias. Without that, there will be no lasting peace. The possibility of imposition still exists, but the Syrians seem no better equipped to do it now than they were eight years ago, the Israelis have thrown in the towel, and the Americans failed conspicuously in their attempt. The truth is that no one is prepared to make the commitment in wealth and casualties which would be required to do it effectively.

That leaves the third possibility, which is the rise of a Lebanese equivalent of Turkey's Kemal Ataturk, who will unite the country and establish a new order. Many thought Bashir Gemayel was such a person, but we will never know. Since it was he who was initially responsible for the attempt by the Lebanese Forces to take over the Shuf area, which history will show to have been a principal cause of the Israeli American failure in Lebanon, it can be argued that Bashir would have been worse than his brother. The question remains whether there is some other man on horseback acceptable to enough Lebanese to make them live in peace. The sectarian and political obstacles to this are enormous, but the reception accorded Bashir on his election shows it is not impossible.

A Scenario of Continued Anarchy

The alternative to some combination of the above is a continued state of anarchy and partition. In this case, a truncated Marunistan will be all that remains of old Lebanon, while the rest of the country will be divided among Shia, Druze, Syrians, and possibly the Israelis. The Sunnis and Eastern Church Christians will live as tolerated but powerless minorities. The Maronites will have power but no hinterland and will be dependent on remittances, but they will survive. So will the other Lebanese. It is Lebanon that will not survive. This scenario is now being played out, and only resolute action and leadership will prevent its coming to pass.

The United States has been asked by the Israelis to help mediate arrangements for a withdrawal of their troops from south Lebanon. Continuation of the Israeli military presence is undoubtedly one of the factors contributing to the deterioration of the situation, but its disappearance will not automatically settle anything. Unless there is a firm agreement between theSyrians, Lebanese and Israelis on effective policing of the area, the Israelis will leave behind them a vacuum which others will rush to fill and the struggle over turf will be catastrophic. There is nothing inherently impossible about making effective security arrangements for the south, but it requires more statesmanship than the parties have been able to display heretofore, and more control over the militias than the Lebanese government or UNIFIL can be expected to exercise. The Israeli proposal to leave control of the area in the hands of their puppet force is also unlikely to solve anything. Once the Israelis leave, Col. Lahad and his forces will be eliminated either wholesale or one by one by the Shia.

Should, then, the United States accept the invitation and involve itself again in this imbroglio? There is evidence of considerable reluctance to do so in Washington, and it is tempting to argue that in no circumstance should we let ourselves get into it, that the parties should be told to negotiate their own way out of this mess. Mr. Shultz reportedly said just that to Prime Minister Karame in New York in October, and there are few who have dealt with the Lebanese who do not feel it would be salutary for them to know that they cannot count on others to rescue them from their folly.

The truth is, however, that the Lebanese are incapable of steering their own course today, because they do not control either the foreign or domestic forces in their own territory. To expect Lebanon to negotiate with Israel as an equal in these circumstances is unrealistic. If the Americans cannot help them, someone else will have to do so, or Lebanon is going to disappear. It may already have done so, and we just don't know it.

Limiting Damage in the Mideast

The sad reality is that we are today, and will be for perhaps the next generation, involved in a damage limitation operation in the Middle East. There is going to be no overall solution, no grand plan which will emanate from the White House or Foggy Bottom, because there is riot and will not be the will to take the political risks involved. The United States government will continue to put one foot in front of the other and muddle along, trying to minimize its losses but incapable of bold new initiatives. At the same time, it cannot afford to take the risk of letting the situation deteriorate on its own, because that would be a bold new initiative of a negative sort. Sooner or later, willy nilly, the United States will be involved in the problem of Israeli withdrawal from Lebanon. It would be least risky to become so at a time of its own choosing and on its own terms rather than to let the dynamic of events create a new and more complicated muddle. This means we are going to be involved in the negotiations, indeed we already have been, judging by press reports of Ambassador Richard Murphy's peregrinations.

We have been playing Sisyphus in the Middle East for forty years, but eternity has just begun. As long as we aspire to world leadership, we will be involved there whether we like it or not. Our object should be to make that involvement as effective as possible and to exert our influence in a way designed to promote our national interests, intelligently and dispassionately perceived. That means we cannot sit back and let events take their course.

Richard B. Parker, a former U.S. ambassador to Lebanon, is editor of the Middle East Journal.