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Washington Report, December 17, 1984, Page 2

Editorial

Amman: A Defeat for Extremism

Yasser Arafat will probably never be a cult figure in the United States. For one thing, some of the Palestinian guerrilla organizations that have crowded into his PLO tent have always been bad news. Like the PFLP of Marxist George Habash, whose skyjackings helped pin the "terrorist" stereotype on all Palestinians, or the Soviet funded DFLP of Nayif Hawatmeh. Actually, these organizations are in competition with Arafat's own Al Fatah, but as chairman of the all inclusive PLO, Arafat takes the rap with the U.S. public for them all.

So it's hard to get excited about the recent meeting of the Palestine National Council in Amman. Obviously, it was a personal triumph for Arafat, who once again has survived against all odds as he did in Jordan in 1970, Beirut in 1982, and Tripoli in 1983. It demonstrated that he's still on top with the Palestinians, and that no other country can pick their leader for them.

But why, Americans may ask, did the PLO go to such pains to reject U.N. Resolution 242? That's the Security Council resolution that calls for Israeli withdrawal from lands occupied in 1967 in exchange for Arab acknowledgement of Israel's right to live in peace within secure and recognized boundaries. Americans, and many Palestinians living in the U.S. as well, view it as the best offer the Palestinians are likely to get.

The official PLO reason for rejection is that the Resolution ignores the Palestinians' right to self-determination. Israel's friends in the U.S. media will see to it, however, that Americans don't stop wondering if that's the only reason.

In any case, the Amman meeting was a victory for Palestinian moderates. The existence of Palestinian moderates at all is a kind of miracle, since every Palestinian believes that his displacement from his own land by an alien people, with the full blessing of the United Nations at the time, is one of the unique injustices of world history. A Palestinian moderate, therefore, is simply a pragmatist who, in the interests of peace now, is willing to share his land with the Israelis. An "extremist" is one who wants it all back now, and won't settle for less.

To be fair, the same must be said of the Israelis. Those willing to divide the land between a Jewish and a Palestinian state are the moderates. Those who are not and they seem to be the majority in Israel today are also "extremists." We just forget to call them that when they come to Washington for the annual handout that makes Israeli extremism possible.

Getting back to the Palestinian moderates, Yasser Arafat despite the American stereotype to the contrary is one of them. He probably thinks that time is on his side and sooner or later Israel will have to come to him to make a deal. However, Americans, and probably many Palestinians as well, see Israel "creating facts" on the West Bank and worry that with each year that goes by, Resolution 242 becomes harder to impose.

It is in outbidding "extremists," like Habash, for followers in the Palestinian camps that Arafat's foot becomes wedged in his mouth.

When he says the U.S. is being used by Israel to pursue policies that are only in Israel's interest, he's right. But those quotes don't make the average U.S. newspaper. When he borrows a line from the leftists, however, and says the U.S. is using Israel to accomplish American goals, that's what Israel's friends in the U.S. media love to quote.

The Russians put out that line to keep the Arabs down on us. The Israelis say the same thing to make Americans think they are getting something back for the incredible U.S. investment now past $1,000 per Jewish Israeli per year in Israel's military and economic base. But when an Arab says that, he's only playing someone else's game.

To Arafat's credit, he says it less than most of the other Palestinian leaders: The ones who stayed away from Amman.

Who were they, exactly? First, there were those the Syrians recruited from Al Fatah, Arafat's own organization and the largest component of the PLO. Some were opportunists, and some were heroes of the Beirut fighting who resented Arafat for promoting too many cronies who hadn't been in the front lines. They've all been used by the Syrians, and probably are starting to realize it. Look for a reconciliation.

Also absent were extremists like Habash, Hawatmeh, and Ahmad Gibril, leader of the Libyanfunded PFLP General Command. Good riddance.

Israel Closes Door on Moderates

The final group of absentees, numbering some 150 members of the Palestine National Council, were West Bank moderates who wanted to support Arafat. The Israelis wouldn't lot them go.

Why not? Would you believe Palestinian extremists being supported by Israeli extremists?

That's right. The last thing Israeli extremists want is for the Palestinians to select a moderate leader with whom Israel might one day have to sit down at the peace table.

Arafat got his quorum anyway. And all of the West Bank Palestinians saw the sessions of the Palestine National Council their own Parliament live on Jordanian television day after day.

Did all this bring Middle East peace any nearer? Maybe.

King Hussein gave Arafat's Palestinians good advice. They showed the world that only they would choose their own leaders. That's essential, since whoever ultimately negotiates for the Palestinians must have the backing of a clear majority.

The Amman meeting may have helped clarify something for Americans as well. In the Middle East it isn't just Palestinians versus Israelis anymore. There now are people in both camps ready to make a peace with which both sides could live.

They are called moderates: Arab moderates and Israeli moderates.

Perhaps, if our government starts rethinking the U.S. economic assistance policies that have nearly killed moderation in Israel while helping extremism grow there, the old Palestinian survivor will do some rethinking too. Like about Resolution 242.

RC