Will Hamas Emerge as Political Party Or Underground Opposition?

By Stephen J. Sosebee

The Sept. 18 armed clash between Hamas gunmen and Palestinian police in the Gaza Strip is both the seemingly inevitable confrontation between President Yasser Arafat's Palestinian National Authority and the Islamic rejectionist groups, and an indication that Hamas leaders are finding it increasingly difficult to control their military units. While Hamas political and spiritual leaders have expressed a willingness to wait and allow the Oslo Accord to self-destruct, the Izzadin al-Qassem rank and file continue to initiate military attacks against Israelis from within the new autonomous Palestinian areas of Gaza and Jericho.

Since the Israeli military withdrawal from the main population centers in the Gaza Strip, the two Islamic rejectionist groups, Hamas and Islamic Jihad, have ambushed and killed more than a dozen Israeli soldiers and settlers in Gaza. While this is hardly a new development—both were conducting "armed struggle" in Gaza before the Israeli withdrawal—the death of a Palestinian policeman in a clash with Hamas personnel in Rafah has pushed President Arafat into a position that he clearly hoped to avoid.

"Palestinian soldiers are forced to arrest Palestinian fighters for attacking Israeli settlers and soldiers on Palestinian soil," says Ahmed Abu Romana in Khan Younis. "There is no way for Arafat to benefit from this, as people still are not convinced that the agreement is in their best interests."

After Arafat signed his agreement with Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin in Washington on Sept. 13, 1993, Hamas leaders held that the Palestinian people soon would turn away from Arafat's leadership. However, as Arafat consolidated his support in Gaza this summer, Hamas attacks on Israeli targets increased significantly.

"Much of their frustration was the result of losing support in the streets and within the new ruling Palestinian authority," explains Saud Jibril, a Palestinian journalist in Gaza. "The Oslo Accord has strengthened Arafat for now in Gaza and Hamas feels threatened that this situation will continue."

In a poll conducted a day before the clashes at the Erez checkpoint in Gaza, which left two Palestinian civilians and an Israeli soldier dead and more than 188 persons injured, the Jerusalem Media and Communications Center found that more than 60 percent of Palestinians in Gaza "welcomed" the Cairo agreement. Meanwhile, 36.4 percent of Gazans responded that the Cairo agreement had "increased their support for the PLO," while only 15.8 percent in Gaza said their support had declined. Nearly 40 percent of Gazans also indicated support for Arafat's Fatah faction, while only 13.5 percent supported Hamas, the second largest Palestinian group. Nearly three-fourths of all Gazan respondents supported "implementing the self-rule experience in the rest of the West Bank."

"The Oslo Accord has strengthened Arafat for now."

Hamas contends that the current street support for the Oslo/Cairo agreements will not last. "The Oslo Accord will destroy itself in due time," says Muhsen Abu Aita, a Hamas leader in Gaza. Hamas did not initially work to destroy it, as it did not want to be blamed for its failure, he says. "This doesn't mean that Hamas will accept an observer role; Hamas will work to reinforce its principles and positions."

Throughout the summer, Arafat, who had returned in July to live in Palestine for the first time since 1967, enjoyed relatively strong popular support. While Gazans now enjoy life without Israeli soldiers shooting people and nightly curfews, Gaza's economic and social conditions continue to challenge Arafat's efforts. Unemployment in the Gaza Strip is estimated at 58 percent and rubbish still litters the streets.

"Without the funds promised by the international community, Arafat's honeymoon in Gaza will be short lived," predicts Ahmed Hassan, a political economist at the Islamic University. "Many of the opposition factions are simply waiting for what they see as the Oslo lies to emerge. They will then be in a much stronger position to deal with Arafat."

By August, the Izzadin al-Qassem units of Hamas and Islamic Jihad gunmen had emerged to attack Israeli targets in Gaza. This forced Arafat who, to get the funding he needs to provide employment, must satisfy the Americans, Israel, moderate Arab regimes and his own people, to do something. His police arrested, and then released, dozens of Islamic activists in early September. This marked the beginning of the end of Arafat's effort, since he arrived in Gaza, not to offend the Islamic opposition.

The first words out of Arafat's mouth when he returned to Gaza at the beginning of July were to promise Sheikh Ahmed Yassin, the founder and spiritual leader of Hamas, that Arafat would work for his release from Israeli imprisonment. Sheikh Yassin, who is in a wheelchair, is serving a sentence of life plus 15 years in isolation in an Israeli prison on charges that he ordered the killing of Palestinian collaborators and IDF soldiers.

"Red Lines"

Arafat's return speech in Gaza was not the only indication the Palestinian leadership is sensitive to the potential power of the Islamic forces. Sheikh Jamal Mansour, a Hamas leader from Nablus, describes "red lines" that the new Palestinian authority should not cross. These red lines are: freedom of expression in mosques; the right to speak about the Islamic point of view on all subjects; the right to carry out educational, charitable, social, religious and political activities in the mosques; the right of Islamic institutions to independence; and the right to assembly and publicity.

"We are not going to confront the Palestinian authorities nor other factions," says Sheikh Mansour. "But they, too, should respect our activities and not confront us." Hamas leaders may not yet be ready to confront Arafat's authority, but their gunmen seemingly have their own agenda.

It is revealing that the "red lines" articulated by the Hamas leadership in Palestine are not just political. Hamas supports an increasingly significant share of social and charitable institutions in Gaza. For the poor in Gaza, who comprise a huge majority of the population, Hamas provides badly needed relief through mosques and other Islamic institutions. It is through such charity, administered by trusted leaders who spend money honestly, more than as a popular political alternative to the PLO, that Hamas finds support in Gaza.

It is equally revealing that the "red lines" include nothing about military activities. That indicates that the political leaders of Hamas are weary of the popular al-Qassem units, who led the military struggle in Gaza against the Israelis for the past two years. "Hamas leaders increasingly feel that they have no control over the al-Qassem cells," explains Sheikh Mohammed Akel in Shati Camp. "There is a debate now within Hamas whether to become a legitimate Islamic opposition political party or to remain underground and continue to attack Israeli targets. This is a dangerous game to play, both with Rabin and Arafat, as it will force them to react."

Arafat is under intense pressure from Rabin to stop any attacks originating from areas under his authority. The Israeli leader has vowed to halt the autonomy agreement and has threatened to use his own military forces to stop Hamas, even within Palestinian areas, if Arafat cannot.

While it may appear that the Palestinian National Authority and Hamas are heading for a showdown, on a local level Hamas and Fatah often find it easier to cooperate, especially in areas where Israeli occupation remains brutally intact. On June 6, for example, the two groups reached an agreement in Hebron to respect each other's opinions and not to provoke each other in leaflets, painted slogans, or posters. Hebron is one area where Hamas and the PLO still coordinate resistance to the occupation. The unifying forces for the two are continuing outrages by Israeli settlers and the tough measures employed by the IDF against Palestinian residents of Hebron since the Feb. 25th massacre of Moslem worshippers at the Ibrahimi mosque by Israeli settler Dr. Baruch Goldstein.

While there is conflict between the military cells and leadership within Hamas, there also is much debate within Hamas whether to participate in the autonomy rule. "Conflict of opinion is the pride of the Islamic movement," says Abu Aita in Gaza. "There is freedom of opinion and analysis until the central decision is made."

Though debate in Hamas over whether to form a political party existed before the autonomy accords, it has increased since the Cairo agreement in May. "Considering the current changes, I see a need to form a political party to represent the Islamist voice," says Ghanem Hashash, fresh from prison. "I think many Islamists are convinced of this idea."

So far, Hamas says it will not participate in elections, which have been delayed again until December. "The future is for Islam, and we won't participate in any autonomy elections," says Ibrahim Yazouri, a Hamas leader in Gaza. "We oppose the peace agreement and refuse to give it legitimacy."

Hamas also opposed the call by Arafat to hold a meeting of the Palestine National Council in Gaza. "The Islamic movement, though playing an important part in Palestinian society, is not represented on the PNC at all," says Yazouri. "This proves the limited nature of the democracy that the Palestinian authorities will allow the Palestinian people to enjoy."

Whether the new Palestinian authority will allow the Palestinian people to experience real democracy remains to be seen. What is certain is that continued military attacks on Israelis and suspected former collaborators by the al-Qassem units in Gaza cannot be tolerated by PNA security police.

"We are in the process of peace," said PNA Minister Nabil Shaath, following an ambush in Rafah that left an Israeli officer dead. "In the Gaza-Jericho agreement, no one has the right to carry out military operations."

Hamas holds that this position eventually will hurt Arafat, as the ambush such as the one in Rafah will be supported by Gazans with fresh memories of hundreds of Palestinians killed and thousands injured by the Israel Defense Forces.

"We hope Arafat will continue to protect Israeli settlers and soldiers from our freedom fighters, as the people will then see the real weakness of the Oslo Accord," says an al-Qassem fighter in Khan Younis. "People may support the withdrawal of the Jews from Gaza, but they will never support protecting them while they continue to occupy Islamic Palestine."

For many, however, Arafat is not protecting Israeli soldiers and settlers but rather his own authority and ability to govern an autonomous region that is a political, economic and social powder keg. How long he can keep the lid from blowing, thus vindicating Israeli opponents of any land-for-peace agreement who assert that Palestinians are incapable of democratic self-government or maintaining the peace, depends greatly on the ability of the Hamas leadership to control its military wing.

"If they do not control their fighters, we will do it for them," says a PLO officer in Rafah grimly. It is clear, however, that a confrontation between Hamas and the Palestinian National Authority in Gaza will be a disaster for all factions and people in Palestine.

Stephen J. Sosebee, a free-lance writer, is a founder of Palestine Children's Relief Fund.