With Release of FIS Leaders, War or Peace in Algeria at Stake in Talks

By Aicha Lemsine

Since mid-September, a great deal of ink has been spilled about the release from prison to house arrest of Abassi Madani and Ali Belhaj, leaders of Algeria's outlawed Islamic Salvation Front, or FIS. During that time, more Algerian blood also has been spilled in the course of continuing power struggles.

After more than two years, the civil strife in Algeria has claimed the lives of close to 10,000 people. In the fortnight following the release of the FIS leaders, 19 Algerians were killed, among them an imam and leader of the moderate Islamist Hamas party in the eastern city of Constantine.

Madani and Belhaj's release gives renewed hope for a more constructive national dialogue and for an end to the violence in Algeria. Yet, in the short term, the price to be paid will be very heavy. Recent events are likely to unleash a wave of blind and brutal violence on the edges of the various Islamist factions, among the secularist opposition and between the elite cliques of the regime itself.

Algerian President Liamine Zeroual's strategy of conducting a national dialogue which includes the banned Islamic Salvation Front is designed to cultivate not only the moderate elements of the FIS, but also of the army. Some senior officers oppose Zeroual's tactics, and the president's political strategy carries considerable risks for him and his position.

The release of the FIS leadership is a triumph of the moderates over the hard-liners, both among the military and the Islamists. It is also, however, the opening bell in a bitter fight between two opposing groups of political and military strategists.

As a result of his secret talks with Madani and Belhaj over the last few months, Liamine Zeroual has won the first round, since the FIS leaders have downplayed their previous political demands. These included the release from prison of all jailed FIS activists, reinstatement of their party's legal status, recognition of FIS victories in the December 1991 parliamentary elections, resumption of the canceled second round of voting, reparations for victims of military repression and amnesty for those accused of terrorist acts.

Now everything seems to be on the negotiating table, as the FIS leadership's declaration demonstrates: "Future negotiations will allow for a just and legitimate solution for the return of stability in our country, and will give the Algerian people the necessary foundation to construct a civilized society in accordance with the principles of Islam."

Most notably, the FIS appears ready to forego the restoration of the results of the parliamentary voting in favor of pursuing future presidential elections, which will more quickly determine the path, Islamic or republican, that Algeria will pursue.

In the short term, the price to be paid will be very heavy.

The concessions made by the FIS already have provoked a reaction from the radical Armed Islamic Group (GIA), which has escalated its terror campaign within the country. The GIA has rejected the leadership of Abassi Madani and reiterated its refusal of any dialogue with the regime or with opposition parties. For the GIA, the Islamic state is to be forged in revolution, not through democratic negotiations.

Just as the bloody battle already has been joined between armed factions of the FIS loyal to Madani and Belhaj and the radical Islamist dissidents, there is a split within the army itself. This conflict pits the supporters of Zeroual and negotiations against the hard-line generals who fiercely oppose any discussions with the outlawed FIS. They believe that prolonged struggle against the Islamic Salvation Front is the best way to eradicate Islamism in Algeria.

On this rocky road toward civil peace in Algeria, the regime appears firm in its intention to proceed all the way with its transitional program, which is based on the restoration of democracy for groups of all political persuasions, including the re-establishment of the still-banned FIS. By first refusing to receive Sudanese Islamist leader Hassan Turabi, who had offered his good offices as a mediator to the Algerians, and then declining Abassi Madani's request to leave the country in order to "convince the other leaders of the FIS in exile to participate in the national dialogue," the government has made it clear that it intends to resolve the crisis within Algeria and among Algerians. Madani's desire to leave Algeria stems on one hand from the desire to avoid the eventual retaliation of the radical GIA, and on the other from the need to gain international media attention, such as that accorded in 1979 to the Ayatollah Khomeini in exile outside Paris before his return to revolutionary Iran.

A Tacit Complicity?

The hypothesis that there is tacit complicity between the FIS and the GIA is often put forward. This is no doubt true as it applies to the achievement of their common objective, creation of an Islamic state, but there is no agreement on the nature of the political system and on the question of leadership. The GIA is closer to the Iranian model, and already has its "sheikh in reserve"—even if he does not appear to be heeding the call—in the passionately anti-Western Ali Belhaj, the number two FIS leader. As for the FIS of Abassi Madani, it is less strident, along the lines of Saudi Arabia: theocratic and conservative on internal matters, but more open to international economic interests and Western politics in foreign affairs. It is not difficult to see the hidden forces at work behind the scenes in the Algerian "peace process."

As the third round of the ongoing government-opposition national dialogue talks begins, against the background of the release of the FIS leadership, the two figures most vulnerable are Liamine Zeroual and Abassi Madani. For this reason, the final months of 1994 may be decisive for the future of the country, as well as terribly bloody for civilians, political officials and intellectuals.

Foreign governments are making their plans accordingly. In this newest phase of cliff-hanger politics in Algeria, France still appears to be searching for a way to pull its chestnuts out of the Algerian fire. With its recent public accusation that Algerian military security authorities instigated last August's armed attack by five young Frenchmen of North African descent on the Hotel Atlas-Asni in Marrakech, which left two Spanish tourists dead and Moroccan-Algerian relations in tatters, the Alawite Kingdom of Morocco seems to have decided to try to score points with an eventual Islamist government in Algeria.

The U.S. is playing a game of wait-and-see. Even if the impact of Warren Christopher's foreign policy charisma on North African politics is open to discussion, the State Department's Algerian desk has the measure of the Algerian crisis. This is thanks in large part to the work of the last U.S. ambassador in Algiers, Mary Ann Casey, whose political objectivity and remarkable knowledge of the Algerian scene should surely help American policymakers negotiate the diplomatic minefield there.

Aicha Lemsine is an Algerian novelist whose political analyses appear often in the Arab press.