Somalia is a Test of U.S. Commitment for Africa

By Rep. Donald M. Payne

Like most of my Congressional Black Caucus colleagues, I have been opposed to the use of force to solve international disputes. If we had been given a chance to vote on action in Grenada and Panama, I am sure I would have voted against it as I did against the Gulf war.

I watched on TV the creation of safe zones in Iraq to feed the starving Kurds, and remembered how I had asked both the State and Defense Departments if we could not do this very same thing for the suffering people in Monrovia, Liberia. How easy it would have been for the 3,000 U.S. Marines waiting three miles off the shores of Monrovia to land and set up secure perimeters where suffering people could come for food and medical care.

The Defense Department said it was doable, but it would take a Presidential Determination. The State Department said it could be another Beirut and that casualties could upset the support President Bush was seeking for the Gulf war.

In other words, it was more in our national interest to save an undemocratic monarchy than a country our freed slaves had founded. Oil was supposed to be the reason that made sense. Yet, how many Americans realized that the African country of Angola, to which we didn't even grant diplomatic recognition, was supplying more oil to America than was Kuwait?

Then came Somalia. There is no need to describe the horrible genocide that was going on there. There were 800,000 refugees, a greater number internally displaced, and one out of five children under five dead.

The world watched with horror as the collective response of bilateral and United Nations assistance was an absolute failure. The Arab League and the Organization of the Islamic Conference were as mute on Somalia as the Organization of African Unity. Without any regional organization to rely upon in Somalia, like the involvement in Liberia of the Economic Community of West African States, the U.N. was forced to add the matter to its agenda.

After much vacillating, secretary-general Boutros Boutros-Ghali dramatically reminded the Western conscience that there were more people at risk in Somalia than in Kurdistan and Yugoslavia combined. We all remember how he chastised the Security Council of the U.N. for devoting too many resources to the ''rich man's war in Yugoslavia'' while turning a blind eye on a crisis "because it takes place in Africa." For once I felt someone was speaking for Africa, and that the needs of children of color were as important as those anywhere else in the world.

President Bush, addressing the Republican National Convention, made a case for airlifts to the starving Somalis. Operation Provide Relief commenced on Aug. 28, 1992.

When I visited Somalia in November 1992 it was obvious that our airlifts were unsuccessful. As soon as food was put down on the ground, it was taken by rival factions, or unaffiliated armed bands of young Somali men.

Upon my return I stated that, "I hope the Somalia tragedy is not what the new world order of protecting the weak against the strong is all about—allowing a country to die because it is no longer in the United States' political and economic interest. "

I concurred with Sen. Nancy Kassebaum and Rep. Mervyn Dymally, who had visited Somalia earlier, that the U.N. must ensure security by sending more troops as a part of UNOSOM I. But, I also recommended that the U.S. should set an example by volunteering our forces, which had the capacity to arrive before it was too late.

And arrive they did! Faced with this dilemma, President Bush consulted congressional leadership to commit U.S. ground forces under the banner of "Operation Restore Hope," thus insuring delivery of this needed assistance. He proved that the new world order was also for helping Black people as well as the rest of the world, which has strong meaning in my district of greater Newark.

We can be proud of the job our service personnel rendered in Somalia, a job done with sensitivity to Somali pride and respect for the preciousness of the human lives saved by their patience, diplomacy and discipline. The Weekly Review in Kenya headlined, "Somalia: The American Effort Was Well Worth It.''

Still, knowing that guns were being hidden until our forces would depart, and that disarming was key to peaceful long-term solutions, as we saw in Namibia, I argued that we should follow secretary-general Boutros-Ghali's advice that disarming should be added to our mission. If we had disarmed in Angola, like Namibia, the fighting there would not be going on today.

In a bipartisan effort, Rep. Dan Burton, ranking Republican member of the subcommittee on Africa, and I co-signed a letter to then-Secretary of State Lawrence Eagleburger on Dec. 22, 1992, urging that disarming of warring factions, wherever noticed, should be added to the terms of engagement. (On hindsight, it would have been much easier to do at the time when we had massive U.S. forces in Somalia, under one command, than it is today.) While the disarming did not happen as a part of the UNITAF operation, I was pleased that President Clinton then gave full support to pursue this task as a part of UNOSOM II.

The Senate took the first step toward authorizing the use of U.S. forces in Somalia on Feb. 4, 1993. The House of Representatives also took responsibility on May 25, 1993, by amending S.J. Res. 45 to authorize U.S. troops to remain for one year (which is renewable), and to implement United Nations Security Council Resolution 814. The House also included in its amendment a War Powers authorization to be used in the event that U.S. troops are engaged in hostilities.

President Clinton, along with other administration officials, has remained strong in his conviction that we must follow through on the task we have begun as a part of UNOSOM II. Defense Secretary Aspin, in his speech of Aug. 27, specifically pointed out that we should bring U.N. combined troop strength up to planned levels of 5,000 more troops. He also proposed "to continue removing heavy weapons from the militia and begin planning for implementation—in conjunction with Somali police—of a consistent weapons control policy.''

It is important to note that there has been considerable success in re-establishing the Somali police and local government councils as well as other aspects of civil society almost everywhere in Somalia with the exception of southern Mogadishu. And in Kismayu, a former trouble spot, Belgian peacekeepers have organized negotiations among clan elders, who have publicly thanked the United Nations for its efforts.

The U.N. and the U.S. Rapid Deployment Forces clearly must change their tactics once again to minimize civilian deaths and risks to the lives of peacekeepers. They must refocus on the fundamental U.N. objectives of reconciliation and rehabilitation. Much as it bothers me, I realize it now may be necessary to find some formula to bring Gen. Mohamad Farah Aidid into the negotiations. Both Eritrea and Ethiopia have offered their assistance, and it would be good to involve them.

Unfortunately, the Senate never acted on the amended S.J. Res. 45. The passage of the Byrd Amendment to the Senate's defense authorization bill was a quick out after the killing of 24 Pakistani troops on June 4 and the subsequent controversy over the best way to handle the Aidid crisis. Sen. Byrd warned that the Senate had never endorsed nation building in Somalia (for which disarming private Somali militias would be necessary).

On Sept. 9, the Senate adopted an amendment expressing the sense of Congress that the president should by Nov. 15 seek and receive congressional authorization in order for the deployment of U.S. forces to Somalia to continue. The House soon followed with the passage of the companion Gephardt Amendment.

Let us not blame the present administration, nor the U.N., even though we may wish the U.N. had performed more effectively. Let us be clear that the blame lies with warlord Aidid, who now is responsible for the deaths of 70 peacekeepers who were only trying to prevent the recurrence of disaster in Somalia.

Our present policy is making Aidid a folk hero, thus giving him more power than he enjoyed when he ejected former dictator Siad Barre. The subsequent diplomatic overtures made by U.S. representatives during Operation Restore Hope days also led him to expect U.S. support for his aspiration to lead a future Somalia.

There was a period in our engagement in Somalia when, for the first time in many years, America was viewed by the world community as helping the powerless and homeless—and without a Cold War agenda. Let us not forget that the guns that need to be gathered and stacked were provided by the U.S. and the former Soviet Union in pursuit of that Cold War agenda. We fought the Cold War on African soil. We have a moral responsibility to bring peace to this troubled land and to finish the job we started under Operation Restore Hope.

Now is the time for America's diverse population to come together in a show of unity for its commitment for Africa. To run when the going gets tough will not only be divisive for Somalia, but for our own population as well.

A commitment to Africa is in our national interest because it is the honorable ethical action to take. These are the values upon which our country was founded. The world expects no less from us today.

Representative Donald M. Payne (D-NJ) has visited Somalia three times within the past year. A member of the House Foreign Affairs Committee and the subcommittee on Africa, he is chair of the Congressional Black Caucus Foreign Affairs Task Force.

For another view of U.S. involvement in Somalia, see "Other Voices," page 99 of this issue.