November/December 1993, Page 27

Words to Remember

The PLO-Israeli Agreement: Breakthrough to Peace or Sellout of the Century?: August 25-October 1, 1993

When the news broke in the last week of August that, while the Washington Middle East peace talks were grinding to a halt after 10 rounds, at least 14 rounds of secret contacts in Norway and elsewhere had produced a breakthrough agreement almost ready for signing, the general reaction was incredulity. The agreement divided Israeli moderates from Israeli extremists, Arab moderates from Arab rejectionists, and, ultimately, the wary skeptic from the desperate optimist inside individual Arabs and Israelis alike. Voices of participants, journalists, and the people who may live with the results for the rest of their lives tell the story in words to remember:

"If reports in the Arab press are to be believed, recent secret talks between the PLO and Israel have yielded the outline of a possible understanding that ostensibly would be taken up when Middle East peace negotiations resume in Washington next week. The Arab reports outlined a first-stage accord in which Israel would pull back from the Gaza Strip and the West Bank city of Jericho and allow Palestinians a semblance of self-rule . . . Leading Palestinian figures say Mr. Arafat has made decisions without consulting the multiple political wings in the Palestinian movement . . . Mr. Arafat, who has always appeared to be a hawk holding out for the hardest Palestinian positions, is now accused of selling out just because, as a West Bank resident put it . . . 'he wants to be president of a state, on any piece of land."' —Correspondent Youssef Ibrahim, New York Times, Aug. 25, 1993

"Foreign Minister Shimon Peres indicated in an interview with CNN that Israel is willing to give up more territory to Palestinians in Gaza and Jericho . . . It would include a declaration of principles that puts aside for now controversial issues such as the status of Jerusalem. . . 'We are certainly close, and I believe it's doable,' Mr. Peres said." —Washington Times, Aug. 27, 1993

"To achieve real, stable peace necessarily demands mutual recognition . . . Peace between the courageous requires that courageous steps be taken." —PLO Information Director Yasser Abed Rabbo, quoted in Los Angeles Times, Aug. 30, 1993

"I expect if an agreement is reached there will be violence. I expect assassinations." —Bir Zeit University lecturer Abdel Sattar Qassem, quoted in Washington Times, Aug. 30, 1993

"If Israel leaves, Gaza will become like Lebanon. There will be civil war." —Gaza Hamas activist Abu Mohammed, quoted in Washington Times, Aug. 30, 1993

"If they fail, all Israelis will see the failure as the end of any conceivable attempt to reach agreement with the Palestinians."—Director Joseph Alpher of Tel Aviv University's Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies, quoted in Washington Times, Aug. 30, 1993

"Once we withdraw from the territory, Arabs who want to kill us will rule there, and they will rule in areas that are very close to the coastline and to Jerusalem. They will basically surround us and they will threaten the country's security and existence." —Likud leader Benyamin Netanyahu, quoted in Washington Times, Aug. 30, 1993

"This is a process that was not carried out in the normal way with the usual accepted public discourse. . . so the final results will require a very close examination. But I think that what we are talking about is a turning point. It is not clear in which direction."—Conservative Israeli Minister of Economics Shimon Shetreet, quoted in Los Angeles Times, Aug. 30, 1993

"The government is creating a Palestinian state with its own hands and is endangering the existence of the state of Israel." —Likud party leader Moshe Katsav, quoted in Los Angeles Times, Aug. 30, 1993

"This is, in fact, an act of national treason. We are not going to call people to a civil war—we are opposed to that—but we are going to call people to a difficult struggle, something beyond the struggles we have already seen."—Secretary Uri Ariel of the Council of Judea, Samaria and Gaza, representing 125,000 Jewish settlers, quoted in Los Angeles Times, Aug. 30, 1993

"It's hard to exaggerate the significance of these mortal enemies constructively coming to terms. If the deal can be consummated, it will mark a breakthrough perhaps as dramatic as the Camp David agreements of 1978. . . Now Israel prepares to acknowledge an independent role for a people it denied for decades had any distinct political existence."—New York Times editorial, Aug. 31,1993

"Top administration officials were aware of the secret Israeli-PLO talks, but they tended to dismiss their potential. In part this was because they tended to dismiss the Israeli Foreign Minister, Shimon Peres, as a grandstanding statesman, and in part it was because of their even lower regard for Mr. Arafat." —Correspondent Thomas Friedman, New York Times, Aug. 31,1993

"All the talk is about Gaza and Jericho. Are they going to forget about the rest of our history in this land? My songs aren't just for Jericho, they tell a whole story of our roots here and generation after generation of Palestinians on this land . . . Now my leaders are suddenly telling me I need to tell a new story for a new occasion."—Palestinian folksinger Omar Al-Jallad, quoted in Wall Street Journal, Sept. 1, 1993

"In our Bible, it is forbidden to give up a centimeter of the Land of Israel . . . But if there is no alternative for the safety of Israel, then that is how it is. What can you do with one who is bigger? The Americans are dictating this."—Resident David Vaknin of Israeli West Bank settlement of Beit Shemesh, quoted in New York Times, Sept. 1, 1993

"I thought that by the time my children went to the army, there would tee peace. . . Enough of it. We can't keep talking for another 100 years, and I think the Arab leaders are tired of war too. With peace, you might lose some land, but you don't lose people. There is no family in Israel that hasn't lost someone."—Resident Baruch Gigi of Israeli West Bank settlement of Beit Shemesh, quoted in New York Times, Sept. 1, 1993

"Because Palestinian infrastructure has been neglected for many years, the [West Bank and Gaza] economy will need some external financial assistance in the next few years. But the amounts needed will be small by international standards, perhaps $500 million to $700 million a year—and the Palestinians already receive about $200 million a year in foreign aid." —Economics Department head Stanley Fischer of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Wall Street Journal, Sept. 1, 1993

"I think we're at the threshold of such a moment as Sadat's visit to jerusalem . . . We know the rejectionists are out there. We know there are people willing to kill and maim."—National director of the B'nai B'rith Anti-Defamation League Abraham Foxman, quoted in Washington Post, Sept. 1, 1993

"The presence and threat that Hamas represents actually helps the PLO. It makes it clear that the PLO is a secular. . . and. . . nationalist organization that is prepared under certain conditions to live with Israel." —President Jerome Segal of the Jewish Peace Lobby, quoted in Washington Post, Sept. 1, 1993

"I am both elated and apprehensive." —Executive Director Henry Siegman of the American Jewish Congress, quoted in Washington Post, Sept. 1, 1993

"The two peoples are finally about to come to terms with the simple fact that they are two peoples and that, for both of them, the country is their homeland . . . What if they cheat? And what if they take whatever we give them and demand more, still exercising violence and terror? . . . If worse comes to worse, if it turns out that the peace is no peace, it will always be militarily easier for Israel to break the backbone of a tiny, demilitarized Palestinian entity than to go on and on breaking the backbones of eight-year-old stone-throwing Palestinian kids. . . From a Zionist perspective, it may be that in the future, people will regard 1993 as the end of our l00 years of solitude in the land of Israel. This may be the end of the prologue for Zionism and now, perhaps, it's time to begin the Israel story proper: to consolidate Israel as a safe, stable, legitimate home for the Jewish people and its Arab citizens, a focus of creative energies and a source of blessing for Israel's neighbors—including the Palestinians." —Israeli novelist Amos Oz, a founder of Israel's Peace Now movement, in New York Times, Sept. 2, 1993

"Mr. Rabin wants to win the next election and to head the government . . . Mr. Peres, his old rival and sometime partner, now wants to cap his own career by bringing peace. The two battlers, notorious for their personal political vendettas against each other, are now working in tandem . . . Unlike the Shamir-Likud government, which would not move an inch in terms of territory to gain peace, the Rabin Peres government and its partner Meretz are sincere in their desire to achieve peace. " —Prof. Amos Perlmutter of American University, editor of the Journal of Strategic Studies, Washington Times, Sept. 2, 1993

"What is about to begin . . . is a testing period of momentous consequences. . . [and] a chance for both Israelis and Palestinians to show whether they can keep their more radical elements under control.'' —Los Angeles Times editorial, Sept. 2, 1993

"The [Israeli] right, while thrown off-balance this week by the sudden agreement, says it is not about to be shoved onto the curb. Nor will it be polite, it says. Settlers in particular feel bruised by Mr. Rabin, who barely camouflages his disdain for them. A few weeks ago, he called them 'crybabies,' and he repeatedly makes clear that he cares mostly about the 98 percent of Israeli Jews living inside the boundaries that existed before the 1967 Middle East war, not the 2 percent on the other side." —Correspondent Clyde Haberman, New York Times, Sept. 2, 1993

"We've been up the hill and down the hill before with the Middle East, but these people are really working at it and I think their hearts as well as their minds are in it . . . I think we should keep our fingers crossed. We're just a sponsor of the process. They will have to make the agreement. And I think there is reason for hope." —U.S. President Bill Clinton, Sept. 2, 1993

"The United States will participate in the matter, but the funds I think will primarily come from others. Many in the Middle East have a large stake in trying to make this successful. The Gulf countries, countries around the world, I think, will be interested in participating. The United States, as usual, will do its part." —U.S. Secretary of State Warren Christopher, Sept. 2, 1993

"Arab anger at how the accord was reached will dissipate in time but legitimate questions will linger. Many Palestinians and other Arabs fear that the Gaza-Jericho formula institutionalizes Palestinian political weaknesses, fragmenting the integrity of the Israeli occupied territories and holding out little or no hope of further significant Palestinian gains. They worry that Israel's bilateral engagement of the Palestinians could grievously dilute the concept of a comprehensive Arab-Israeli peace accord based on U.N.Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338. The burden is also on the PLO to address Palestinian-Arab concerns about potentially serious issues like the status of Jerusalem, refugee flows, economic investment decisions, military security and political sentiments in the region."—Jordanian editor Rami G. Khouri, New York Times, Sept. 3, 1993

"This is the opportunity for the Middle East to make it into the 21st century. It now has a chance not to be a backwater. Israel hasa chance to realize its potential to be the Singapore of the Middle East . . . It's more than the Berlin wall, because a whole range of political relations that were seen as inconceivable have now become possible." —Pro-Israel historian Steven Spiegel, University of California at Los Angeles,quoted in New York Times, Sept. 3, 1993

"I think that Israel feels now that the risk of aggressive peacemaking presents more opportunity and less risk down the road than the alternative of simply maintaining the status quo with its endless cycles of war, terrorism and hostility."—Executive Vice President David Harris of the American Jewish Committee, quoted in New York Times, Sept. 3, 1993

"This is the first step toward the establishment of a Palestinian state, which I think will happen sooner rather than later. And far from being a cause of peace and stability, I think it will be the cause of another war. As I see it, the Palestinians have finally decided to adopt the so-called phase strategy, which calls for getting a foothold to begin with, with a state in phase 2, and then using the state as a launching pad for a final assault."—Neo-conservative editor Norman Podhoretz of Commentary magazine, organ of the American Jewish Committee, quoted in New York Times, Sept. 3, 1993

"The events of the last few days, to the extent that the dream turns into a reality, represent not only a dramatic change in the Middle East, but also an extraordinary achievement in normalizing the lives of every citizen of the state of Israel who has dreamed of peace since 1948 but never had a day of it. . . There's going to be a vigorous debate in this country. But I think that the major Jewish organizations will support the decisions reached by the Israeli government."—President Steven Grossman of the American Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC),quoted in New York Times, Sept. 3, 1993

"The plan is a decision to defeat the Palestinian people and to extend the occupation under the framework of self-rule . . . Everyone who participates in selling the plan will not escape the account of Palestine and its sons." —Leaflet signed by Islamic Jihad group in the occupied territories, quoted in Christian Science Monitor, Sept. 3, 1993

"If the keys to the Gaza Strip are actually handed over, the Palestinians who take control will find they have inherited a political and administrative nightmare. Where there is bold talk of building ports, factories, schools and highways, of a flourishing democracy and bustling gateways to the Arab world, the reality is grim. . . How these frustrations are played out in the next few years could be critical to the success of a Palestinian self-rule experiment in Gaza. If Palestinians feel their standard of living is improving and if they remain enthusiastic about the peace agreement, the support for Islamic militancy could fade."—Correspondent David Hoffman, Washington Post, Sept. 3, 1993

"The Palestinians do not just get an embryonic state. They get an endowment too. The Palestinians were bankrupted by their unfortunate backing of Saddam Hussain in the Gulf war. The Saudis and Kuwaitis, understandably miffed, cut off their mendicant brothers. Now the Palestinians not only get the occupied territories, they get Israeli [and American] collaboration in obtaining a huge cash infusion from the West to make them a going concern . . . War weary, hungry for peace, Israel is putting its existence on the line. Israel's offer to the Palestinians deserves credit for its generosity. Its wisdom, which hinges on how correctly it has read the Palestinian mind, has yet to be determined."—Pro-Likud syndicated columnist Charles Krauthammer, Washington Post, Sept. 3, 1993

"For us, Jerusalem is the most important issue, and the Jews say it has been unified forever . . . Also the issue of the Jewish settlements in the occupied territories. Israel refuses to remove them. Third, the border. The borders will remain under Israeli authority. So where is Palestinian authority? It is a joke."—Gaza Islamic Society head Sheikh Hassan Deib, quoted in Los Angeles Times, Sept. 3, 1993

"The best gift American friends can give Israel is to put away the political mudballs and listen harder and more carefully to those onboth sides of the most important decisions since the birth of Israel. "—Pro-Israel columnist A.M. Rosenthal, New York Times, Sept. 3, 1993

"Neither side told even American Secretary of State Warren Christopher about the meetings until Aug. 6 in Jerusalem becausethey feared the Clinton administration was so pro-Israel it would gum up the works. . . [But] the Israeli-Palestinian conflict was destroying Israel's economic future. Because of the seemingly endless conflict, there was no foreign investment at all, there was no effective way to absorb and give jobs to the hundreds of thousands of Russian Jews who were flocking to Israel, and Israel was getting none of the high-tech industries for which its population was so well trained. In short, one of the most highly educated and able populations in the world was falling behind far lesser nations due to its obsession with keeping down its neighbors . . . Also worthy of note here is the stubbornness of former President Bush and Secretary of State James Baker. For without their tenacious work on the Middle East peace, none of this would have happened. If they had not pushed the peace negotiations, the parallel track in Norway would never have happened. Without their holding up the $10 billion in loan guarantees to the right-wing and no-negotiations Likud government, this Labor government would never have come to power."—Washington Times editorial, Sept. 4, 1993

"Palestinian officials do not hide the fact that recognition from Israel is now a cornerstone of Mr. Arafat's policy. In effect he has gambled that after recognition from Israel, he can quickly get similar recognition from the United States and West European governments, opening the way for funds to flow to his cash-strapped organization. The money could be used to bring about the sort of tangible improvements in the lives of Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza Strip that have the power to elicit support for the peace plan and stanch the growing popularity of the Islamic Resistance Movement, or Hamas, and other fundamentalist groups." —Correspondent Roger Cohen, New York Times, Sept. 4, 1993

"After 15 years in which we have been fighting against the Israeli government to have them recognize the need to come to terms with the Palestinians, it has finally happened and people want to express their support."—Israeli Peace Now spokesman Tzali Reshef, quoted in Washington Times, Sept. 5, 1993

"There will be some groups—and it's enough to have two or three groups—who will organize to do something to stop the process. That might include assassinations of figures in the government . . . If people define the situation as threatening the existence of the Jewish state, if you say some ministers are traitors, if you say it is a death sentence for the Jewish future, those kinds of words are the essential step toward organizing a group that will act accordingly." —Professor of religious affairs Menachem Friedman of Bar Ilan University in Israel, Associated Press, Sept. S, 1993

"The laws of the Torah override the laws of the government. They override the laws of the army." —Former Chief Rabbi of Israel Shlomo Goren, justifying on Israeli television the possible assassination of PLO Chairman Yasser Arafat, Associated Press, Sept. 5, 1993

"Today we are heading into the hardest battle, the battle for peace. There is nothing for us in Gaza. The sooner we get out, the less trouble there will be for us and the dangers to our sons who must serve there." —Israeli Housing Minister Binyamin Ben-Eliezer, quoted by New York Times, Sept. 5, 1993

"By doing this shameful and suicidal act, I think this government has forfeited its right to be regarded as a legitimate government of Israel. This is an act of high treason."—Former TehIya Party Member of the Knesset and resident of West Bank Qiryat Arba settlement Elyakim Haetzni, quoted in New York Times, Sept. 5, 1993

"Yesterday I received what I might have expected to receive a little earlier from the Palestinian leadership and President Arafat—a complete package on all that has been reached so far. I read it thoroughly and our position is one of full support."—King Hussein of Jordan, quoted in Washington Post, Sept. 5, 1993

"Among all the Arab parties at the peace talks, the Palestinians have always been recognized as the ones with the hardest task, and with the most to lose if the peace talks failed. It is not surprising, therefore, that they should try so hard to achieve some agreement with the Israelis, even at the risk of upsetting their peace partners . . . There has never been the slightest prospect—given the situation as it stands now—that the Israelis would suddenly agree to full and immediate fulfillment of Resolution 242. The Gaza/Jericho option appears to be a possible way out of the deadlock."—Editorial in Gulf Times, Doha, Qatar, Sept. 5, 1993

"In the end, Shimon Peres and Yasser Arafat turned to each other because they had no place else to go. Their joint desperation leaves their joint draft political accord vulnerable to pot-shooting from all sides. But the agreement sets in motion an Israeli-Palestinian chain reaction that offers hope for an end to nearly 100 years of civil war in the Holy Land. . . Mr. Peres turned to secret contacts with the PLO in Oslo as an alternative to the Washington talks. He dragged Mr. Rabin, and the Clinton administration, along once he could show that Mr. Arafat was finally ready to accept the interim arrangements that had been on offer to the Palestinians since the 1979 Camp David peace treaty . . . While he attempts to disguise it in his flamboyant rhetoric in Tunis, the PLO chairman accepted in Oslo that his organization will play the role of enforcer of any potential Israeli-Palestinian peace on the West Bank and Gaza Strip." —Columnist Jim Hoagland, Washington Post, Sept. 6, 1993

"In Israel, the Tel Aviv stock exchange soared to record highs yesterday, with investors apparently euphoric that peace was near. Leaders in the Arab world continued to line up behind the peace plan. The Central Committee of Mr. Arafat's Fatah movement— the mainstream faction of the PLO—approved the accord Saturday, as did Jordan's King Hussein. Syrian President Assad indicated his support for the plan yesterday after a six-and-a-half-hour meeting with Mr. Arafat. . . Six Persian Gulf Arab states also gave qualified approval to the accord. A press release said the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) foreign ministers 'welcome the draft agreement reached between the two sides as a first step toward achieving . . . full Israeli withdrawal from Arab lands and, at the forefront, Jerusalem' . . . In Cairo, the Islamic fundamentalist group Jihad urged Muslims to target Jerusalem and liberate the city from Israeli rule. Libya denounced the accord, saying the only just solution was the old PLO ideal of a single state including both Jews and Arabs. Iran said Saturday that it would fight the peace plan and warned PLO members not to become involved in a 'risky plot,' Tehran's official Islamic Republic News Agency reported." —Staff writer Martin Sieff, Washington Times, Sept. 6, 1993

"He [Arafat] has some internal opposition and even more dangerous external opposition from Hamas. But we weighed this decision carefully, and he knows there is no going back."
—Senior PLO political adviser Bassam Abu Sharif, quoted in New York Times, Sept. 6, 1993

"No one has any alternative. It is impossible to go back." —Israeli Foreign Minister Shimon Peres, quoted in New York Times, Sept. 6, 1993

"The self-assuredness in Tunis is in marked contrast to the mood just after the beginning of the latest round of Arab-Israeli peace talks when, at Arafat's urging, foreign ministers from the front-line states—Jordan, Lebanon, Syria and the Gulf nations—met in Damascus. Arafat was terrified that Syria would sign anearly peace agreement with Israel on the relatively uncomplicated Golan Heights matter and leave the Palestinians hanging. He feared the Jordanians might do the same thing, except that they were linked to the Palestinians on the same negotiating delegation." —Correspondent Kim Murphy, Los Angeles Times, Sept. 7, 1993

"How will I be able to tell the difference between a policeman and a terrorist? If I'm stopped by such a person, I'll shoot him, because there will be no other choice. We're surrounded here by a million Arabs who hate us and want to destroy us."' —West Bank Jewish settler Ilan Tanenbaum, reported in New York Times, Sept. 7, 1993

"Israel is in mortal peril. Nothing could be more dangerous for Israel's future than accord with the PLO." —Former Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir, quoted in Washington Times, Sept. 7, 1993

"Within the Palestinian community, Arafat seems to be fending off his critics chiefly because they are too disparate in location and mental outlook to unite behind a plausible alternative. Leftist radicals, Islamic fundamentalists and dissidents within Arafat's own mainstream Fatah faction of the PLO share no basis to build an alliance other than their distaste for the autonomy plan." —Correspondent William Drozdiak, Washington Post, Sept. 7, 1993

"This is a first step. There are more details and more work.We must build. Our capital will be Jerusalem and only Jerusalem." —East Jerusalem leader Faisal Husseini, quoted in New York Times, Sept. 7, 1993

"All the Muslims in the whole world will never give up this piece of land [Jerusalem]. I would accept half and half, but Israel won't give even one centimeter . . . This [agreement] is good for the whole world. If Palestine has a government, people there can work again. No one wants to invest there now. They are afraid. Arabs themselves don't want to build there. Maybe now they can invest there." —Palestinian-American businessman Jamil Mohammed, quoted in New York Times, Sept. 8, 1993

"The PLO is afraid of the rising strength of Hamas, and likewise the Israelis are worried about the rise of their own rightist groups. . . This is all an expression of weakness. I do not think the people will accept this." —Palestinian-American Prof. Ghada Talhami of Lake Forest College, IL quoted in New York Times, Sept. 8, 1993

"This is going in the direction of a revolt, a revolt of the people who are telling the prime minister to go no further. . .We can and will bring this government down." —West Bank settler's' leader Uri Ariel, quoted in Los Angeles Times, Sept. 8, 1993

"The greatest lie of them all is that this dangerous agreement will bring peace. . . It will not bring peace, it will bring more terror, more terror, more terror. It is laying the groundwork for the next war."—Israeli Likud leader Benyamin Netanyahu, quoted in Los Angeles Times, Sept. 8, 1993

"There has been no terrorism since the PLO renunciation except for that infamous Abbas raid. That was really an isolated incident of utter futility. Abbas was aiming precisely to disrupt American-PLO relations, which is the only thing he succeeded in doing. He didn't even hit an Israeli car. Nothing else at all has occurred to indicate a lack of resolve on the Palestinian side. No planes have been hijacked, no hostages have been taken. The Israeli security forces know this, and that is why the government believes us. . .The Americans made some errors of judgment about what the Israelis would or would not accept. It turns out that the Israelis were willing to accept far more than the American mediators who were speaking to us on their behalf. . . So, when the Jericho idea was presented to the United States, President Clinton and Secretary Christopher were mildly interested, but the team in charge of the peace process totally rejected it. That is why we took it to the Israelis directly. . .What we are seeing...is the start of a real historical reconciliation, not only between the Palestinians and the Israelis, but between the Israelis. Israel is to realize that the Palestinians do exist, that the PLO is, and the Arabs at large, not just a slogan for a terrorist group, but a real organization."—PLO leader Nabil Shaath, quoted by Nathan Gardeis, Los Angeles Times, Sept. 8, 1993

"I think the fear of fundamentalism was the major factor that led Rabin to change his mind, and deal directly with the PLO in secret talks in Norway that reached an outline of a peace treaty . . . Rabin decided that the way to cope with the fundamentalists was to let the PLO do the job for him." —Israeli journalist Danny Rubinstein, quoted in Christian Science Monitor, Sept. 8, 1993

"There is a common interest to combat the religious . . . All the Arab leaders, including Arafat, feel threatened by them."—Palestinian political analyst Zakaria Al-Qaq, quoted in Christian Science Monitor, Sept. 8, 1993

"In the Middle East, the choices are never between bad and good . . . They are always between bad and worse . . . we decided to choose the bad rather than the worse."—Israeli Government Press Office Director Uri Dromi, quoted in Christian Science Monitor, Sept. 8, 1993

"We have in the region a common enemy, fundamentalism and poverty. . .What is starting to impress itself [on Arab leaders] is that without stability with Israel there can be no economic progress, and without economic progress, fundamentalism cannot be fought."—Israeli Foreign Office Director General Uri Savir, quoted in Christian Science Monitor, Sept. 8, 1993

"The PLO had for all practical purposes recognized Israel a long way back when it agreed to United Nations resolutions asking for respect for the territorial integrity of all states in the region. That in effect meant that the organization had given up its historic stance that Israel, illegally set up as it was, had no right to exist and must be liquidated. Yesterday's reports about mutual recognition moves merely indicate a formalization of the PLO's position—and its readiness to live alongside Israel within a separate and independent Palestinian state."—Editorial in Khaleej Times, Dubai, U.A.E., Sept. 10, 1993

"I could not believe it was finally taking place. . . So much time lost, so many lives wasted. It should have happened years ago."—Israeli peace activist Abie Nathan, quoted in New York Times, Sept. 10, 1993

"The least of our problems is going to be the PLO flag. They're going to bring in 30,000 terrorist Palestinian police and return 800,000 new terrorists kicked out of here since 1967. . .We're in big trouble. My home is in big trouble." —West Bank Jewish settler Yael Ami, quoted in Washington Times, Sept. 11, 1993

"They have postponed the make-or-break issues because they couldn't solve them. This next phase is pretty do-able, but then the road is going to get tricky. For the Israelis, the issues of their settlements and a security presence and Jerusalem are real tough issues. For the Palestinians, the final borders and statehood and Jerusalem are very tough issues to compromise on. But that's for later."—U.S. Middle East specialist William B. Quandt, quoted in Washington Post, Sept. 11, 1993

"For so many Israelis, until the intifada, the Palestinian entity was something nonexistent. They said it was only in the mind of the Palestinians. I think the five years of the intifada were a prolonged incubation, not only for the Palestinians to realize that they need to come to some kind of agreement but also for the Israelis to realize that the Palestinians do exist, that the PLO is not just a slogan for a terrorist group, but a real organization.—Director Reuven Gal, Israeli Carmel Institute, quoted in Washington Post, Sept. 11, 1993

"The intifada was another lesson in the limits of power. . . The intifada demonstrated compellingly to the Israelis and the world that we don't just have Palestinian refugees, but we have a Palestinian nation in our midst." —Israeli political scientist Yaron Ezrahi, quoted in Washington Post, Sept. 11, 1993

"Mr. Clinton has done his part to guarantee that Monday's event will come off as a rousing foreign policy plus for his administration. Serendipitously, he did not have to invest the time, political capital and major foreign aid package that Mr. Carter did in brokering Israel's 1979 peace treaty with Egypt. But in his Rose Garden appearance today, he linked the agreement with two other American successes—Camp David and the 1991 Madridtalks." —Correspondent Elaine Sciolino, New York Times, Sept. 11, 1993

"It was appropriate that Rabin went beyond emotion and ringing words, as Peres did too, to signal that the present agreement is the start of an unstoppable process which will give the Palestinian people a homeland of their own . . . The basic requirement is that all the lands occupied by the Israelis in the 1967 war are restored to the Arabs. If that happens, not only peace but prosperity—as envisioned at yesterday's ceremony—will become a reality." —Editorial in Gulf News, Dubai, U.A.E., Sept. 14, 1993

"It trivializes the Israeli-Palestinian dispute not to realize that it was real and irreducible: two peoples, one land. Only when the two had exhausted the quest for unilateral advantage could they begin to explore mutual accommodation. It took courage, and there were policy errors aplenty, but it took time and experience and blood too." —Washington Post editorial, Sept. 14, 1993

"Of course, who knows if it will work? But we know what doesn't work. The present situation doesn't work."—Israeli author David Grossman, quoted in New York Times, Sept. 14, 1993

"Yesterday's signing is only the beginning of a similar process in which both sides say the Americans must play a far more active role than they have so far. The agreement is a broad declaration with a deadly combination; it is purposely obscure in details yet ruthlessly speedy in timetable...Hidden in the closet—and alluded to only in passing yesterday—are the nightmare issues between these two peoples—the fate of Jerusalem and of Jewish settlements in the West Bank and Gaza; the right of Palestinian refugees to return to their former homes; and the size and powers of an independent Palestinian state. . . I'm apprehensive because I haven't seen in the past eight months the kind of energetic American involvement that we had before. This kind of activist approach just doesn't seem to jibe with the Clinton administration's style and priorities." —Deputy director Joseph Alpher of the Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies in Tel Aviv, quoted in Washington Post, Sept. 14, 1993

"[Rabin and Arafat] had something in common. Neither supported the Camp David process; Rabin believed that Begin made too many concessions to Egypt, while Arafat viewed Sadat as a traitor to the Arab cause and called for his assassination—a point President Clinton ignored yesterday. Both are battle-hardened survivors, not visionaries. Both believed that time was running out for them and that they had no choice but to deal with each other." —Columnist Glenn Frankel, Washington Post, Sept. 14, 1993

"PLO officials have said the accord might allow the return of some 800,000 Palestinians, most of whom were displaced to Jordan when it lost the West Bank to Israel in the 1967 Middle East War. Israel says the accord does not mention that."—Reuters correspondent Rana Sabbagh, Washington Times, Sept. 14, 1993

"If the Israelis and the Americans are going to impose a solution on us, they will have to face Iran, and they know what that means. There is a common interest between us and Iran in confronting the United States, Israel and their supporters at this time.The end result: Arafat will be killed, and the accord will fadeaway." —Ahmed Jibril, founder of the PFLP-GC,a Syrian-funded Palestinian militia and one of 10 Palestinian groups rejecting the Oslo agreement, quoted in Washington Times, Sept. 14, 1993

"Of course we're worried. But this is natural. When childrengo for the first day to the university, they get tense. On the daywhen a woman gets married, she gets tense.... We are aboutto start something new after 45 years of mobilization on bothsides." —PLO Adviser Bassam Abu Sharif,quoted in Los Angeles Times, Sept. 14, 1993

''To see a young Israeli, tall, good-looking, proud, and not to think of him as someone who might kill my son—that will be a wonderful day. . . And I hope that Israelis will come to look at us as people too." —West Bank merchant Said Musalla, quoted in Los Angeles Times, Sept. 14, 1993

"In recent months, the input of American policymakers has been so one-sided that it exasperated not only Palestinians but even the Israelis themselves. This was most evident during the May and June rounds of Palestinian-Israeli negotiations, when U.S. policymakers intervened, presenting draft documents that were unacceptable to both sides. In both cases the American drafts were less forthcoming to the Palestinians than the Israelis' drafts; a U.S. draft of a 'declaration of principles' went beyond the Israelis' proposals on a whole array of crucial issues, including who might ultimately have sovereignty over the territories. Unless the Clinton administration can learn to play an impartial role—taking as a starting point what the parties themselves say they want instead of what the United States thinks they should want—it will continue to be neither a mediator nor an honest broker, but rather a major obstacle in the path of peace." —Prof. Rashid Khalidi of the University of Chicago, adviser to the Palestinian delegation to the peace talks, International Herald Tribune, Sept. 15, 1993

"Basking in the afterglow of the accord on Monday between Israel and the Palestinians, Israel and Jordan signed an agreement today that provides the basis for resolving 45 years of hostility between them. . . The Jordanian-Israeli agreement could lead to settlement of their joint border, guarantees for Jordan's security and joint efforts to harness water resources, protect the environment and develop the Dead Sea region. But the most divisive issue between the two countries is the future status of the 1.5 million Palestinian refugees in Jordan." —Correspondent Elaine Sciolino, New York Times, Sept. 15, 1993

"For us to finally recognize Arafat from the outside is one thing, I can say hello to him on the street. But that is not all. Now he is coming into my house. We are going to share some of the rooms . . . It is much more complicated than the peace treaty with Egypt. There, space was being divided. Here it is being shared." —Israeli historian Meron Benvenisti, quoted in New York Times, Sept. 15, 1993

"Two issues will be critical here. Who will control water resources and who will control land-use zoning. Both are now in Israeli hands. Somehow they will have to share, because Israel draws water, for instance, from under the West Bank to irrigate fields as far away as Tel Aviv." —Correspondent Thomas L. Friedman, New York Times, Sept. 15, 1993

"There is a realization now that war is out of the question, and that empty slogans don't win peace. We missed so many chances in the past by not giving consideration to all aspects of what was on offer.”—Jordanian historian Hazem Nusseibeh, quoted in Christian Science Monitor, Sept. 15, 1993

"The Iranians are equally anxious and angry about this agreement. It is a deal that raises anxiety in places like Damascus and Baghdad as well, the more so since it appears that Palestinians by and large are rallying behind Arafat so far." —Columnist Qassem Janfar, Al Khayat, London, quoted in New York Times, Sept. 16, 1993

"We're talking about restructuring a society. As a result of the intifada and the repressive reaction to it, Palestinians went through a collapse of national institutions. In many areas, they have to be rebuilt from scratch. . . The education system needs revamping. The banking system needs to be modernized, while communication is also antiquated. . . And the water system is so polluted in Gaza that it now has one of the highest rates of kidney failure in the world." —Executive Director Khalil Jahshan, National Association of Arab Americans, quoted in Los Angeles Times, Sept. 16, 1993

"It's vital that both Israelis and Palestinians begin to see in short order that peaceful coexistence is tangibly in their interests. . .The overall initial aid requirement can be measured in the low billions, not peanuts exactly, but minuscule compared to what still more years of confrontation and violence would cost the region and the world. Economics now looms large as a key tomaking this bold new experiment in peaceful coexistence work."—Los Angeles Times editorial, Sept. 16, 1993

"When they agreed to this, both Arafat and Rabin most certainly unleashed forces which they will have great difficulty in controlling. In a historic sense, it's like what happened in the Soviet Union in 1985." —Kuwait University sociologist Khaldoun Naquib, quoted in Washington Post, Sept. 17, 1993

"If the peace process launched this month produces some form of acceptable Palestinian self-rule, an important foundation of authoritarianism in the Arab world is going to disappear. . . For the last quarter of a century, authoritarianism has taken one of its legitimacy's from the [Arab-Israeli] conflict itself because military people thought they could deal better with Israel than civilians."—Ghassan Salame, Institute of Political Studies in Paris, quoted in Washington Post, Sept. 19, 1993

"I think you'll find that both sides will crack down hard on their own outlaws . . . It's an absolute necessity for both sides to maintain a tight grip on security because it's necessary to lure investment and foreign aid." —PLO Oslo agreement negotiator Ahmed Qureita, quoted in Washington Times, Sept. 19, 1993

"The 'historical breakthrough' announced recently by the PLO and the Israeli government is a joint decision to signal a new phase of reconciliation between two enemies, but it also leaves Palestinians very much the subordinates, with Israel still in charge of East Jerusalem, settlements, sovereignty and the economy. Although I still believe in a two-state solution peacefully arrived at, the suddenly proposed peace plan raises many questions . . . For the more than 50 percent of the Palestinian people not resident in the occupied territories—350,000 stateless refugees in Lebanon, twice that number in Syria, many more elsewhere—the plan maybe the final dispossession. Their national rights as people made refugees in 1948, solemnly confirmed and reconfirmed for years by the U.N., the PLO, the Arab governments, indeed most of the world, now seem to have been annulled. . .I admire those few Palestinian officials who bravely aver that this may be the first step toward ending the occupation, but anyone who knows the increasingly slapdash, not to say irresponsible, methods of Arafat's leadership—its lack of care, precision and seriousness—is better advised to start working for a different future . . . Our struggle is about freedom and democracy; it is secular and. . . up until the past three years it was fairly democratic. Arafat has cancelled the intifada unilaterally, with possible results in further dislocations, disappointments and conflict for both Palestinians and Israelis." —Professor Edward W. Said, The Nation, Sept. 20, 1993

"There is no question that neither Rabin nor Peres could have pulled off the current diplomatic coup alone. . .Rabin was incapable of offering the moral support that could turn their contacts into anything concrete. Only Peres, with his vision and imagination, could...Only Rabin could sell the package to the public without evoking too many cries of 'treason.' The Rabin Peres team has thus proven invaluable, at least in the eyes of those who believe that the Oslo agreements are the best thing to happen to the peace process since Anwar Sadat's visit to Jerusalem in November 1977."—Susan Hattis Rolef, editor of Labor movement monthly Spectrum, in Jerusalem Post, Sept. 20, 1993

"I never shared the dream of a "Greater Israel," with settlements spreading up and down Judea and Samaria [on the West Bank], but I felt that, if others wanted to, well, let them. It took me a long time to realize how problematic these settlements were, how much of a military and financial and political burden, and how very, very few of our people, maybe 3 percent, wanted to live out there. But once I did, I thought, it's not fair that this 3 or 4 percent make us pay the price. . . I believe and know that if things get out of hand in Gaza and threaten Israel that Rabin will roll the tanks right through there. Arafat should know that too, and I think he does." —Israeli accountant Yosef Cohen, quoted in Los Angeles Times, Sept. 20, 1993

"Our Arab nation at this historic point needs to transcend the past, with all its pains and hardships, and face the future more strong and united, so our nation can deal strongly with the new world order as it is being crystallized, and so that it will not be at the expense of our people. Our talks with the Israeli delegation in Washington had reached a dead end because of a retreat from the principles upon which the peace process began.... In actual fact, the talks collapsed. We proceeded to respond positively to some of the side efforts and other channels that helped us exit from this dead end in order to try and break the deadlock. The agreement which we have reached. . . is only a starting step to laying down a transitional solution, which must be based on the withdrawal of occupation. . . from our territories and holy Jerusalem . . . Comprehensive peace can only be realized through a final solution and the establishment of similar solutions for all Arab areas." —PLO Chairman Yasser Arafat in talk to Arab League Ministers in Cairo, quoted in Los Angeles Times, Sept. 20, 1993

"Rabin's second big land-for-peace deal will be Israel's withdrawal from the Golan Heights in exchange for real peace with Damascus. Few who know Rabin doubt that he means it, but Assad may be wondering." —Columnists Rowland Evans and Robert Novak, Washington Post, Sept. 23, 1993

"The Knesset, rocked by anxious lawmakers shouting at full voice, approved the Israeli-Palestine Liberation Organization peace accord on Thursday in a 61-50 vote that gave Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin a mandate to stay in power and push forward with talks. . .Members of the Knesset outdid their usual raucous debate as they wound up 32 hours of discussions on the accord. . . But in the end, lawmakers voted along the usual party lines with only a few exceptions, including three defectors from the Likud opposition who said their consciences would not let them vote against peace even though they saw problems with the accord." —Correspondent Carey Goldberg,  Los Angeles Times, Sept. 24, 1993

"Economic success is no more assured than is a political triumph once Israelis and Arabs try to turn a handshake into specific agreements. But it is just as crucial. While development remains impossible without stability, neither can peace endure unless both Arabs and Israelis have vested economic interests in sustaining it. . . By many measures the region's potential is limited. A common market of Israel, Jordan, Palestine, Lebanon and Syria would have only 28 million people. Transport and utility systems are inadequate. The terrain is mostly desert and has little energy or water. None of the five states is likely to leave the international dole for years." —Correspondent Robert Keatley, Wall Street Journal, Sept. 24, 1993

"The dangers here go beyond all logic and beyond what the people can permit itself."—Israeli Likud leader Ariel Sharon, quoted in Los Angeles Times, Sept. 24, 1993

"We have finished the easy part. Now, we have the task of giving reality to the basic agreement we reached. We have become partners in peace and no longer adversaries in conflict." —Palestinian spokeswoman Hanan Ashrawi, quoted in Los Angeles Times, Sept. 24, 1993

"Economic reconstruction has to start immediately. If it doesn't, there will be a real collapse. Either we will have another Somalia or we will be one of the economic tigers...Our infrastructure has been destroyed during the long period of occupation . . . This is not just my responsibility, it is the responsibility of the international community." —PLO Chairman Yasser Arafat, quoted in Ankara by correspondent James Dorsey, Washington Times, Oct. 1, 1993