An Arab-Muslim Opponent

It's a Formula for Bloodshed

By Ahmad Abul Jobain

Its sponsors insist that the Gaza-Jericho First plan, flawed as it is, represents a positive milestone in the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. Voices of Palestinian dissent are characterized as lacking vision or advocating extremism. Yet Palestinian opposition cannot be ascribed solely to radicalism or religious zealotry. The flaws in the proposal are not minor glitches; they are major, potentially explosive defects. The document contains elements of failure—Palestinian economic dependence, tyrannical partisan politics, and institutionalized collaboration—and virtually none of success.

The parties involved have achieved nothing spectacular. Israel has been seeking to relieve itself of the "burden" of Gaza. Jericho is a backwater that offers the Palestinians no tangible gains. Nor is the concept of allowing East Jerusalemites (EJs) to participate in an election new. The Labor Party suggested such involvement during the 1980s when it supported a joint Palestinian-Jordanian confederation. EJs, according to that proposition, could vote, but Israel would retain sovereignty over the area. The Oslo agreement permits Israel to redeploy its troops, spares it the expense of a costly occupation, and leaves it in full control of the territories involved.

The text obliges all forthcoming "authorities," such as those for development and electricity, to conduct joint ventures with Israel. Even Palestinian social welfare must be a joint effort. Yet it is inconceivable, for example, that a seaport authority or an export promotion board will be able to function effectively if Israel "jointly" develops the entity's infrastructure and controls both its transportation requirements and foreign affairs. Furthermore, since Israel relies upon West Bank aquifers for its water needs, it is unlikely to hand over control of these vital resources to the Palestinians. The arrangement clearly is not conducive to the evolution of a self-reliant, independent Palestinian state.

Immediate chaos will result from establishment of a "Palestinian police force consisting of police officers recruited locally and from abroad" (holding Jordanian passports and Palestinian documents issued by Egypt). There is already significant evidence that the PLO and the Shin Bet, Israel's secret service, are cooperating to choose the "right" men for the job.

Inhabitants of the territories will have no opportunity to question the appointments. Furthermore, although the police are being trained in Jordan and Egypt, Israel has the final say in their accreditation. Imposition of these police on Palestinians wary of cooperation with Israel is a formula for lethal internecine conflicts between foreign Fatah supporters and intifada activists.

Although some present Palestinian "collaborators" with Israel will be publicly sacrificed, with Israeli and PLO approval, to legitimize the incoming Fatah men as loyal nationalists, Israel may in fact institutionalize its policy of using Palestinians as informants by giving them badges and a puppet PLO authority to answer to. Arafat's Fatah, in turn, will become Israel's sycophant, perpetually in fear of provoking Israeli encroachment on its authority.

The policemen who will come into the territories from abroad are almost all Fatah men who have never lived under occupation. They are loyal to Arafat and will punish anyone not displaying similar fealty. Arafat has paved the way for an intrafactional rift that will weaken the nationalist forces considerably. The leadership of Al'Asifa, a Fatah wing in the territories, issued a communiqué on Sept. 10 vowing not to end their confrontations with Israel. Should the incoming "police force" be seen as assisting Israel to eliminate this opposition, Arafat may gain authority, but will sacrifice his legitimacy in the process.

The inevitable disputes are based on several factors. First, the PLO has traditionally sought the mantle of the Palestinian people's sole representative. In doing so, it has demanded uniformity rather than flexibility or pluralism. In the interests of national unity, and with the absence of any other political force, it met with little opposition. Therefore, when it assumes any form of power within the occupied territories it will seek to implement its will rather than apply democratic principles.

Second, the secrecy that shrouded the agreement effectively excluded Palestinians under occupation from having a say in their political destiny.

Finally, one of the main motivations for this plan is the elimination of Hamas. Chaim Ramon, an Israeli minister, stated on Britain's ITN news broadcast that the government of Israel and the Palestinian "moderates" would join forces against the "extremists." In fact, it is possible that if the PLO does not, or is unable to, crush the Islamists, Israel will redeploy its troops into the territories, claiming that Arafat could not deliver on his promises.

Although some analysts marginalize Hamas' influence, doing so is a gross miscalculation that underestimates the likelihood of bloody confrontations. That, in the words of an Aug. 30 Hamas memo, "could become a civil war, [thus giving] support to the Zionist view that Palestinian people are immature and incapable of ruling themselves." The PLO has tried to play down the possibility by stating it has reached a "code of honor" with Hamas. Hamas, however, flatly denied that any deals have been made.

Hamas, being the most pragmatic Islamist group in the territories, is likely to adopt a "wait-and-see" attitude. It is important to note that the Hamas military wing, Katatib Izzedin Qassam, does not always conform fully to the leadership's orders. Because of Israel's repeated crackdowns, the combat units are decentralized.

In addition, individuals unhappy with the deal will probably carry out attacks in Hamas' name; and the Islamists will not deny responsibility. Therefore, technically, Hamas will continue its jihad against the occupier. Politically, however, it will be willing to enter the electoral process. Hamas handbills have repeatedly denounced Arafat as a traitor, but avoided displaying similar enmity toward the PLO so as to keep Hamas' options open for entering the political process.

Although the "declaration of principles" stipulates the introduction of elections, it is unlikely they will take place. Neither Israel nor Arafat wants to risk an Islamist victory for control of the Palestinian Administrative Authority. Rather, they prefer a system like Egypt's, whereby the Islamists can participate in union and university balloting, as they already do, but keep away from politics. The Islamists, therefore, probably plan to wait until the situation becomes intolerable before they go beyond anti-Arafat rhetoric into action.

Those granted power (and guns) by Israel, however, are unlikely to wait for the Islamists to consolidate their power. The PLO will attempt to discredit them as fanatics and question their loyalty to Palestinian unity while simultaneously isolating leaders and hunting activists. That there will be inter-Palestinian confrontation is certain. Nonetheless, in-fighting is not the only reason the plan will fail.

First, the terms of agreement are not legally binding; and the process is not, as some optimists have insisted, irreversible. Israel could redeploy forces into Gaza and Jericho at any time. It could claim that any one of the inevitable clashes is an infraction of the declaration of principles. Its military action would, therefore, not be deemed a violation of the plan.

The Palestinians, however, would have lost their bargaining edge and their six year-old uprising. Should Israel re-enter Palestinian towns, the residents would be unable to rekindle the resistance, since it has literally drained them of their resources.

Second, shelving the "right of return" ignores a significant number of Palestinians. Arafat will either propose that Arab states provide refugees with citizenship or he will attempt to buy them off with compensation. While this may comprise a short-term fix, it will not provide a permanent solution to this issue. Any Palestinian authority that does not guarantee some form of return for the refugees cannot hope to maintain public support.

Third, if East Jerusalem remains under Israeli administration, there will be no peace. Given Rabin's adamant rhetoric, it is unlikely that any substantive compromise will be reached. Israel may allow EJs to participate in municipal elections and may even allow the Palestinian authority the semantic privilege of calling East Jerusalem its capital. Israel, however, will certainly govern all the area's affairs. Nabil Shaath, Arafat's senior aide, has stated that the Palestinian entity can either be a Somalia or a Singapore. More realistically, it will adopt the authoritarianism of Syria, and deal with the opposition accordingly.

Ahrnad Abul Jobain is managing editor of the Middle East Affairs Journal.