An Arab-American Skeptic

Results Depend on Motives of the Signers

By Robert G. Hazo

Whether the Israeli-Palestinian agreement will lead to real peace depends not only on what happens in the next year or two, but also on the motives each side had for signing it. No one, therefore, has all the answers to the "real peace" question, not even the principals on each side.

On the Israeli Side

It is possible that Israeli leaders finally realized that living in hostile surroundings indefinitely was precarious at best. But this argument, which was demonstrated in the 1973 war, has been around for years. So has the Israeli leader who made the fateful decision, Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin. Up until now he had given no indication that he possessed the vision to recognize the force of the argument. Foreign Minister Shimon Peres, who does have that vision, as did Abba Eban before him, approved the negotiations, but it was Rabin's decision to sign, and Rabin heartily dislikes Peres.

It also is possible that Rabin realized that because of the U.S. public's growing concern about America's financial situation, the foreign aid on which Israel is so dependent increasingly is at risk. The only way for Israel ever to become economically independent, moreover, is to integrate its economy into the Middle East and beyond. Thus the agreement, and thus the Israeli and U. S. stress on economic development following the agreement.

It is possible, too, that the increasing deaths of Israelis at the hands of Islamic militants faced the Israeli government with unacceptable losses. Thus, it may have decided on the old colonial policy of divide and-rule, a continuing tactic it used in Lebanon to pressure the Lebanese government to curb the Hezbollah militia operating in the security zone. In the agreement with the PLO it is clear that the Palestinian authorities are obliged to suppress Palestinian attacks on Israelis. The words "strong police force" are not included by chance.

It also is possible that Israel was simply losing too many Jewish immigrants because of its severely restricted economic opportunities and the disincentive of endless guerrilla war.

On the Palestinian Side

Analysis of Palestinian motives for signing is easier because the focus of responsibility falls primarily on one man, PLO Chairman Yasser Arafat. It is entirely possible that he all along intended to take anything he could get in the way of a deal. He was short on money, having alienated the oil-producing states by siding with Saddam Hussain in the Gulf war. His mainstream Al Fatah movement was losing its monopoly on Palestinian leadership to local leaders in the West Bank and Gaza. Also, he may have believed sincerely that he had to negotiate now while something remained to negotiate, given the multiplication and expansion of settlements. Finally, one cannot dismiss the possibility that Arafat, approaching 65 after many brushes with death, was determined, one way or another, to become the first president of the Palestinian state.

Readers can pick and choose among the motives, but should keep two realities in mind as events unfold: First, a peace with dignity and independence for the Palestinians depends on how hard their popularly elected leaders and parliament negotiate over electricity, water and the other basics necessary to build their own economy rather than simply to service the Israeli economy. Second, deeply held attitudes of contempt on the part of the Israelis and hatred on the part of the Arabs will make the agreement vulnerable to disruption for a long time—perhaps for two generations —before true reconciliation and a firm peace are achieved. All this, for the foreseeable future, makes lasting peace a long shot, at best.

Robert G. Hazo is chairman of the Middle East Policy Association.