The Gulf War Reader

Edited by Micah L. Sifry and Christopher Cerf. Random House, 1991. 526pp. List: $15.00; AET: $11.95 for one, $15.00 for two.

Reviewed by George Shadroui

It is one of the ironies of the 20th century that information translated not into knowledge but confusion.

The assassination of President John F. Kennedy, a drama played out in front of a national press corps and recorded on film, remains one of the great "whodunits" of our time. One could add a long list of similar events, so clear at the outset, so confusing in the aftermath.

The Gulf war was no exception. Conspiracies abounded (and still do) about the motives of every major actor in the sorry tragedy. Did the United States give Saddam a green light, in order to cut him down to size? Did Saddam and King Hussein hatch a plot to divide the spoils of the Gulf? Never mind the causes, what about the results? Just how reliable were the much-touted high-tech weapons? And how many Iraqi soldiers and civilians were killed in what turned out to be one of the most lopsided wars in history?

More than six months after the war's end, such questions remain the subject of intense discussion, which only underscores the need for skepticism when reading or watching "comprehensive," on-the-spot analysis of the network-CNN-Time variety.

How, then, to approach The Gulf War Reader, edited by Micah L . Sifry and Christopher Cerf? Consisting mainly of documents, journalism and opinion released or written as events in the Gulf unfolded, the book as an historical resource has limited value. Public pronouncements by US President George Bush, Iraqi President Saddam Hussain and other public figures are interesting to read in full (again), but they reveal little new information.

The possible exception in this collection is a full transcript of the meeting between April Glaspie, America's ambassador to Iraq, and Saddam Hussain. It is clear to this reader, at least, that Ambassador Glaspie left that meeting convinced no invasion was imminent. Also of some historical note are the essays at the beginning of the book (Walid Khalidi's and Phillip Knightly's in particular) that review the bitter and complex legacies World War I imposed on the region.

The book's primary value is as criticism, not history. Many of the "facts" of the war will remain open to interpretation and doubt. Some will always see the United States and Israel as the puppet masters behind an essentially anti-Arab, imperialistic onslaught; others will maintain that Saddam Hussain alone is responsible for a war that wrecked the region and inflicted suffering on millions of Arabs.

Nor is it obvious that there was a clear course that would have averted tragedy. Those who supported the use of sanctions point to the massive destruction unleashed by the war and Saddam Hussain's survival to buttress their case. Those who supported a quick war wonder how long Saddam could have withstood sanctions and remained in Kuwait given his ability to survive one of the most devastating military defeats in history.

The Gulf War Reader is not likely to break new ground for those troubled by these "what if" questions. However, a number of the essays included do raise questions that are deeper and more permanent. Can the existing system of nation states survive peacefully? Will arms sales ever be controlled? Will human rights ever replace greed as a shaping force in human relationships? And is a civilized dialogue between Middle Eastern and Western cultures possible? On these issues, there is much intelligent comment and insight to be found.

A Sampling of Essays

Lewis Lapham asks why Bush should be so self-righteous in defense of a Gulf emirate with medieval notions of morality and on behalf of an America whose daily violence "would frighten all but the most remorseless Arab."

"The line Mr. Bush so boldly drew in so empty a desert was the line between profit and loss. To the capitalist sensibility, the geopolitics of money transcend the boundaries of sovereign states. The world divides, unevenly but along only one axis, between the nation of the rich and the nation of the poor.

In fact, Bush overreacted to the Iraqi aggression and thus transformed Saddam Hussain from a neighborhood bully into an international bogeyman, argues Edward Luttwak. Why create a world war, Luttwak asks, when a quick air strike would have sufficed to end the crisis?

Edward Said questions the US role in the war but also casts a trenchant critical eye at an Arab world locked in a conspiratorial, militaristic mindset.

"The time has come where we cannot simply accuse the West of Orientalism and racism—I realize that I am particularly vulnerable on this point—and go on doing little about providing an alternative."

Christopher Hitchens suggests the United States, by playing a cynical, immoral geopolitical game in the Middle East, sent confusing signals that Saddam Hussain eventually read to his own liking and to the near undoing of the region.

The passionate pleas in Congress for and against war retain much of their poignancy. Sen. Daniel Patrick Moynihan laments: "This is so unnecessary." Rep. Stephen Solarz proclaims it a war to thwart aggression, protect US interests, undo a gross wrong, and create a new international order: "If this isn't worth fighting for, I don't know as an American and as a Democrat, what is.

Many of the "facts" of the war will remain open to interpretation and doubt.

The Gulf War Reader includes anecdotes that are often more telling than the instant analysis of the international press: a member of a Gulf ruling family who gambled away $17 million during a visit to a Cannes casino a few weeks before the invasion of Kuwait; a Texas oil man who cynically sent Saddam a message of congratulations upon his occupation of Kuwait (and the prospect of higher oil prices); an American military censor who struck out the word "giddy" and replaced it with "proud" in a journalist's description of pilots returning from an early air raid over Iraq; an American Marine standing up at a table before the war and saying, "May God forgive us for what we are about to do."

One is left, in the aftermath, to contemplate the utter senselessness of the invasion and the muddled result of the American-led counterattack. So many people who had no power or choice got caught in the crossfire of these clashing armies. For many of them, all the talk of morality, national interests and new world orders will ring hollow; there will be only an empty place at dinner each night and a silence that will speak more powerfully to them than any words offered by newspapers, radio and television around the world.

George Shadroui is news editor of the Washington Report on Middle East Affairs.