Open Negotiations with the PLO

By Jerome Segal

The first thing the new Israeli government should do is to take a long look backward and a long look forward. Looking backward, it will see that 41 years ago the Palestinians and the Arab world rejected the United Nations partition resolution, rejected the idea of two states, and rejected Israel's existence. A look 40 years into the future is impossible without a crystal ball, but the Israeli government can see this much: If Palestinian nationalism is not met halfway, the conflict will continue into that distant future, and conflict over the next.

Then the Israeli government should look at the present. It will find that the PLO has accepted the partition resolution of 1947, that the PLO is calling for negotiations on borders, that the PLO has renounced terrorism, and that the PLO is prepared to base negotiations on resolutions 242 and 338 and the principle of self-determination and security for all peoples.

If the new government can see this much, then the basic policy decision is obvious: It should seek to open a negotiation process with the PLO. And it should seek to create an environment in which those negotiations have the best possible chance of leading not only to a negotiated settlement but to a lasting resolution of the conflict.

To move events in this direction, the new government should:

Announce that on the basis of PLO statements on the partition resolution, 242, and terrorism, it is prepared to negotiate with the PLO;
Announce that it is willing to pursue those negotiations under an international umbrella which will also serve as the venue for negotiations with the Arab states;
Announce that henceforth, peaceful demonstrations in the West Bank and Gaza will be permitted;
Announce that completely open municipal elections will be allowed in the West Bank and Gaza; and
Announce that Palestinians from the territories will be welcome to enter into full dialogue with the Israeli people.

In short, by taking these and other steps, the Israeli government cannot only open the negotiations, but it can begin a process which over time will make it possible to reach a settlement and provide the only basis for lasting peace in the Middle East: mutual respect for the national rights of both peoples.

Jerome M. Segal is a research scholar at the Institute for Philosophy and Public Policy, University of Maryland, and president of the Israeli-Palestinian Peace PAC (I-PPPAC) His book, Creating the Palestinian State—A Strategy for peace, will be released next month by Lawrence Hill Books.

Formulate an Agenda First

By Sol Schindler

The first thing the new Israeli government must do is what every other government must do: govern. The current pattern of revolving prime minister ships, as odd as it is, has actually worked, which is a kind of tribute to the pragmatism of the Israeli political parties (a trait few people believe exists). Nevertheless, it cannot continue. According to recent polls, substantial majorities in both Labor and Likud are against further sharing of responsibilities. The new government, therefore, cannot be a caretaker government but will institute elections in the occupied territories and then enter into negotiations with those elected. This eminently sensible statement supposes that the Israeli government is willing to negotiate in good faith with residents of the territories concerning some form of self-government, and that there are leaders in the territories who are willing, when elected, to negotiate.

Although this second supposition is not so easily verifiable, even the most intransigent of those in the territories are aware that change can come only through negotiation. Although negotiations are the beginning, it is possible that peace may arrive, as in so many other parts of the globe.

Professor Segal suggests that Israel look back over its 41-year-old history to its formative days when the Arab world rejected the concept of its existence. I suggest we all look back to those days and see that because one side refused to talk to the other, even sit in the same room as the other, peace was unobtainable. It was clear that although it took only one aggressor nation to make war it needed two willing partners to make peace. In 1967, after the Six-Day War, Moshe Dayan said he was waiting for the telephone to ring, meaning that Israel was finally in a position where it could trade land for peace. But the phone did not ring. It took yet another even bloodier war for one contestant to decide to talk, and finally a peace treaty was signed and land returned. But stasis remained on all other fronts.

Ironically, it is the intifadah that has now made peace a possibility. The focal point of action has at last shifted from the conference rooms of Beirut and Damascus to the towns of the territories. There the residents, after 40 years of relying on foreign surrogates, are attempting to take their future into their own hands. They will be the negotiators with whom Israel will deal. If a workable compromise can be reached, it does not matter whether King Hussein or President Al-Assad talks or does not talk. The inevitable will finally have happened.

Sol Schindler, a retired Foreign Service officer, writes and lectures on international affairs.