The 99th Congress: A Reprise

By Dennis J. Wamsted

The 99th Congress officially adjourned in mid-October, and members scurried homeward to campaign for the upcoming November elections. One of the 99th Congress' last official acts was the passage of a massive Continuing Resolution to fund the federal government's expenditures during the 1987 fiscal year (which officially began October 1, 1986). Within this bill is some $12 billion in foreign aid funds for the coming year, including approximately $5.1 billion in funds earmarked for the Israeli and Egyptian governments. In many ways, Congress' failure to pass an independent appropriations bill for the US foreign aid program—the vast majority of which is directed toward just four Middle Eastern countries (Israel, Egypt, Pakistan, and Turkey)—exemplifies the general ambivalence most congressmen feel toward the region.

The Impact of Senator Percy's Defeat

The defeat of former Senate Foreign Relations Committee Chairman Charles Percy (R-IL) in the 1984 elections—linked with the 1982 defeat of Representative Paul Findley (R-IL)—probably had more impact on current congressional attitudes toward the Middle East than any other single event. Percy, who was widely respected by the Reagan administration and on Capitol Hill, was targeted before the '84 elections by individual Jews and pro-Israel groups nationwide as being too independent vis-a-vis the Arab-Israeli conflict and the question of Palestinian self-determination. As a result, his opponents in both the Republican primary and the November general election received substantial support from increasingly powerful and numerous pro-Israel PACs (political action committees) nationwide. For example, Percy's Democratic opponent in the general election, Paul Simon, received approximately $240,000 from a total of 55 pro-Israel PACs. Simon also benefitted from a decision by Michael Goland, a Jewish real estate developer from California, to spend approximately $1.2 million of his own money in "independent expenditures" to defeat Senator Percy. Under current U.S. federal campaign law, citizens may spend as much of their own money as they wish, either in support of or in opposition to a candidate for federal office, so long as those expenditures are made without consultation with either campaign. Hence the term "independent expenditure."

As with the '82 effort to unseat Findley, the then-ranking minority member of the House Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on Europe and the Middle East, the anti-Percy campaign was successful. A highly respected, evenhanded senator was defeated because the pro-Israel lobby in the US had deemed him insufficiently supportive of Israel. Indeed, shortly after the elections, Thomas Dine, the executive director of the American Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC—the principal pro-Israel lobby group in the United States), said: "All the Jews in America, from coast to coast, gathered to oust Percy. And American politicians—those who hold public positions now, and those who aspire—got the message." The message: Don't speak out on Middle Eastern affairs unless absolutely necessary, and never, ever criticize Israel. The impact: Debate in Congress on Middle Eastern developments was throttled to an even greater degree than in years past. In particular, the Senate, supposedly the world's "greatest deliberative body" where difficult issues can be freely and openly debated, has become a virtual rubber stamp for pro-Israel legislation and a largely unquestioning bastion of support for Israeli government decisions.

Two issues addressed during the 99th Congress, aid to Israel and sales of sophisticated weaponry to America's Arab allies, illustrate all too clearly that American politicians had, indeed, "got the message."

Bending Over Backwards for Israel

When Congress convened in January 1985, it was immediately confronted with a decision concerning aid to Israel. At that time, Israel—despite having received a total of some $20.5 billion in US economic and military aid in the previous eight fiscal years (FY 1978-1985), an average of more than $2.5 billion per year and representing more than 30 percent of the total amount of foreign aid allocated by the United States during this period—was on the verge of bankruptcy. To avoid this, Israeli officials had requested an emergency supplemental economic aid allocation of $1.5 billion.

To its credit, the administration initially opposed the request, arguing that additional aid would be wasted unless concomitant reforms were undertaken by the Israeli government to strengthen the country's staggering economy. However, Congress, following the lead of pro-Israel politicians such as Republican Representative Jack Kemp (R-NY)—who charged that the administration was treating Israel "like a Third World country is treated by the IMF (International Monetary Fund)"—was not swayed by the administration's arguments. With Dine's "message" still ringing in their ears, the House and Senate worked swiftly to fashion an acceptable package, and by mid-year Israel had garnered another $1.5 billion in US aid.

No Compromise on Arab Arms Sales

The second issue, the question of selling arms to America's Arab allies, received a radically different reception on Capitol Hill. The administration originally intended to send arms sales requests for both Jordan and Saudi Arabia to Congress for consideration in early 1985. A letter of opposition initiated by Senator Alan Cranston (D-CA)—one of Israel's staunchest congressional backers—and signed by 50 of his colleagues, prompted the administration to "freeze" all arms sales to the Middle East pending a review of the region's military balance. Then, in the fall of 1985, congressional opposition induced the administration: 1) to abandon completely a planned sale of advanced US jet fighters to Saudi Arabia; thereby prompting the Saudi government to conclude a contract with Great Britain for some 130-plus aircraft worth an estimated $12 billion; and 2) to postpone consideration of its proposed weapons sale to Jordan until early 1986.

Despite the legitimate, US-documented security needs of these two American allies, the beginning of the 1986 election year did nothing to lessen congressional opposition to the two sales. Indeed, the reflexive and unbending opposition of a small number of influential congressmen, linked with the refusal of anyone within the Republican Party to champion the president's requests on Capitol Hill, ultimately led to the outright cancellation of the proposed sale to Jordan, and so reduced the size of the planned Saudi sale as to render virtually meaningless the package that was finally approved. It should be noted that it was Percy, as chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, who coordinated the successful 1981 effort to ensure passage of the president's proposed sale of AWACS (Airborne Warning and Control System) planes to Saudi Arabia—an action that earned him the unending enmity of virtually every pro-Israel group in the US.

Not surprisingly, shadows of Percy's defeat lingered. For example, during the late spring debate over the much-reduced, $265 million arms sale to Saudi Arabia, Senator Rudy Boschwitz (R-MN), in a not-so-subtle reminder of the risks of antagonizing the pro-Israel lobby, introduced a number of his colleagues to Michael Goland. During his talks with a number of potentially vulnerable Republican senators running for reelection this year, Goland intimated that those senators voting in favor of the administration's proposal risked his opposition during the fall campaign. Besides his individual efforts against Percy, Goland is on AIPAC's National Council and is a frequent contributor to the California-based Citizens Organized PAC, one of the largest pro-Israel PACs in the country. (See this issue of The Washington Report for additional information on the ongoing electoral efforts of the 80-plus pro-Israel PACs around the country.)

That, in a nutshell, was the 99th Congress—fearful of the power of the pro-Israel lobby and unwilling to speak out in defense of US, as opposed to Israeli, interests in the Middle East. Unfortunately, unless the American public shines a light on the activities of the pro-Israel lobby in the US, and, in particular, on the coercive efforts of pro-Israel PACs around the country, the shadows of Percy's and Findley's defeats will linger indefinitely.

Dennis J. Wamsted is a Washington-based free-lance writer specializing in Middle East affairs and the US Congress.