Libyan Sandstorm: The Complete Account of Qaddafi's Revolution

By John K. Cooley, New York, N.Y.: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1982. 288 pp. $16.50

Reviewed by Les Janka

When scholars write as well as journalists, and journalists do research as well as scholars, what a wonderful world it will be. In the meantime, let us beware of books whose covers promise "the complete account" of anything. In Libyan Sandstorm, John Cooley (author of the superb Green March, Black September), sets out to answer the question: "Who is Colonel Qaddafi?" Although he skillfully presents a great deal of interesting information, his latest book ultimately leaves one unsatisfied, with little we didn't already know and more questions than solid answers. Nevertheless, by diligently collecting and fitting together a number of key episodes, Cooley fills an important gap in our understanding of contemporary troublemakers; the sum of the detail has a startling impact when read altogether.

Perhaps the strongest point of the book is its portrayal of the evolution of Libya from a poor desert kingdom to a massively armed, wealthy socialist state committed to exporting its influence beyond its borders. It is in fact Libya's geography, its oil, and its people which have provided the stage for a Qaddafi to act out his dreams of Islamic revolution. Another leader may not have done as much for or to Libya, but perhaps no other Arab country would have tolerated for so long the antics of a Qaddafi. For all the trouble making efforts carefully chronicled by Cooley, the nuisance potential of Qaddafi's regime is unlikely to survive him. The Libya he has created will for a long time, however, be a critical factor in Mediterranean politics.

The Shaping of Qaddafi

In his introductory chapters Cooley tracks the early environment that shaped the young Qaddafi and his fellow military co-conspirators as well as the conditions which produced the September, 1969 coup against the lethargic, corrupt monarchy of King ldris. Qaddafi was deeply influenced by Egypt's President Nasser and his ideals of Arab unity and socialist development. Much more deeply rooted in the fundamentals of Islam, however, Qaddafi carried Nasser's nationalism to even higher levels of opposition to Israel and anti-Westernism. In this context, another most useful chapter deals at length with Qaddafi's vision of a new society and presents revealing excerpts from his manifesto, The Green Book.

Particularly commendable is Cooley's treatment of the involvement of Americans Edwin Wilson and Frank Terpil in Qaddafi's terrorist apparatus. The shocking inability of the United States to control the export of sensitive weapons, technology and talent is set forth in such a way that for this reason alone the book should be required reading for those officials charged with U.S. munitions control and related regulations.

Intelligence Intrigues

Certainly the most controversial portions of the book center around Cooley's thesis that Qaddafi was supported and protected by Western intelligence agencies, including the CIA, in the early years of his regime. It is here that his dramatic reporting outruns his research, if not the facts. Admittedly a journalist can more readily hide behind "confidentiality of sources" than can scholars, but to be credible a journalist must offer more than judgments drawn from acute observations, confidential tips and coincidences explicable only by the machinations of secret services. We are given a chapter full of intriguing intrigues and overfull of organizational details about the French, Israeli and Italian intelligence services, all mostly repetitious of existing exposes. A strongly anti-communist Qaddafi may have indeed benefited from some clandestine assistance from unexpectedly benevolent western agencies. The arrest of Edwin Wilson and other recent events hint at much yet to be revealed, but Cooley's case that the CIA provided help critical to Qaddafi's survival remains unconvincing and unproven. Similarly, the chapter on Qaddafi's relations with the superpowers is not quite complete: no mention is made of the May 1971 closing of the "Peoples' Bureau" in Washington.

One annoyance of contemporary publishing custom is the prefatory acknowledgement in which the proud author expresses gratitude to those contributing to the book's gestation but humbly absolves all of responsibility for its shortcomings. John Cooley should have also declined any credit for the dust jacket's nonsense describing Libya's emergence under Qaddafi as "arguably the modern world's most important revolution." Very arguable indeed! Moreover, Cooley should immediately and publicly withdraw the gratitude expressed to his editors for they left his work replete with unnecessary errors: Johns Hopkins University has no law school (p. 18); Bakersfield is not south of Los Angeles (p. 54); In 1976, French President Pompidou could not have sold Libya Mirage aircraft intended for Nasser's Egypt (p. 160). Nasser died in 1970 and Pompidou in 1974. Two or more such errors per chapter is enough to distract even the most forgiving reader.

Les Janka was Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Middle East Affairs from 1976-1978.