The Lebanon Labyrinth

Almost overnight, the Reagan Administration seems to have found a new friend and partner in the Middle East—the regime of Lebanon's new president Amin Gemayel.

In just a few short weeks since last September 23, when President Gemayel took office and made it clear that he was counting on the U.S. to be his friend in need, the Administration has been quick to respond, both in word and deed.

Symbolic of the blossoming friendship was the invitation last month to President Gemayel to visit the United States—a visit which was the first ever made by an incumbent president of Lebanon. But there have also been more tangible manifestations of the new alliance:

The U.S. has expanded, at Lebanon's request. the mission of the 1,200 U.S. marines in Lebanon, who were sent in to help the new regime establish its control. The marines, instead of just guarding Beirut's international airport, are carrying out more risky patrol operations.
President Reagan has agreed to "consider seriously" a request by President Gemayel for a substantial increase in the size of the multinational peacekeeping force, of which the U.S. marines form a part.
The U.S. has committed itself to train Lebanon's army and to help it expand in size to the point where it can establish control in the country. It will set up a training group of U.S. officers and enlisted men in Lebanon, and has agreed to provide the army with communications gear, armored personnel carriers, howitzers and tanks.

In the meantime, the commitment on how long U.S. marines are to stay in Lebanon appears to be more open-ended than Congress was initially led to expect. A. U.S. State Department spokesman has said that at some point it "would be up to the government of Lebanon to request the marines to leave." Yet some Lebanese officials have been expressing the opinion that the peacekeeping forces would be required for at least two years.

In the view of many observers, the U.S. may be moving into a Lebanese labyrinth, full of dangerous twists and turns, which it may find it very difficult to get out of.

U.S. Chips on Gemayel

For one thing, the Administration is putting its chips on a leader who has got off to a good start but may still find himself unable to carry the country with him for the medium and long term. President Gemayel is not yet assured of the continuing support of the Phalange, the tough, no-nonsense Christian militia which is still Lebanon's strongest military force—more powerful than the Lebanese army itself. For the time being, the Phalange has been giving Gemayel its support mainly by not interfering while he carries out his policy of national reconciliation. But the Phalange is watching him closely. There are many among its leadership who suspect he may be "too soft" on the Muslims, too ready to play footsie with other Arab countries, and too lacking in gratitude to the Israelis who helped put him into office. Within the last few weeks, the Phalange and some other allied Christian militia groups have brought there heavy weapons and ammunition up into the mountain areas they control and stashed them away just in case. Should Gemayel's authority ever be challenged, the U.S. could suddenly find its troops caught up in a renewed sectarian conflict.

Another dangerous road is the one which the U.S., as a mediator, hopes will lead to the withdrawal of all foreign forces from Lebanon. It has moved hardly any distance down that road yet. With the Israeli invasion already nearly six months old, Lebanon's presidential palace at Baabda is still within a mile of Israeli guns, and the main negotiation for withdrawal involves talking about how negotiation will take place. Meanwhile, all sides have adopted firmly conflicting positions: the Israelis will not withdraw until all the PLO guerrillas have gone; Syria will not withdraw until the Israeli troops are out; and the PLO plans to keep a military "presence" in Lebanon indefinitely.

The longer a time that it takes to move down this road, the more chances there are that major fighting—among heavily-armed Syrians, Palestinians and Israelis—who are still facing each other along the breadth of central Lebanon—could flare up again. The fronts are hardly ever entirely quiet as it is. There are occasional ambushes of Israeli soldiers, and Israeli attacks on Syrian missile batteries. Druze villagers and Phalangists fight each other in the mountains east of Beirut, with Israeli soldiers getting caught in the crossfire. Sunnis and Alawites skirmish in the streets of the northern city of Tripoli. All of these incidents can act as catalysts for greater violence.

Numerous Stumbling Blocks

But the Israelis are showing little sign that they believe time may be a crucial factor. The many conditions which they have put on their withdrawal seem bound to make any negotiations long and tortuous. One of these conditions calls for a role in supervising the security of south Lebanon to be given to Major Saad Haddad—a renegade major from Lebanon's regular army, who for more than four years has controlled an enclave in south Lebanon under Israeli patronage. Another is a demand that Gemayel sign a written agreement with Israel on security arrangements for a 35-mile-wide buffer zone in the south. Either of these conditions will be difficult for Gemayel to accept at a time when he is seeking to get broad support for his regime from Lebanese Moslems and from Arab countries which have not yet forgiven Egypt for opting out of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict by signing a separate treaty with Israel, and do not want to see Lebanon do the same thing.

These are some of the reasons why President Gemayel is anxious to build up his army into a force that could credibly provide for the security of all Lebanon, including the south, once the foreign troops have gone. He has said that his goal is to create an elite fighting force of 60,000 troops. But he has also said that he would like the present multinational peacekeeping force of 3,800—composed of French and Italian as well as American troops—to be expanded to 30,000 while his army is being reconstituted. Even though other countries might be asked to join the force, an increase in the number of the U.S. contingent would probably become necessary.

If and when this happens, the U.S. may face the prospect of sending more U.S. troops into an increasingly risky situation to help Lebanon, its new ally, get on its feet. The big question then could be: will the Administration stay the course?