The Real Shultz Stands Up

The man who likes to drop by our office to ask us things about the Middle East came in again, for the first time in nearly three months.

Q Hi! I'm wondering if

A Let's can it, Humphrey. Can't you see I'm working on deadline?

Q For goshsakes, can't you ever say anything nice? I only wanted to ask if

A So read this editorial I've written for our issue of November 14. It'll tell you all you need to know. Then let me get back to work.

Q But

A Read it!

Q Okay, okay. Now I've read it. But I still don't

A You still don't get the picture? Okay, I'll try to fill in some of the blanks for you, but it'll have to be quick.

Q Sh

A Shultz? Yes, it has been a surprise to a lot of people that Secretary Shultz should turn out to be the chief sponsor of a new, cozy relationship with Israel. This is because when Mr. Shultz came into office he was widely depicted as being a believer in an "even-handed" approach to the Arab-Israeli conflict—and in fact Israelis were afraid that he would tilt too far towards the Arabs for their liking.

Q Wait. As a d—

A I'll get to Assad in a moment. The thing is, the reason many people are surprised about Shultz is that their original premises were all wrong. They thought Shultz would be "pro-Arab" because he had been a top executive of Bechtel, a large construction company with good relations in the Arab world. It was pointed out that he had made numerous trips to Saudi Arabia on business. But the thing is, going to an Arab country to negotiate business contracts doesn't automatically mean that you build up any depth of knowledge regarding the root causes of the Arab-Israeli conflict, or necessarily make you sensitive to the Arab arguments and points of view regarding this complex issue. It certainly doesn't seem to have worked out that way in Mr. Shultz's case.

By the way, it's interesting that you should have brought up Assad in this context, because

Q I didn't br

A —he has a lot to do, in my opinion, with the sharpness—if not the substance—of Mr. Shultz's rhetoric when he talks about Syria these days. It was Mr. Assad who took direct aim at what Mr. Shultz thought was his finest foreign policy achievement, and shot it down.

Q You

A Yes, I'm referring to the Lebanon-Israel withdrawal agreement, signed last May 17. There is every indication that Mr. Shultz thought it was a big breakthrough at the time, and that it would soon lead to a similar Syrian agreement to withdraw. But of course, it not only didn't do that, it hardened Mr. Assad's position in a number of ways, and acted as a major roadblock to a national reconciliation among Lebanon's factions. In fact, even the Lebanese government itself now wants the agreement revised, and the Israelis are hinting that this might be possible. Now more and more people, some of them with the advantage of hindsight, are heaping criticism on Mr. Shultz's head—saying he should have kept in closer touch with Assad while the Lebanon-Israel withdrawal discussions were going on, and should have known that Assad would never have accepted the final result, which gave too many political and military concessions to Israel. Shultz may now be aware, deep inside, that what he thought was a triumph was really a lot less than that—and he would be less than human if he felt kindly towards the man who made that fact so clear.

Q Where

A Where does this new U.S.-Israeli partnership leave the people of South Lebanon, the West Bank, and so forth? That's a good question, Humph. It's obvious that the Israelis are hardly going to interpret this new military, financial and moral support from the U.S. as a signal that the U.S. believes Israel is doing a lot of harmful things in the Middle East. So the Israelis will probably go on doing what they want to do, as they have always done in the past—but with even fewer fears than before that there will ever be any U.S. "pressures" on them to change their tack. This certainly doesn't bode well for the people in either of those places.

By the way, you should have mentioned the Golan Heights, too, because regarding this occupied area the U.S. has sent a signal that could be interpreted by the Israelis as being quite specific. Two years ago, the Administration put into the deep freeze an initialed U.S.-Israeli "memorandum of strategic understanding," as a protest against Israeli annexation of Golan. Now the U.S. has unfrozen it. This does not imply official U.S. acceptance of the annexation—but it certainly makes it clear that the Administration does not believe the issue is important enough to argue over very seriously.

That's enough questions, Humph. I'm really in a hurry

Q So am I. Ever since I came in here, I've been trying to ask you if I could use your bathroom!