Sudan: Problems for U.S.?

By S.A. Baynard

The United States faces a serious dilemma in the Sudan. A civil war there has worsened since Islamic law was implemented just over one year ago, and recent concessions by the Sudanese president have not stopped it. U.S. business interests are menaced by this civil disorder, and the American government is in a worse bind. One of its best "friends" in Africa may be guilty of human rights violations against its non-Muslim minorities and may also be fighting southern rebels with American-made equipment.

The present government came to power in 1969 and followed a pro-Soviet foreign policy and socialist domestic policy for its first 26 months. Nearly overthrown in a pro-communist coup in 1971, the regime moved to the right and Jaafar Nimeiri became president in a system of one-man rule.

By the late 1970s Nimeiri had become close to the U.S. and Egypt. He has parlayed these relationships into tangible manifestations of support: Joint military maneuvers and economic and military aid, amounting to $240 million from the U.S. in 1984. American business was welcomed back into the Sudan after 1972 under increasingly favorable terms.

Although Nimeiri, age 55, is a master of domestic politics, the government in Khartoum is besieged on several fronts: In addition to the civil war in the south where about 30 percent of Sudan's 22 million people are either Christian or animist, there are doubts about army loyalty, and growing concerns from the regime's two external props—the U.S. and Egypt—over the imposition of strict penalties resulting from Nimeiri's version of Islamic law.

Troubles Galore

The economy is a shambles: An external debt of over $8 billion; declining standard of living; development projects delayed or halted; and paralyzing strikes by physicians, teachers, bank workers and others. The Sudan has become a basket case rather than a "breadbasket."

The major achievement of the Nimeiri government—the Addis Ababa Accord ending the 1955-1972 civil war—is in ruins because of Nimeiri's failure to live up to his power-sharing promises. There were army mutinies and mass arrests in the south in 1982. In June, 1983, Nimeiri announced he would redivide the presumably autonomous southern region into three smaller regions—clearly a contravention of the Addis Ababa Accord. After the implementation of Islamic law in September, 1983, attacks began on Chevron oil installations and the giant Jonglei Canal project. The Jonglei project was halted and Chevron has stopped production, carrying out only exploration efforts sufficient to meet the terms of its contract.

Late last September, Nimeiri backpedaled on both the southern redivision issue and possibly on his plans to Islamize the country. First, he announced a cancellation of the redivision plan and then, on September 29—at a celebration marking the first anniversary of the implementation of Islamic law—he lifted the state of emergency imposed in April and also suspended the special Islamic courts. The courts were the most obvious manifestation of the new policy and Nimeiri may simply leave them suspended and work on Islamizing in less confrontational ways. These concessions are probably too late to stop the civil war, which was not caused by these two divisive policies but only triggered by them. The real causes lie in the long-standing historical differences between the peoples of the north and south, and grievances by southerners that they do not receive a fair share of development funds. The southerners harbor the suspicion that even after significant oil production begins in the south, they will not control the revenues derived from their own territories.

The Sudanese army is an unknown factor. Nimeiri has tried his best both to intimidate and buy off the officer corps. Generals who criticized the President in January, 1982, were sacked—including the First Vice President/ Minister of Defense and the army's 22 most senior officers. The army was structurally "decentralized" in October, 1982, and no tanks are allowed in the capital (Nimeiri probably has not forgotten the critical role of tank units in the coup of 1969). Army "corporations" were established in 1981-82 for export/import, banking, commodities and so forth—a policy innovation which can best be interpreted as an open means of buying cooperation from ranking officers. Lately there has been resentment in the army over the flogging of a senior officer for breaking the new prohibitions against alcohol consumption. Last September the most popular of Nimeiri's original Revolutionary Council colleagues, Mamoun Awad Abu Zeid, was detained for being present where alcohol was being served. He flew to London, where he reportedly requested political asylum.

Relations with Egypt Strained

Egyptian support has been one of Nimeiri's major props against coup attempts or threats of subversion from Ethiopia or Libya. Nimeiri's relations with Egypt are now strained and no one knows if Mubarak would still come to Nimeiri's aid if needed.

Nimeiri may have imposed Islamic law because he was "born again," because he thinks he may soon die from his circulatory ailments, because he wanted to secure support from important domestic groups, or—most likely—a combination of all three. One of Nimeiri's latest balancing acts pits the Muslim Brotherhood (and probably at least two factions within it) against the small group of Sufis (Islamic mystics) who are now his closest advisors.

Among questions U.S. policymakers must consider are: (1) Will the army continue to tolerate being openly corrupted, being used in another civil war, and having its officers publicly humiliated for contravention of Islamic law? (2) Can the economic situation continue to deteriorate without pushing the Sudanese into popular rebellion? (3) Will even devout Sudanese accept Islamization as a substitute for real policymaking, economic wellbeing and political participation?

If only one of these questions is answered with a "no," then the American government and U.S. businesses should be thinking of how to minimize their risks in the Sudan. They may choose either to show by concrete acts of assistance that their relationship is with the Sudan and not simply the Nimeiri regime, or to ease themselves out slowly. It is not in the interests of the U.S. government, American business or the Sudanese people for anyone to give up on the Sudan. Even if Nimeirils days are numbered, the Sudanese do not yet identify him with the U.S. to the extent that his downfall will be the end of a relationship, a la Iran. The U.S. should take care that the Sudanese continue to feel this way.

S. A. Baynard is a professorial lecturer at Georgetown University and the author of a forthcoming book on the Sudan.