Arms for Jordan?

By Dennis J. Wamsted

On October 21, the Reagan Administration formally notified the U.S. Congress of its intention to proceed with its long-delayed proposal to sell a package of advanced U.S. weaponry to Jordan. Only three days later the U.S. Senate, by an overwhelming margin of 97-to-1, adopted a compromise proposal offered by Senate Foreign Relations Chairman Richard Lugar (R-IN) to delay Senate consideration of the Administration's request until March 1, 1986. Although the House has yet to pass a similar resolution and, in fact, may enact a measure disapproving the sale, most Congressional observers believe that a serious confrontation between Congress and the Administration has been averted. Indeed, following the Senate vote, both those in favor of the sale and those opposed could claim victory. How did this compromise materialize?

The actual package as announced by the Administration—which is variously valued at between $1.5 billion and $1.9 billion, depending on the aircraft that is ultimately selected—includes the following components:

Forty advanced fighter aircraft, either Northrup's F-20 or General Dynamics' F-16, depending on which aircraft is selected by the U.S. Air Force as the force's new air defense craft, valued at between $756 million and about $1.1 billion. This allows for two squadrons of 18 planes each and two planes per squadron for training purposes.
Three hundred Ford Aerospace AIM-9P4 air-to-air missiles, worth $20.1 million.
Twelve Raytheon Improved Hawk surface-to-air missile units, worth $600 million.
Fourteen Improved Hawk platoon command posts and sets to permit the conversion of the Hawk missile units sold to Jordan in 1976 from stationary to mobile units, worth approximately $100 million.
Seventy-two General Dynamics Stinger shoulder-fired surface-to-air missiles, worth five million dollars.
Thirty-two FMC Corp. M-3 Bradley armored vehicles, valued at $74.1 million.

Even before the Administration's official announcement, a number of pro-Israel Congressman had protested that it was not the right time to sell arms to Jordan. Others sought to convince, or coerce, the Administration into not sending the formal notification of the sale to Congress at all.

Similar Congressional persuasion /coercion had already convinced the Reagan Administration to delay planned sales to Jordan twice. The entire sale was postponed in February, 1985, and a smaller proposal to sell a number of Stinger antiaircraft missiles to Jordan was sidetracked in early 1984.

Congress Opens Fire on Arms Proposal

Indicative of this coercive mood was House Foreign Affairs Chairman Dante Fascell's (D-FL) statement to Secretary of State George Shultz October 17 that the Administration should abandon its planned sale and that if it went ahead with the proposal, then he would be the prime sponsor of a joint resolution to block the sale. In addition, the committee's ranking Republican member, William Broomfield (R-MI), warned Secretary Shultz that the proposed sale "couldn't be timed any worse than it is."

Meanwhile, in the Senate, a group of traditionally strong supporters of Israel—including Edward Kennedy (P-MA), John Heinz (R-PA), Daniel Inouye (D-HI), Robert Kasten (R-WI), Alan Cranston (D-CA) and Rudy Boschwitz (R-MN)—began circulating a draft resolution during the 20-day informal notification period that would have prohibited any arms sales to Jordan until King Hussein begins direct peace talks with Israel.

Following the Administration's official notification, Kennedy introduced the measure, which by then had been signed by a total of 74 Senators (45 Democrats and 29 Republicans), saying: "No sophisticated weapons whatever should be sold to Jordan unless and until that nation accepts the existence of Israel and begins direct negotiations with Israel for peace." Not to be outdone by his Democratic colleague, Senator Cranston said that since the talks could drag on for years without resolution, the United States should sell advanced weaponry to Jordan only after an actual Israeli-Jordanian peace treaty is signed. Likewise in the House, where Representative Larry Smith (D-FL) led the drive to oppose the sale, Minority Leader Robert Michel (R-IL) said that the Administration's proposal had "no possibility whatsoever" of passing that Democratic-controlled body.

In announcing the sale, the Administration contended that the arms package was justified from a military standpoint. This point was not challenged even by Members of Congress opposed to the sale. The Administration also stressed the importance of the package for the peace process. Specifically, the Administration statement notifying Congress of the sale stated: "The proposed sale is in the best interests of both the United States and Jordan because it meets Jordan's legitimate security requirements and furthers our mutual objectives of fostering a just and lasting peace in the region."

The Administration's Defense

Administration officials have repeatedly stressed the military justification for the sale in discussions with Members of Congress. State Department officials, for example, noted that, with the exception of the Bradley armored vehicles, the entire package is designed to bolster Jordan's highly inadequate air defenses. One department official—emphasizing the Administration's contention that Jordan needs this arms package to deter Syria—added: "Jordan has 36 advanced fighter aircraft versus 240 for Syria." Along these same lines, during testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Secretary of State Shultz said that Syria was trying to prevent Jordan from making peace with Israel. The secretary added: "The U.S. arms sale to Jordan represents a powerful political signal of American support for Jordan that will strengthen the King's ability to stand up to...attacks (from Syria)."

Defense Department officials, recalling the Middle East Arms Transfer study conducted last spring, emphasized that the proposed sale would not pose asecurity threat to Israel. One Pentagon official stated bluntly: "The balance is in Israel's favor and will increase. In the next three years, Israel will take possession of approximately 75 General Dynamics F-16s. The sale will not change the balance."

The Senate's decision to delay consideration has allowed both sides to claim victory. For their part, the sale's opponents say they have achieved all of their goals, and managed to do so without publicly rebuking or embarrassing Jordan's King Hussein. Senator Kennedy said he supported Lugar's compromise, instead of insisting on going ahead with his resolution of disapproval, because "my sense is that we have derailed the Administration proposal for this arms sale and achieved everything we wanted to." Another Senator opposed to the sale, Ohio Democrat Howard Metzenbaum, said he believed that it was important that "nobody wins and nobody loses," adding that, as a result, "the peace process will be permitted to move forward in a positive manner."

Republican Boschwitz hinted at another reason for the Senate's overwhelming approval of this compromise measure, noting that he "didn't want to have a vote in the middle of the Reagan-Gorbachev meeting" in mid-November, which also would have been the end of the 30-day formal notification period for the Jordan arms sale proposal.

The Administration also had reason to be pleased with the compromise. Some observers noted that the Administration's decision simply to proceed with the formal notification process constituted a setback for the pro-Israel lobby and its Congressional supporters. Further, the Administration was able to prevent the outright disapproval of the sale, thereby keeping alive hopes for progress in the ongoing peace process. Emphasizing this interpretation, Senator Lugar noted: "To the extent that bad things didn't occur [that is, a vote of disapproval] and good things could still occur, I think we're all a whole lot better off, including the King."

There was even some speculation that the language in the resolution delaying Senate consideration until March 1 actually gave the Administration de facto approval for the sale. Lugar, for example, said that Reagan would be able to proceed with the sale next spring unless Congress took further action to block it. (An important note here is that Congress virtually never reports bills out of committee for full floor consideration until May, implying that the sale's opponents would not be able to attach a resolution of disapproval next March to a spending bill or some other piece of legislation that would be politically difficult for the President to veto.) Representative Smith, who is strongly opposed to the sale, said he was "concerned about the language in which the delay is cloaked." The Florida Democrat added: "There's a little bit of concern in the House that it [the Senate's resolution] ... is a conditional resolution of approval before March 1 and an outright resolution of approval after that."

If Smith is correct, it appears that the Administration has, at least initially, successfully challenged Israel's stranglehold on Congress.

Dennis J. Wamsted of Washington D.C., has lived and studied in the Middle East and writes frequently on it.