The Arab Predicament: Arab Political Thought and Practice Since 1967

By Fouad Ajami, New Rochelle, New York: Cambridge University Press, 1981. 220 pp. $19.95

Reviewed by Peter A. Gubser

The Arab Predicament may be characterized as a critique of Arab society and Arab history during the 1967-1981 period. It is often literary, if not poetic in style, full of almost philosophical ideas and many thoughtful, at times pithy phrases, sentences, paragraphs. The book is not a detailed history, relating numerous events and facts. Rather, Professor Ajami presents synopses of leading Arab thinkers' analyses and criticisms—self-criticisms if you will—of their own society and politics as well as his own views. Because of its many insights and thoughtfulness, it is worth serious attention. I state this not because the reader will agree with all of what Professor Ajami writes. Rather, his thoughts and analysis are often provocative and more often disturbing, but they deserve our attention because many have considerable validity.

Professor Ajami elucidates a number of themes which run throughout the book, too many to recount in this limited space. Some of the more thought provoking may be summarized as follows:

Western technology is being imported into Arab countries, but it is not being absorbed or truly integrated into or understood by the Arab society. True absorption cannot occur until and unless the society also evolves in fundamental ways similar to, but by no means in the same way, Western society evolved when it developed this very technology. In this context Professor Ajami is particularly critical of the oil rich countries.

The transition from the pre—to the post—1967 period marked a fundamental shift in Arab politics. The earlier period was dominated by the radicals, the self-proclaimed revolutionaries, largely drawn from the military. The 1967 defeat of the Arabs by Israel underlined the hollowness of this revolution. The radicals such as President Nasser and the Ba'th Party were discredited, their rhetoric proved empty. Some of the rulers are dismissed as no more than military gangs similar to the Mamluks of yesteryear. These leaders were much more interested in securing jobs for relatives (Syria) than building economies; or were unwilling to undertake the hard decisions leading to true economic and social change (Egypt).

During the 1970's, the apparatus of the various states came largely under the control of conservative regimes. And the state systems, which dominate society, came—often quite directly—into conflict with the needs and desires of the community system. According to Professor Ajami, the latter's challenge to the conservative state order may be seen in the rhetoric of the radical Palestinian leader George Habash or more tangibly in the 1970 Jordanian civil war which the state won, expelling the threatening community forces—largely Palestinian guerrilla groups—from the country. Pan-Arabism, the often serious goal of the 1950's and 1960's, was in rapid decline by the 1970's. Not only have state borders taken on rigidity, but also the various countries started seeking out what they perceived to be their own state or national interests. The prime example, naturally, has been Egypt going its own way by seeking peace with Israel.

Professor Ajami's handling of Islam is enlightening. On the one hand Islam is coopted by the state, used to legitimize actions that often would be otherwise unpopular. On the other, it is the populist expression of the people. It may be used by the community to show discontent with modern technology or changing customs, e.g. the liberalized role of women. Or it may be the institution through which opposition to the regime is expressed. Thus the Muslim Brotherhood leads the attack on Syria's Alawite dominated regime, or religious figures foment Cairo street riots or preach in the mosques about or against the direction of socio-economic change.

West Not a Shaker

Interestingly and rightly, Professor Ajami does not overly emphasize the influence of Western countries in the Middle East. They are not given the role of makers and shakers in the region. Rather, he cogently argues, the basic characteristics of the society and the forces within are the stuff out of which history evolves.

There is no doubt that the critical nature of the book will disturb some—perhaps especially the broad condemnation of the wholesale importation of technology. Professor Ajami could have mentioned that Egypt has been successfully managing and integrating various levels of technology for millenia, and the Aswan High Dam is but one more logical step in the development of its sophisticated irrigation system. Jordan, as another example, not only tries to adopt technologies and systems, but also makes conscious attempts to adapt these to the constraints of its society.

Another aspect to the book which may be disturbing is that it is largely critical, focusing on failures in Arab society. There is no concluding prescription or suggested direction for Arab society to take. The positive cannot be found in these pages. Using the medium of strong, specific and broad criticism, though, one may see that Professor Ajami is telling the Arab world—"know thyself, know thy society, know thy nation."

Peter A. Gubser is President of American Near East Refugee Aid (ANERA).