South Lebanon: Prospects for Peace

Text and Photos by JoMarie Fecci

Repeated statements by Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Barak confirming his pre-election promise to withdraw Israeli forces from south Lebanon within a year of assuming office offer a glimmer of hope. However, an examination of the situation on the ground in the south, and events that led up to that promise, allows only the most tempered optimism.

Military Status Makes Withdrawal More Likely

A series of events starting with the Feb. 23 Hezbollah attack that killed three Israel Defense Forces soldiers have combined to create an atmosphere in which withdrawal is more likely. That attack was followed by an embarrassing incident wherein the IDF released a video purporting to show their forces killing a Hezbollah guerrilla who, to their dismay, turned up very much alive, conducting a press conference from his hospital bed in Lebanon the following day. Then, on the 28th, General Erez Gerstein, the highest-ranking Israeli officer in the south, was assassinated in a roadside bomb attack that also killed three others.

It was Gerstein’s death that put south Lebanon on the agenda during the spring Israeli elections. It also probably served as the catalyst for attempts by members of the then-incumbent government of Binyamin Netanyahu to speak of “amending” the “April Understanding.”

The April Understanding is an informal agreement made after the Qana tragedy in the spring of 1996 in which more than 100 Lebanese civilians who had taken refuge in a United Nations compound were killed by Israeli shelling. The agreement, intended to protect both Lebanese and Israeli non-combatants, essentially accepts the right of Lebanese groups to armed resistance against military targets within the part of Lebanon occupied by Israeli forces and Israel’s puppet militia, the South Lebanon Army (SLA).

The rules of engagement defined by the agreement are simple: resistance fighters can only attack military targets within the occupation zone from outside of built-up civilian areas, and the Israelis and their SLA allies may only hit at armed elements outside of built-up civilian areas. Disputes are brought before a Monitoring Group which consists of representatives from Israel, Lebanon, Syria, France and the United States.

According to UNIFIL (the U.N. International Force in Lebanon), despite frequent breaches, the April Understanding had more or less held, preventing incidents from spiraling into serious escalation—until this spring. Then an increase in the number of “quality” resistance operations targeted at military objectives and hitting the IDF directly led hawkish Israelis to want to change the agreement. Forgetting for a moment that the understanding also served to protect Israeli civilians in northern Israel, Israeli hawks believed it unfairly tied the hands of their forces while allowing the Lebanese guerrillas great liberty of action.

At the same time, with a survey by Israel’s Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies indicating 55 percent of Israelis favored a unilateral withdrawal from the south, a series of trial balloons on partial withdrawl options came from various quarters in Israel. Meanwhile, however, operations in the south continued as usual.

“The first half of this year has been particularly hard on us because of the disregard for the April Understanding,” said Lt. Col. Patrick Nash, commander, 85th Irish Battalion, UNIFIL. In an incident which made the Irish government question its continued commitment to UNIFIL, the Irish Battalion lost one soldier and had another gravely wounded when the SLA fired mortar rounds into the U.N. position after their own compound had been pounded by resistance shelling. (The Lebanese civilian deaths at Qana resulted from a similar pounding by Israeli artillery of an encampment of Fijian troops assigned to UNIFIL into which the Lebanese had fled for protection against Israel’s “Operation Grapes of Wrath,” which targeted a deadly rain of bombs at the civilian infrastructure throughout Lebanon.)

One officer at the Irish battalion’s B Company believes that UNIFIL was being purposely targeted because the resistance were hitting the SLA very hard. He theorizes that the harried SLA men thought that by giving UNIFIL a taste of what they were receiving, it might encourage the blue helmets to take actions to stop resistance activity.

Instead it led to a meeting between Irish Defense Minister Michael Smith and Israeli Defense Minister Moshe Arens, during which Smith demanded guarantees that the Irish would no longer be targeted by the SLA, warning that Dublin would consider terminating its involvement with UNIFIL if the situation remained unchanged.

The significance of the SLA withdrawal from Jezzine following so closely on Netanyahu’s loss at the polls was hotly debated. Some observers said it was a trial run for a more significant withdrawal, while others claimed it was just an attempt by the IDF and SLA to create a more defensible front line.

According to Irish Capt. David McNamara, “Despite all the talk of withdrawal and the abandonment of some posts, they have been rebuilding and strengthening other positions—notably the Haddata and Rachaf compounds.” Irish officers are unsure whether the moves are attempts to make a more defensible line, or an attempt at boosting the morale of the SLA soldiers who must man the most vulnerable forward posts to protect the Israeli forces behind them from casualties.

June saw a series of attacks and counter-attacks producing casualties on all sides—including an increasing number of Lebanese civilians. By June 20, when two more Lebanese civilians were wounded by Israeli troops firing missiles into a village, the resistance fired several mortar rounds just south of the Lebanese-Israeli border into western Galilee. Israeli jets pounded the wadis in response, and the escalation culminated in the June 24th Israeli air raids deliberately targeted against Lebanese civilian infrastructure that plunged Beirut into darkness, killing at least five Lebanese and wounding 62. The Hezbollah Katushya attack in response killed two Israeli civilians.

Following its June 24 attacks, the outgoing Netanyahu government stated that it considered the April Understanding void and refused to attend further meetings of the monitoring group.

According to Lt. Colonel Nash, the situation has calmed considerably since then. The arrival of Barak’s team was cautiously welcomed. “We hope diplomacy rather than militarism will take center stage now,” Nash said. “We are hopeful for the peace process, but we are realists and are prepared for any eventuality.”

Upon taking office, Barak reinstated the April Understanding and reaffirmed his intention to withdraw from Lebanon. However, the situation on the ground in south Lebanon has changed little. And the assassination of a Hezbollah security officer, Haj Ali Hassan Deeb, in August opened a new round of heavy fighting along the confrontation zone.

SLA Morale and Desertions

The situation within the SLA has reached crisis proportions. Morale is low, and desertions are increasing—both by forced conscripts who risk crossing the lines, and by more culpable men who are abandoning a sinking ship while they can still hope to get out without punishment.

“We were the sandbags of the Israelis,” said “Hassan” (his name has been changed to protect family members still in the Israeli-occupied zone), who served eight months in the force assigned to a position near Barachit. The flight of conscripts like “Hasssan” is the most obvious sign of the SLA’s manpower crisis.

The fact that he was in the SLA at all illustrates the manner in which Israel has conscripted cannon fodder for its Lebanese militia. Before his induction he had been imprisoned for several months in the Israeli-funded, SLA-operated Khiam prison on charges of working with the Lebanese resistance. He was given only about 10 days’ training before being sent to man one of the more frequently attacked posts.

Another recent SLA deserter, Moustafa Nabaa, who served in the force for three years, told how the militiamen were often used as lures by the IDF in attempts to draw out the guerrilla fighters so the Israeli air force could pound them.

“They would usually take 15 guys from different positions, and send us up the mountain to wait for Hezbollah. When Hezbollah came we were supposed to fire on them and fight,” he said. Nabaa admits that once when he saw Hezbollah fighters pass by his post, he didn’t report it until over an hour had passed because he believed the Hezbollah wouldn’t attack positions that don’t report on them.

Nabaa finally abandoned his post on May 12 1999. His motivation seemed cloudy. A cousin who had already deserted called and told him that if he came over to the Lebanese side he would get a house and a salary from the Lebanese government. “Though the government gave me nothing in the end, I am glad to be here,” said Nabaa. “Before, people said I was collaborating with the Israelis, now I have my dignity back.”

Increasing Resistance

Both the quality and quantity of resistance actions have increased, making it more difficult for the Israelis to remain inside the zone. As it is, the bulk of IDF forces inside Lebanon only man the rear positions, leaving the SLA militiamen on the front line.

“Mukawama (resistance in Arabic)—they are afraid of this word,” says Mira, a supporter of Amal, another Lebanese Shi’i political party and militia, and teacher at an elementary school in Qana. “The resistance is not only those who are carrying weapons. The mother, when she is giving milk to her kids, is giving it for the resistance. Teachers, bakers, nurses, we are all the resistance.”

Though Hezbollah’s forces continue to conduct the bulk of the actions, there has been growth in the number of actions by all factions.

Some cynical observers believe that the recent increase in attacks by Amal since an Israeli withdrawal seems imminent, is a bid to place itself in a more equal role with Hezbollah as “liberators” in the post-withdrawal south.

Life in the Front Line Villages Remains the Same

The tobacco farmers in the villages on the front lines have seen no changes in the conflict level. And they are still being affected by it.

A section of Aliya Fakhri’s house in Madjal Zoun collapsed when it was hit by a missile fired from an Israeli Cobra helicopter more than a month after Barak’s government came to power. Luckily, she and her family were visiting her father-in-law at the time. Knowledgeable observers suggest that the Israelis hit the house, which is on high ground at the edge of the village, because resistance fighters had probably fired from nearby.

The technicalities of “acceptable” actions according to the April Understanding mean nothing to Fakhri and her children, who are now homeless. And she has no faith in Barak’s promise to withdraw.

Residents of the front-line villages are used to such incidents. Retaliatory fire is targeted on areas from which resistance fire has originated, as well as on “infiltration routes” through the wadis surrounding the front line villages. If a villager’s farmland is in one of these areas, shells fall there. If the villagers are there, harvesting or working their fields, they are at risk—and sometimes they become casualties.

Asiya Ador took a break from stringing tobacco leaves to recount her experience. “Many times when I am working they are firing or shells are falling, spraying shrapnel everywhere,” she said. “If it’s not in my field I just keep working. If it’s close I take cover and then go back to work when they are finished. Life goes on.”

UNIFIL tries to provide escorts to front line farmers during the peak harvest periods. But they cannot be everywhere at all times. In Madjal Zoun between 20 and 30 people have been killed on the main road over the years.

According to the village mukhtar (chief) of Madjal Zoun, this year’s tobacco harvest was significantly disrupted by shelling, shooting and unexploded ordnance. “Everytime we go to our fields we take our lives in our hands,” he complained.

“We are not afraid. God and our children protect us,” says Musa Ador, referring to his and his relative Asiya’s sons in the resistance.

Expulsions Continue

On July 29, Human Rights Watch issued a report, Persona Non Grata: The Expulsion of Civilians from Israeli-Occupied Lebanon. Despite the attention surrounding the report, expulsions have continued.

This form of collective punishment is primarily used against the families of those who in one way or another do not support the occupation system.

In the past, mass expulsions were common. Abdallah Ali Hachem’s wife and two children were put out of Cheb’a along with 48 other residents. Their only crime was that Hachem had been a “troublemaker” and, even worse, encouraged other residents not to cooperate with the occupation administration. For his “activism” Hachem, who has had Canadian citizenship since 1975, had already spent three months in the Khiam prison.

Security forces ransacked the family’s house before taking them, still in their nightgowns and slippers, with the other villagers to the crossing point, where they were let out and told they couldn’t return. Hachem says incredulously, “I never held a weapon. All I wanted was to stay in my village and keep my Lebanese identity. And for that my whole family was expelled.”

The families of SLA deserters are systematically expelled. Wafa Melhem and her two-year-old daughter recently suffered such a fate. At the end of July 1999, two-and-a-half months after the night her husband failed to return home from his militia post, a local SLA security official, Muhammad Zein Hader, came to her house and simply told her she would have to leave in the morning. She could never return.

Those suspected of having sons in the resistance face an even more harrowing fate. One man’s mother was interrogated by local SLA security officials for hours before being forcibly expelled, along with other family members. “They just took the keys to our house and took us to the crossing point and left us there,” she said. “We were not allowed to take any belongings or money. They told us we could not return and threatened to blow up the house.”

The parents of the Hezbollah fighter who survived the spectacular chase that had been shown on Israeli TV back in February were expelled on Feb. 26, and their house was destroyed on March 25. Local security officials had already detained the gray-haired father several times, including a stretch in the Khiam prison.

While most of the deportations are carried out by the SLA, Human Rights Watch declared that “Israel bears ultimate responsibility for both its own actions and those of its proxy militia.” The group has called for international pressure on Israel to allow the expelled Lebanese civilians to return to their homes. So far there has been no movement on this front.

A representative of a Lebanese association engaged in helping the deportees said with exasperation, “In a civil society the acts of adults are not the responsibility of the parents. The idea of collective punishment—or punishing entire families for the acts (or alleged acts) of one person has been roundly condemned. Yet it continues.”

JoMarie Fecci is a free-lance photojournalist based in the New York City area.