Commander Barak Tries an End Run Around Wye

By Rachelle Marshall

Pessimists who predicted that newly elected Prime Minister Ehud Barak would turn out to be Binyamin Netanyahu with a human face had it almost right. Barak’s approach is less confrontational, and on some points he is willing to compromise, but when it comes to key issues such as the return of West Bank land or release of Palestinian prisoners, both of which were called for in the Wye agreement signed last October, Barak has proven to be almost as unyielding as the man he replaced.

The former Israeli chief of staff ran for election as a middle-of-the-road pragmatist who regarded peace as the best way to ensure Israel’s security. His supporters described him as a modest man with a superior intellect. But on taking office, Barak emerged once more as a commanding general, turning his back on dovish members of his party—including former Prime Minister Shimon Peres—and taking an iron-fist approach to peace negotiations. According to a correspondent for the Northern California Jewish Bulletin, he is seen in Israel as “an autocratic, supremely self-confident leader, riding roughshod over those who should form his most solid phalanx of support.”

Barak’s self-confidence should be bolstered by the fact that he has a major ally in President Clinton. Because of the close rapport that has developed between the two men at their first meeting, Clinton has decided that the United States would no longer act as mediator in peace talks but as a “friendly observer.” In reviving the fiction that Israel and the Palestinians negotiate as equals who, if left alone, could reach mutually acceptable agreement, Clinton gave Barak the green light to use strong-arm tactics on the Palestinians without risking American intervention.

As a result, the Palestinians found themselves struggling to achieve what was promised to them a year ago in an agreement that itself granted them lessthan what they had earlier been promised. Under the Oslo agreement the Palestinians hoped eventually to gain exclusive control over almost all of the West Bank, expectations that were crushed with the election of Netanyahu. The Wye agreement signed last October called for three Israeli troop withdrawals from the West Bank, after which the Palestinians would have full or partial control of 40 percent of the territory, up from the present 27 percent. Israel also agreed to release Palestinian prisoners, open a safe passage between Gaza and the West Bank, and permit the opening of a Gaza seaport. But after withdrawing troops from 2 percent of the West Bank, Netanyahu froze further implementation of Wye and Barak has shown no eagerness to comply with it.

He initially proposed that the two additional troop withdrawals scheduled for completion last spring be postponed until after final negotiations begin. When the Palestinians objected, arguing that Israel would gain additional leverage during the negotiations if it held on to the territory to be returned, Barak accused them of “inflexibility” and of “putting up obstacles.” His response was not surprising. In a 1996 interview Barak urged that Israel should keep much of the territory promised to the Palestinians by Oslo until final negotiations were underway. Those areas, he said, were “vital assets” that Israel needed as bargaining chips.

This time Barak argued that further Israeli withdrawals would jeopardize several West Bank settlements by leaving them in the midst of Palestinian-held territory. He even suggested that the security of Israel itself was at stake. Palestinians could point out that the location of armed Israeli settlers in what for centuries has been Palestinian territory has posed far greater risks to the Palestinians than to the settlers. During a recent four-day curfew in Hebron, for instance, soldiers protecting the Jewish enclave shot a Palestinian woman and a 3-year-old child. On Aug. 16 a settler named Nahum Korman was acquitted by the Jerusalem District Court of the murder of 11-year-old Hilim Shush in 1996. Several witnesses said they saw Korman beat and kick the boy to death. Korman claimed Hilim had fainted and he was trying to resuscitate him.

When the Palestinians continued to insist that Israel carry out its obligations under Wye, Barak agreed to a second troop withdrawal in November that would give the Palestinians 5 percent more territory, still 6 percent short of the promised 13 percent. An aide to Barak commented that “the Palestinians would get 75 percent of what they expect, so the difference between us is not that dramatic.” But since 3 percent of the area to be turned over by Israel was to remain open space, under Barak’s proposal the Palestinians would get 75 percent of only 10 percent of the land—hardly something to cheer about. Finally, after Palestinian negotiators accused the Israelis of “a breach of trust,” Barak signaled that the third withdrawal might begin in January and be completed by mid-February.

Even if the troop withdrawals are fully carried out, the Palestinians will end up with scattered pieces of land, isolated from one another by crisscrossing highways and squeezed by expanding Jewish settlements. Israel will continue to retain jurisdiction over security in the areas to be returned—a responsibility frequently translated into roadblocks and curfews. Palestinians had gone to Wye demanding that Israel return an additional 40 percent of the West Bank. The resulting agreement gave them only a fraction of that.

In late August Israeli and Palestinian negotiators finally reached an agreement to open a road through Israel from the Erez crossing in Gaza to a village near Hebron, and another that will connect Gaza with Ramallah. Special buses will transport Palestinians on these roads and “VIP” passes for Palestinian cars will be expanded. Work on building a harbor for Gaza will begin in October.

The talks broke down when the two sides clashed over the release of prisoners, a subject of painful concern to almost every Palestinian family. Wye calls for the release of 750 prisoners, but Netanyahu freed only 250 petty criminals, not the political detainees the Palestinians expected. They rejected Barak’s proviso that no Palestinian guilty of shedding Israeli blood could be released, and demanded freedom for at least 400 prisoners arrested before Oslo. The Israelis said they would release no more than 348. With Secretary of State Madeleine Albright due to visit Israel on Sept. 3, Barak threatened that if the two sides could not come to an agreement Israel would implement Wye “as it is written.” That is, Israel would determine unilaterally the areas it would withdraw from and the criteria for releasing prisoners. Israel would also be free to ignore the agreements already reached on safe passage between Gaza and the West Bank and construction of a Gaza harbor. The day before Albright’s visit a difference of 50 prisoners remained, but after her arrival the Palestinians agreed to go along with the lesser number rather than risk losing what they had gained. With Albright looking on, but pointedly disclaiming the role of mediator, Arafat and Barak signed an agreement calling for the withdrawal of Israeli troops from 11 percent more of the West Bank, the release of 350 Palestinian prisoners, and the start of final peace talks by next February.

The flurry of negotiations had little effect on the situation on the ground. On Aug. 10 Barak informed the Council on Jewish Settlements that he will not demolish any of the 30 settlements erected after the Wye agreement, many of which consist only of a few trailers planted by militant nationalists on Palestinian grazing land. Construction of Jewish housing has resumed in the East Jerusalem neighborhood of Ras Al-Amoud, and according to a human rights group, the Law Society, in the month of July alone Israel seized more than 2,000 acres of Palestinian land and demolished 12 houses to make way for settlement roads.

In Lebanon Israel has continued its air attacks against Hezbollah despite Barak’s promises to withdraw Israeli troops within a year. In late August Israeli commandos provoked a new round of violence when they assassinated a top Hezbollah commander. The next day Hezbollah fighters killed two Israeli soldiers and Israel responded with heavy bombing raids.

A statement from Hezbollah said Israel’s actions “confirmed beyond doubt that Barak was no different from his predecessors.” According to Kenneth Roth, director of Human Rights Watch, Israeli forces are still cooperating with the surrogate South Lebanon Army in expelling Lebanese villagers from their homes and farm land and forcing them to leave their possessions behind. Roth pointed out that, “Tearing civilians from their homes is not the way to engender trust on the part of Israel’s negotiating partners.”

Small, Important Differences

Barak is no less opposed than Netanyahu to sharing sovereignty over Jerusalem, allowing the return of Palestinian refugees, or freezing construction of Jewish settlements, but in small but important ways his government does differ from the previous one. House demolitions continue, but at a slower pace. Police Commissioner Shlomo Ben-Ami, who has criticized them in the past, has vowed to review all demolition orders. Israeli officials are considering granting retroactive building permits to some Arab homeowners in East Jerusalem. In another departure, Interior Minister Natan Sharansky said he wanted to stop taking away residency rights from Palestinians who leave Jerusalem for more than seven years. Israel will also allow Orient House, which houses several Palestinian offices in East Jerusalem, to remain open. Netanyahu had ordered the venerable building closed.

Another small sign of hope was Israel’s release in July of Osama Barham, who has been in prison for six years without trial. The new minister of justice, Yossi Beilin, called administrative detention “a badge of infamy in a democratic state” and was backed by 11 members of the Knesset who signed a petition calling for an end to the practice. Barak must make the final decision but has so far been silent. (It would be an irony if Israel should end administrative detention just when the United States has begun jailing legal immigrants on the basis of secret evidence.)

Sometime in the months ahead Israeli and Palestinian negotiators will finally begin considering the issues that will determine the future of both peoples for generations to come: control of land and water, the return of Palestinian refugees, and the status of Jerusalem. Palestinians will go into the negotiations strengthened by the fact that Yasser Arafat and Nayef Hawatmeh, head of the Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine, have agreed to work together on behalf of a united Palestinian position and negotiating strategy. The two men became bitterly divided after Arafat signed the Oslo agreement. Hawatmeh wants negotiations with Israel to be based on U.N. resolutions requiring the return of territory Israel captured in 1967 and has said no peace is possible without the return of Palestinian refugees.

Even if the newfound unity holds, Palestinian negotiators will face a formidable opponent in Barak. Two prominent writers, a Palestinian and an Israeli, recently published in two very different publications strikingly similar portraits of the man who will lead Israel during the final negotiations. In Palestine Report of Aug. 10, editor Ghassan Khatib refers to Barak’s “mentality of power” and writes that “Even if he is going to try to push forward the negotiation process, which it seems he will, Barak will do so in a military fashion. In other words he will squeeze the other party to the maximum.” Khatib warns that “While this strategy might do well on the battlefield, it may lead to unexpected reactions from the Palestinian people.”

Like Khatib, Avishai Margalit also refers to Barak’s battlefield approach. In the Aug. 12 issue of the New York Review of Books the Israeli scholar writes, “Among negotiators in Israel there are two schools—the tough and the tender. The tough school says that Israel must take advantage of its strength at the negotiating table and extract all possible concessions from the Palestinians,” in order to achieve “the maximum amount of territory and the minimum of Palestinians.” But such an agreement, according to Margalit, “is a recipe for disaster because it will stir up all the irredentist elements in Palestinian society.” He concludes, “I suspect that Barak, like Rabin, belongs to the tough school.”

Both Khatib and Margalit are suggesting there is a limit to the Palestinians’ patience. If, after seven years of talks, Arafat and his colleagues fail to come up with tangible gains in the final negotiations, their remaining credibility will be gone, with consequences no one can predict. The only certainty is that there will be no Middle East peace until the Palestinians achieve a state of their own with sufficient land and resources to survive. If Barak’s aim is to protect Israel’s security, he will have to learn the difference between Palestinian surrender and a just peace.

Rachelle Marshall is a free-lance editor living in Stanford, CA. A member of the International Jewish Peace Union, she writes frequently on the Middle East.