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OCTOBER/NOVEMBER 1999, pages 12, 98 Affairs of State Albright as “Facilitator” Tries a Sacrifice Bunt
Secretary of State Madeleine Albright, on her first solo trip to the Middle East in more than two years, was placed for a time in an awkward position by none other than newly installed Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Barak. This was despite the fact that the U.S. government had announced that it is only a “facilitator” and no longer a mediator in the process. This was in accordance with Barak’s public request that America take a reduced role now that he is in charge. In return, Albright arrived seeking some small victory for which the administration of President Bill Clinton could take credit before negotiatiors reach the really tough “final status” problems upon which the U.S. refuses to take a stand: borders, Jerusalem, refugees and water. But after almost four months of dithering about the dangers of implementing the Wye River accord, the Israeli general left everyone thoroughly confused as to what he really intended to do. The Department of State had gone along with his attempts to re-negotiate issues already settled at Wye River, saying only that any Israeli-proposed changes would have to be agreed to by the Palestinian Authority, and utterly ignoring the year-long delay in implementing an agreement signed by Israel, Palestine and the U.S. only after serious arm-twisting by President Clinton himself.
No matter. The important fact, according to the Department of State in the run-up to the shuttle trip by Albright, was that the two parties were talking with each other. The fact that they seemed to be talking past each other on issues detailed in the Wye agreement, which was supposed to be monitored by the Americans, was completely ignored in the rush to shore up the new Israeli prime minister in his attempt to proceed to permanent status talks without giving the Palestinians most of the sparse benefits provided by Wye: Release of political prisoners, access corridors from Gaza to the West Bank, opening of a Palestinian port, and freeing up of direct access between the Palestinians and the outside world. Instead, only a few days before the arrival of the secretary, after stops in Morocco and Alexandria to consult Arab leaders who could be helpful in the permanent status talks which the U.S. is now focusing on to the exclusion of any involvement in the specifics of the Wye River agreement, the Israeli prime minister warned that if the Palestinians did not agree to his revisions, he would implement Wye River “as originally signed.”
When the Department spokesman was asked what “implementing the original Wye agreement” would mean, he did not know. Apparently the weaker party was being left to dangle between Wye River and permanent status, with no real promises from American officials to help.
Media sources said that what Barak was suggesting was a recognition of the Palestinian state within one year providing the issue of Jerusalem was postponed indefinitely. That would be interpreted by everyone except the Israelis and Americans as trading Jerusalem for statehood (to which Palestine has long since staked its “inalienable claim”), another non-starter. Albright’s mission was supposed to include an attempt to start up Syrian negotiations. But those negotiations can only begin if Israel agrees to start them at their break-off point (under the Rabin and Peres administrations) which the Syrians interpret as meaning that Israel accepts, in principle at least, full withdrawal. The Israeli settlers movement continues to broadcast the words of Barak four years ago while he was foreign minister in the Labor government when he said that withdrawal west of the Kuneitra line on the Golan would threaten Israeli security. That is the approximate line Israel holds today and one that is a non-starter for the Syrians.
Barak managed to let a lot of good will seep away as he postured and threatened the Palestinians. At some point, even generals trying their hand at diplomacy must move or suffer the consequences: more violence, which already has begun on the West Bank and in south Lebanon. It was only when it appeared that the renovation really was about to fail over Yasser Arafat’s demand that Barak release 400 Palestinians prisons and Barak’s refusal to release more than 350 that Albright finally stepped in. Characteristically, instead of persuading both parties to split the difference, she asked Arafat to yield on the matter. He did and an agreement was signed. It is as difficult to read the intentions of the Clinton administration as it is to understand what the cabal of Israeli generals now in charge of the peace process intend to do on specific issues long ignored and yet central to any real peace. Certainly, the Americans are shying away from all such specifics, hoping to “focus” on permanent status issues. As the Israeli prime minister put it in answer to a provocative question about harsh and even brutal treatment of Palestinians, “I do not want to deal with the past. Only the future counts.” With this attitude, the future may quickly replicate the past. Eugene Bird, a retired foreign service officer, is president of the Council for the National Interest and diplomatic correspondent for the Washington Report.
SIDEBAR 1
The interesting aspects of the Wye II or Sharm el Sheikh agreement negotiated before and during Secretary of State Madeleine Albright’s September visit to the Middle East is that it may actually be implemented. If Israel carries out its withdrawal commitments this time, by February of the year 2000 the Palestinian Authority will have 17.2 percent in Area A (full control), 23.8 percent in Area B (administration only), and the Israelis will retain 59 percent under their complete control (Area C). The percentages are of the Israeli-occupied territories in the West Bank and Gaza, which are 22 percent of the former Mandate of Palestine. Therefore, to derive the approximate percent of the original Mandate under full P.A. control, multiply 17.7 percent by 22 percent (.172 x .22 = .03784) and you discover that the P.A. goes into final status negotiations in full control of less than 4 percent of Palestine. The nature preserve specified in Wye I is believed to be shrunken or even eliminated in Wye II and replaced by the transfer of other lands, but this will be up to the Israelis to decide. No maps were presented by Israel during any of the negotiations. The current reformulation of the dates and the affirmation that both parties will refrain from any actions in the occupied territories that undermine the final status will be largely ignored by Israeli settlement activity throughout the territories, the single greatest violation of the spirit and promises made at Oslo. Meanwhile the Palestinian people will remain on parole and the negotiations on ending the occupation by providing access—under heavy Israeli security supervision—to the outside world remain the bedrock of the peace process. The parole officer and judge of how well the Palestinians are carrying out their security duties will be Ehud Barak. The U.S secretary of state will be on the sidelines, acting, in effect, as public defender of President Arafat. And all this in a U.S. election year. —E.B.
SIDEBAR 2
The Israeli Supreme Court, 30 years too late in the opinion of many legal and human rights specialists, reversed its long-standing refusal to cancel the use of “moderate physical pressure” against Palestinians, including American citizens, and ruled on Sept. 6 that certain parts of the Israeli Shabak (internal security police) torture procedures were illegal. Almost immediately, both Likud Party leaders and some members of the government indicated that the Knesset would pass new legislation designed to continue brutal interrogations. Widely welcomed by the international community, the decision by the court was a surprise even to lawyers who had pushed a dozen cases through the courts over the past 10 years without any results. The court had previously ruled that the proper place to deal with the problem was through the Knesset, not the courts. The Supreme Court decision also came the month after Prime Minister Barak had been approached by Rep. David Bonior (D-MI), Democratic whip in the U.S. House of Representatives, who suggested that it was time to cancel the 50-year-old emergency regulations. The prime minister promised only to look into the matter. U.S. Secretary of State Madeleine Albright also approached Israeli Foreign Minister David Levy Sept. 2 about the torture of U.S. citizens after national media attention was generated by an Aug. 26 press conference with three of the victims sponsored by the Partners for Peace group in Washington, DC (see report on p. 113). The Department of State spokesperson, when asked Sept. 7, said that the U.S. had always opposed the use of torture by Israel, for the first time using the “t” word from the podium. After the court handed down the startling decision, Justice Minister Yossi Beilan said that he was “very proud” of the decision. Prime Minister Barak, by contrast, said that the decision was “problematic.” Israeli peace activists have long maintained that the widespread use of torture actually creates more potential terrorists. But the Israeli security services, which run at least five torture centers and process an average of 1,000 Palestinians each year through these centers, have created a system which will be hard to dismantle. The infamous Moskaviya prison in Jerusalem, only blocks from the American Consulate, was previously scheduled to be shut down. However, its interrogation center will be moved to new quarters, according to Israeli human rights lawyers. The Israeli Supreme Court decision outlawing specific torture procedures seems likely to be reversed by a coalition of Likud members of the Knesset working with security-minded members of the government. It is almost certainly too soon, therefore, to hail the end of torture in Israel. —E.B. |
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