Turkey’s Kurdish Workers’ Party Rebels Pledge Unilateral End to Armed Struggle, Withdrawal From Turkey

By Jon P. Gorvett

After 15 years of armed conflict in southeastern Turkey between government forces and the Kurdish Workers’ Party (PKK), July saw the possibility raised of an imminent end to the violence.

An announcement came from PKK leader Abdullah Ocalan, currently in jail awaiting an automatic appeal of the death sentence handed down against him in June by a Turkish State Security Court. Via his defense lawyers, he said that the PKK would give up the armed struggle and withdraw from Turkey starting Sept. 1. The announcement came as the latest in a series of surprise statements from the rebel leader since his capture by Turkish special forces in Kenya last February.

During his trial, Ocalan had frequently referred to his readiness to “serve the state” and belief that the war—in which an estimated 30,000 people have been killed—was now unnecessary. PKK objectives became increasingly blurred as its original calls for a separate state for Turkey’s 12 million Kurds weakened into calls for more autonomy and, finally, during the trial, for “cultural freedoms.”

Commentators speculated that this conciliatory stance might have more to do with Ocalan being on trial for his life than any real strategic change, but Ali Ozcan of the Diyarbakir branch of the mainly Kurdish People’s Democracy Party (HADEP)—which garnered some 60 percent of the vote in the city’s last municipal election—claims that this is part of a longer term strategy.

“Firstly, Ocalan’s declaration is not new,” he says. “The PKK have declared cease-fires three times since 1993. This last one has been in operation since September 1998—before Ocalan was captured. There are no winners or losers here. The aim was to keep the Kurds in the world’s mind. Many people have been killed to win the Kurds an important place. The PKK’s aim has been achieved. Now, violence is not needed.”

Among Kurds in Diyarbakir, whether violence is any longer needed or not, there is undoubtedly a great sense of fatigue with it. The Turkish army has established control over the region to a great degree, and centers of the insurgency, such as Diyarbakir, although still heavily militarized, are nowhere near as violent as they were in the early to mid-1990s, when the PKK campaign was at its height. The countryside, too, is mainly in the hands of the military, with road blocks less frequent and patrols less widespread.

Yet whatever the military indicators, the political problem remains unsolved. In the cities, towns and villages of the region, the language heard everywhere is Kurdish, yet nowhere is there a word of it written down. In schools, Kurdish children still have to swear their identity as Turks at morning assemblies, yet few if any keep up the pretense when teacher is not around.

“We are proud to be Kurds,” explains one high school kid who, as with most Kurds when talking to journalists, did not want his name used for fear of reprisals. “The Turks are our brothers, but we are Kurds, not Turks.”

The view is commonplace. “This war isn’t only for a piece of land,” explains Ozcan. “The most important thing it is for is identity.”

Since his first declaration, Ocalan also offered disarmament by the PKK in return for disarmament by government forces. Later, when the earthquake struck northwestern Turkey, the PKK also declared that it was moving the Sept. 1 cease-fire and withdrawal date forward as a gesture of support for the earthquake’s victims, and that PKK operations inside Turkey would cease before that date.

So far, though, the response from the Turkish authorities to the PKK moves has been on the one hand to reject the announcement as irrelevant, while on the other hand opening a channel between the president and HADEP. Turkish President Suleyman Demirel met with HADEP mayors from the southeast in Ankara in early August and, despite the anger expressed by both sides, he did recognize the mayors’ legitimacy. This was a significant shift from the position up to now, where southeast regional governors, appointed by the military-dominated National Security Council, have refused to recognize HADEP municipal leaders.

The conciliatory approach has also undermined the case for Ocalan’s execution. While during the trial and in its immediate aftermath the call to hang the PKK leader was the only one being made by politicians and media, this has now faded, with more commentators and opinion formers returning to their previous, and apparently long-held, opposition to the death penalty.

These moves are seen as positive by HADEP, but still have a long way to go. Certainly among many Kurds who have had members of their families killed in the conflict or had their homes destroyed, there is a sincere wish that the fighting end and that they simply be left alone to be themselves.

“All the people have left for the cities,” says one former inhabitant of the village of Kadikoy in Bingol province. She is “former” because, she claims, the army accused the villagers of collaborating with the PKK and burned down their homes. “We need peace,” she continues, “and we believe in peace. But the other side? We just don’t know what they want.”

Jon P. Gorvett is a free-lance journalist based in Istanbul.