 |
 |
OCTOBER/NOVEMBER 1999, pages 8-10 Special Report Massive State Failure Highlights Need to Review Turkey’s Vibrant But Flawed Democracy
The tremors from the Aug. 17 earthquake that took some 15,000 lives and destroyed the homes and livelihoods of many thousands more will continue to be felt throughout the Turkish Republic for some time. A major consequence of the quake was to cast a glaring spotlight on Turkish democracy, revealing its inherent strengths and critical flaws. During rescue operations, Turkish volunteers and non-governmental organizations demonstrated great courage, initiative and resilience against overwhelming odds. The Turkish media fulfilled its role admirably, recounting stories of dedication and heroism, individuals clawing through the concrete with their bare hands to save victims. It articulated the public’s anger and frustration over the inefficiency and lack of organization of the official rescue effort. And it did not hesitate to denounce builders and local officials by name responsible for shoddy construction. Both Turkish and foreign observers widely reported that civilian authorities failed to respond quickly and effectively to the national tragedy and the military were slow to move. Rescue efforts were hampered by lack of direction and coordination, absence of emergency planning and proper equipment, bureaucratic lethargy and red tape. In response to criticism, the government blamed the media for sapping public morale and one television channel was shut down for a week. Reasons for the official shortcomings are multiple and some quite comprehensible. The current administration had only been in office since the end of May and was just beginning to tackle pressing structural problems. For the past decade, Turkey has been governed by a series of embattled coalitions, more intent on holding onto power than overhauling the outmoded administrative structures. At the same time, the crush of urbanization has heightened tensions between the centralized state and municipal governments in outlying cities and towns. An even greater handicap is the confidence gap, which was apparent on two levels: between civil authorities and the military and between the secular establishment and Islamic organizations. Out of a kind of misguided pride, the government delayed calling for help from the armed forces, generally recognized as the best-organized institution in the country. When the generals suggested establishing martial law in the earthquake zone, the government said no thanks; this was a job for the civilian administration. Unfortunately, Turkey doesn’t have any kind of Federal Emergency Management Agency prepared to handle national catastrophes, and had to make do with the unwieldy state bureaucracy. Prime Minister Bulent Ecevit, a Social Democrat who has lived through four military interventions in the past 40 years, has on various occasions declared that the armed forces should stick to military affairs and leave governance to the civilians. This time, clearly, he should have accepted military help, perhaps on condition it come under civil authority. The armed forces did set up their own crisis center and removed more than 40,000 people from the rubble. But clearly more lives could have been saved if the military had been called in at the outset and assumed control of the rescue and relief effort. On another plane, the secularists who dominate the present government have been so engrossed in the military-led campaign against Islamic extremists that any kind of Islamic activity is suspect. The central authorities and their governors not only failed to call on cooperation from the mostly Islamic-led municipalities (who went ahead with their own relief programs), but actually obstructed work by Islamic volunteers on the grounds that they had political motives. They even froze the bank accounts of two Islamic foundations which were trying to mobilize aid for the quake victims. A positive sign, on the other hand, was that the highly nationalistic government soon recognized its inability to cope with the magnitude of the problems and welcomed foreign assistance, even from erstwhile adversaries like Greece. Foreign aid poured in from the usual American and European sources, but also from neighbors, namely Israel, Iraq and Iran, and far-flung friends like Japan and South Korea. Turkey suddenly found it is not alone. In the aftermath of the quake, some of Turkey’s leading journalists declared that beyond relief and reconstruction, there was an urgent need to overhaul the state. Hasan Cemal, a senior columnist for the influential daily Milliyet, wrote this was the first time he has seen such a strong wave of anger directed at the state and the politicians. “These voices, demanding an account for what happened, must be heard,’’ Cemal wrote. “The state and society in general must learn a lesson, The state must reorganize itself. We need state reform.’’ Sedat Ergin, Ankara bureau chief of the mass daily Hurriyet, wrote that the quake had proved so fatal “because of unauthorized land development, thieving contractors, irresponsible municipal administrations and politicians’ and bureaucrats’ encouraging, or at best, ignoring what was going on. It is not only thousands of buildings that collapsed in the quake, but also the system itself as a whole.’’ Turkish Daily News editorialist Ilnur Cevik wrote: “The quake has shown the naked truth to all citizens that this system based on injustice, corruption and favoritism is no longer viable and has to be changed.’’ Earlier he called for a government of national unity to face the challenges of the post-quake period. “It means everyone will put aside the endless political bickering, stop treating each other like enemies, stop this unfruitful debate of secularists and Islamists and get together for a common cause.’’ What has gone so terribly wrong in this country—which has the oldest parliament in the region, established in 1876 under the Ottoman Empire? What happened to the Turkish Republic, established in 1923 by the military hero Mustapha Kemal Ataturk, who went further than any other Muslim leader to create a modern, secular and progressive state? It was Ataturk who abolished the Sultanate and the Caliphate and set up a parliamentary regime, who gave women the right to vote and be elected before some European states did. It was Ataturk’s dream to form a classless unitary society, without distinction of race, where all citizens were equal before the law. Ataturk’s followers insist he was a democrat even though he ruled with a single political party. Ahmet Taner Kislali, a professor at Ankara University’s Faculty of Political Sciences and a leader of the Ataturk Thought Association, emphasizes that for the Turkish leader, Republicanism was a synonym for democracy. In a recent book, Regards Sur Ataturk, published in Paris, Kislali quotes Ataturk as saying: “The Republican regime means the model of a State consisting of a democratic system.’’ Specifically, Ataturk advocated a multi-party system, political parties “charged with checking up on one another.’’ He also stressed that personal freedoms must be guaranteed: “freedom of life, freedom of work, freedom of opinion and conscience.’’ In his manual Civic Instructions, Ataturk said, “In a government based on national sovereignty, public opinion plays an important role. Without freedom of the press, meeting and without devoting a large place to criticism of public affairs, public opinion cannot do its duty.’’ He also strongly defended the independence of the judiciary, questioning “the independence of a country, whose justice was not independent.’’ From the outset, Ataturk tried to include an opposition to his Republican Party in the National Assembly, with the only condition that they not be “counter-revolutionary,’’ according to Kislali. But on two occasions, the opposition tried to restore the Sultanate and the shariah (Islamic law), which Ataturk would not tolerate. And several revolts by Kurdish tribal leaders were brutally crushed in the name of national unity. Within Ataturk’s single party, however, ideological pluralism was allowed and independents were encouraged to enter the National Assembly. And by 1946, a decade after Ataturk’s death, his successor felt strong enough to introduce multi-party democracy. The trouble is it was democracy imposed from the top and guaranteed by the armed forces.
Turkey’s elite military commanders consider themselves the standard-bearers and defenders of Ataturk’s legacy. Four times in the past four decades the generals have intervened in the democratic process, ostensibly to save democracy. And each time, after restoring order with a new set of restraints, the military have voluntarily withdrawn, leaving civil society to start afresh. In recent years, Ataturk’s disciples, both civilian and military, face the same demons that plagued his regime from the start: the revival of an activist Islamic movement and the refusal of Kurdish nationalists to be assimilated. To combat this double threat, the establishment has acquired an arsenal of legislation which, when applied, makes a mockery of democratic principles. At the same time, the armed forces, fortified by a regime of martial law in eastern Turkey, have for the past 15 years waged a relentless war against Kurdish guerrillas. For these reasons, Turkish democracy is, sui generis, ambiguous, contradictory, erratic and unpredictable, sometimes ugly and at times very wonderful. Foreign journalists who covered the last national and local elections on April 18 could conclude that the Turkish Republic was the most vibrant democracy in the region, putting Western democracies to shame with the high 86 percent voter participation. A total of 21 political parties ranging from the radical left to Islamic conservatives and including Kurdish nationalists freely presented their respective messages through a diverse press and a vociferous campaign. Demonstrating their sovereign independence, Turkish voters confounded virtually all the pollsters and analysts—the ultimate test of free elections. The winners were two nationalist parties, one on the left and one on the right, which had made little impact in the 1994, 1995 polls. The pro-Islamic party, which had won the last time around only to be forced out of government by a military-led campaign, did poorly this time in general elections but held its own locally. On the other hand, the two mainstream conservative parties lost ground significantly, and Ataturk’s old Republican People’s Party couldn’t pass the 10 percent threshold to get into parliament. According to democratic procedure, Bulent Ecevit, leader of the winning Democratic Left Party, was called on to head the government. Needing a parliamentary majority, Ecevit formed a coalition with his ideological adversaries, the number two Nationalist Action Party and the conservative Motherland Party, pointedly excluding the pro-Islamic Virtue Party. The Grand National Assembly is the mirror of a Western-style parliament, a place where governments stumble and fall, where deals are made and legislation is produced, often the result of political compromise. The current parliament has been exceptionally productive. An understanding with the pro-Islamic opposition enabled the government to pass a constitutional amendment that would allow international arbitration—a stipulation by the International Monetary Fund. In return, the coalition agreed to changes in the Political Parties Law that would make it more difficult to close a party, as had been done with the former Islamist-led Welfare Party. But some of the new legislation is patently anti-democratic and has been widely denounced as window dressing and worse. A Repentance Law designed to encourage Kurdish guerrillas to lay down their arms was drastically limited by the Nationalist Action Party to include only low-level guerrillas who had never taken part in armed action. Even more controversial was an Amnesty Law, which Prime Minister Ecevit himself said he had “difficulty digesting.’’ Intended to respond to critics of the Turkish justice system—and relieve overcrowded prisons—the law as approved by the largely conservative parliament would have set free some 26,500 prisoners and reduced sentences of another 32,000. Under the amnesty, gang members, mobsters, swindlers, and torturers were to be set free. But the law did not affect prisoners convicted of thought crimes or alleged crimes against the state like Akin Birdal, former head of the Human Rights Association, Esber Yagmurdereli, a blind human rights activist, and Leyla Zana, a former Kurdish parliamentarian. Those pious students and teachers who have been excluded from university because they wear headscarves would also benefit from the amnesty—if they removed their headcovering. Bowing to public pressure, President Suleyman Demirel blocked the law and returned it to parliament for revision. The president did approve a bill that pardoned journalists and writers, on condition they did not repeat their “crime’’ within three years. Fifty people were expected to benefit from this ruling. What is so remarkable about Turkey’s selective democracy is that it does work in times like these. Even more astonishing is the fact that this country, which would not acknowledge it had a human rights problem in the early 1980s, now permits activities of several human rights organizations that are strongly critical of official policies. The main rights groups are the Human Rights Association and the Human Rights Foundation, which operate nationwide but are focused on Kurdish problems. Their branches have been closed down and leaders arrested and jailed and some activists murdered, but they still exist and continue to carry out their mission. Just as surprising, Turkey has recently opened its doors to foreign human rights observers. Several human rights groups sent delegates to the trial of the Kurdish guerrilla leader Abdullah Öcalan. Even though Öcalan received the death sentence—which is now under appeal—observers reported that the trial had satisfied “European standards.’’ Last summer, Harold Hongju Koh, U.S. assistant secretary for democracy and human rights, was given free rein to tour sensitive Kurdish areas in the southeast and talk to a broad spectrum of people. Later, at a press conference at the U.S. Embassy in Ankara, Koh was extremely blunt: “In my travels, I listened to many concerns expressed to me about restrictions on freedom of expression, especially political, cultural and religious expression; the continued use of torture and the lack of accountability of those who commit it; harassment of human rights defenders, including NGOs, defense lawyers, doctors who document abuse, and journalists who report on human rights; and the difficult situation in the southeast, where terrorism by the PKK and other groups, economic underdevelopment, forced village evacuations, and the rights of Turkey’s citizens of Kurdish descent remain serious concerns.’’ The American official did applaud Prime Minister Ecevit’s new government for making human rights a top priority and taking “some important steps’’ to realize that commitment. Among these measures, he noted the removal of military judges from State Security Courts, legislation to improve the accountability of civil servants and increase punishments for those engaged in torture, and introduction of a “no tolerance policy’’ for human rights violations by law enforcement officials. But unfettered elections, active political parties and non-governmental organizations, a free-wheeling media, parliamentary government and piecemeal reforms do not democracy make. Major changes must be made in the laws of the Republic, starting with the present constitution, drafted in 1982 under the military regime. In particular, paragraph five of the preamble of the constitution, which is a catchall for any kind of thought crime, must be repealed. It asserts: No protection shall be given to thoughts or opinions that run counter to Turkish national interests, the fundamental principle of the existence of the indivisibility of the Turkish state and territory, the historical and moral values of Turkishness, or the nationalism, principles, reforms and modernism of Ataturk, and that as required by the principle of secularism there shall be absolutely no interference of sacred religious feeling in the affairs of state and politics. In its latest survey on the state of free expression in Turkey published in February, Human Rights Watch says that the press in Turkey suffers from “multiple personality disorder.’’ Aside from certain sensitive topics, “the media today is lively and unrestricted—indeed often sensational,’’ Watch points out. “Risky areas include the role of Islam in politics and society, Turkey’s ethnic Kurdish minority and the conflict in southeastern Turkey, the nature of the state and the proper role of the military.’’ The New York-based human rights group states that punishment for violating these taboos include fines and imprisonment of writers, even death squad murders, the closing of newspapers, banning of books and the firing of journalists. Emphasizing that repressive actions are facilitated by an “antiquated legal system and restrictive constitution,’’ reflecting the country’s more authoritarian past, Watch recommends specific changes in the constitution, Penal Code and Anti-Terror Law, Political Parties Law, Radio and Television Law and the Press Law, among others. Turkish novelist and political columnist Ahmet Altan is quoted in the Watch report as describing the ambiguous nature of Turkish democracy: “You can say there is no freedom of expression, you can say there is press freedom, and you are right in both statements. It’s not like in a typical dictatorship—the borders are not clear, you can’t know where they are. The application of the law is arbitrary. But in many ways the arbitrariness is worse. You don’t know when you will get into trouble.” The real challenge facing the Turkish Republic today is to clear away the rubble of years of flawed policies and re-examine the national direction and priorities. It is almost as though the earthquake erased man-made walls and has given Turkey the chance to start anew. Unfortunately, the military does not seem to have changed its mindset. Meeting with Turkish editors after the earthquake, the chief of General Staff, Gen. Huseyin Kivrikoglu, accused Islamists of trying to exploit the situation, criticized present and past governments for failing to combat Islamic activists, and reaffirmed the armed forces’ determination to fight against Islamic radicals. But in a speech at the opening of the judicial year, Chief Justice of the Court of Appeals Sami Selcuk publicly attacked the 1982 constitution for restricting democratic freedoms and declared that it should be rewritten. If Turkey wants to become a full-fledged member of the world’s democratic community, it must begin by restoring trust among the different factions of this divided society. The secular establishment will have to come to terms with the significant Islamic and Kurdish sectors of society. History has shown this cannot be done by force, although repressive policies can bring about a temporary lull. Now with the Kurdish guerrilla leader in captivity and his movement suing for peace and the Islamic movement led by recognized moderates, it is time to give democracy a chance. This can only be done by dismantling the morass of legal restrictions and establishing a genuine democratic system, with true separation between religion and state, the military subordinate to civil authority, and freedom of worship, assembly and expression guaranteed for all citizens. Marvine Howe is a former correspondent for The New York Times. Her book, Turkey Divided, will be published by Westview Press in March 2000.
SIDEBAR
The Turkish Embassy has set up a Web site at www.turkey.org which lists bank accounts that have been set up to send money to Turkey. With so many people scrambling to send aid, Turkish Americans formed the Turkish Relief Association to coordinate donations. The toll-free number is (877) TURKEY9, or (877) 887 5399. The following development and assistance agencies are collecting donations (In the memo section of your check write “for aid to Turkey” or your donation will go to their general fund.): The Adventist Development and Relief Agency, Turkey Earthquake Relief Fund: PO Box 4289, Silver Spring, MD 20904; (800) 424-2372; Web site is www.adra.org The American Jewish World Service, Turkish Earthquake Relief Fund: 989 Avenue of the Americas, 10th Floor, New York, NY 10018; (800) 889-7146; Web site is www.ajws.org The American Red Cross International Response Fund: PO Box 37243, Washington, DC 20013; (800) HELP NOW; Web site is www.redcross.org AmeriCares: 161 Cherry St., New Canaan, CT 06840; (800) 486-HELP; Web site is www.americares.org Direct Relief International, Turkey Relief Fund: 27 S. La Patera Lane, Santa Barbara, CA 93117; (800) 676-1638; Web site is www.directrelief.org Global Relief Foundation: PO Box 1406, Bridgeview, IL 60455; (888) 256-2532; Web site is www.grf.org The Holy Land Foundation: PO Box 832390, Richardson, TX 75083-2390; (800) 909-6822; Web site is www.hlf.org Islamic African Relief Agency: PO Box 7084, Columbia, MO 65205; (573) 443-0166; Web Site is www.iara-usa.org Life for Relief and Development: PO Box 236, Southfield, MI 48037; (800) 827-3543; e-mail address is relief@aol.com Mercy International USA: 44450 Pinetree Dr, Suite 201, Plymouth, MI 48170; (800) 556-3729; Web site is mercyusa.org Success Foundation: PO Box 8125, Falls Church, VA 22041; (703) 820-7199; Web Site is www.successfoundation.org U.S. Committee for UNICEF: 333 E. 38th St, 6th Floor, New York, NY 10016; (800) FOR-KIDS; Web site is www.unicef.org World Vision: PO Box 78481, Takoma, WA 98471-8481; (888) 562-4453; Web Site is www.worldvision.org |
|
|