Washington Report on Middle East Affairs, October/November 1998, pages 23-24

Election 1998

Elections 2000: Arab and Muslim Americans Can Forge a Viable Coalition

By Muna Salman and Suliman Mustafa

One of the principal dilemmas facing Arab- and Muslim-American political organizers is the absence of a unifying vision that can combine Arab and Muslim voters in the U.S. into an effective voting bloc. From an Arab and Muslim leadership perspective, the Jewish vote in America is blessed with the greatest gift of all, a clarity of objectives and solid grassroots commitment. Can Arab and Muslim Americans find common ground to enter the 21st century as key players on the American national political stage? Yes, if we leverage areas of commonality.

The Jewish lobby in the U.S. has a clear mission: to support the policies of the elected government of Israel no matter what, right or wrong. The National Rifle Association (NRA) is also a case in point of how simplicity and clarity of objectives translate into political potency.

With Democrats taking a drubbing over Clinton’s private indiscretions and Gore’s fund-raising tactics, the next presidential election promises to be a close one. Swing votes such as minority votes or single-issue voting blocs can tilt the scale in one candidate’s favor. This upcoming presidential election could offer Arab and Muslim Americans a chance to flex their fledgling political muscles.

Common Issues

Typical of other Third World countries, Arab and Muslim states are hardly united in their policies and outlook. But Arab and Muslim communities in the diaspora have been welded together by outside forces. This unintentional coupling of “causes” proved a very positive development to both communities. The resulting almost doubling in numbers of voters espousing common issues has been a cause of celebration for visionary leaders in both communities.

Over the last decade, it has become apparent that both Arab and Muslim Americans have been joined together by their unfortunate circumstances and shared experiences in the U.S. The sense of being besieged brought upon by negative media images, government-sponsored civil rights violations, and gross double standards in U.S. foreign policy have all but united many political objectives of both communities.

Christian Arab nationalists, still considered the secular intellectual heavyweights of Arab America, see themselves as inseparable from Muslim Arabs and have mobilized to defend their community from anti-Muslim discrimination while continuing their campaign for justice in the Arab world. Muslim Americans who care deeply for Jerusalem’s fate as well as ending the suffering of Palestinians and Iraqis cross paths often with Arab Americans of all faiths who have similar concerns.

On the domestic policy front, the task of finding common ground is less complex. On civil rights, both communities seem to have developed a solid consensus on key issues: end airport profiling, secret evidence, and job discrimination. On social issues the situation is a bit more complex. New immigrants tend to espouse a conservative social agenda. The later generations of Arab and Muslim Americans tend to shift toward the center over time.

On foreign policy, more effort is needed to build a common agenda. Arab and Muslim Americans have very diverse views on what constitutes the ideal state of affairs in the Arab or Muslim world. Those views include a pan-Islamic nation, secular pan-Arab nation, Islamic pan-Arab nation, Greater Syria, Syria out of Lebanon, Greater Jordan, Historical Palestine, 1967 Palestine, pro-Oslo, anti-Oslo, binational Israel, Islamic Palestine, independent Kashmir, autonomous Kashmir within India, Pakistan-controlled Kashmir, Islamic Bosnia, secular Bosnia, independent Kosovo, autonomy for Kosovo, pro-democratization, pro-status quo, and all the possible permutations and combinations of the above positions and more.

Clearly, a realistic outlook on U.S. foreign policy should be sought without becoming bogged down with endgame scenarios and the political eccentricities of a few but vocal members of both communities. This is easier said than done. There has to be a realization that accepting a lowest common denominator agenda on foreign policy is a good first step that has never before been achieved. The alternative is no agenda and no progress. Stated differently, the alternative is the continuation of the Arab- and Muslim-American status quo of self-induced marginalization.

Some Arab and Muslim leaders are preaching the virtues of a zero-foreign policy agenda rooted in domestic issue activism. They are advocating increased emphasis on subjects such as education, taxes, defense, welfare reforms, and healthcare reforms. Some view this strategy as asking Arab and Muslim Americans to equate, and sacrifice, justice for Palestinians and Kashmiris, for example, with lower taxes.

The Arab and Muslim communities have a hierarchy of issues. At the top of the hierarchy are issues relating to justice at home and justice abroad. Reduced taxes and interest rates, while desirable, are lower on the totem pole of issues and fall in the category of luxury, not justice.

A realistic Arab-Muslim American agenda for 2000 might read as follows:

1. Support for lifting the sanctions against the Iraqi people and respect for Iraq’s territorial integrity.
   
   
2. Support for U.N. resolutions on Kashmir.
   
   
3. Support for U.N. resolutions on Israel including the withdrawal from Palestine, Lebanon, and Syria to pre-1967 borders.
   
   
4. Support for autonomy for Albanians in Kosovo.
   
   
5. Support for the abolition of the dubious “secret evidence” in U.S. courts.
   
   
6. Support for the abolition of discriminatory “airport profiling” practices based on appearances, names, religion, or national origin.
   
   
7. Support for democratic reforms and respect for human rights in the Arab and Islamic world.

The above agenda, put together, resonates with the bulk of mainstream Arabs and Muslims as well as with the global community. This agenda is rooted in fairness and international law. Both are values most voters don’t have reasons to reject, thus reducing the political risk to candidates. Candidates can then be judged on their positions vis-â-vis our common issues.

Caveat emptor! Traditional coalition-busting tactics will entice some candidates to selectively endorse one group’s issues at the expense of the other. Holding firm to the common agenda and promising a candidate the full vote or no vote is the only policy against the collapse of the coalition.

Oslo is a case in point of how catastrophic the results can be when one player in the coalition, the Palestinian leadership, breaks away from the team hoping to maximize its own gain with little concern for the well-being of other partners. Today, the sorry state of the “peace” process and the deplorable conditions of the Palestinians speak volumes to the dangers of coalition-busting.

The Arab and Muslim communities have a hierarchy of issues.

For newcomers to the art of coalition-building, the process of seeking common ground with other political groups is akin to compromising one’s values. This political naivet’ has crippled Arab and Muslim empowerment campaigns for far too long. Instead of viewing success as many steps to be taken over time, many view success as one giant leap over two great divides. To them, the middle ground is total failure. This attitude is a recipe for failure.

For too long now, the Arab and Muslim grassroots have put the Jewish lobby on a pedestal, demanding that our organizations live up to the same level of excellence. Ironically, the same grassroots have deprived their organizations of the needed ammunition for success, also known as political realism and commitment in money and time.

No, the U.S. will not leverage its resources to promote Arab or Islamic unity. That’s for Arabs and Muslims to pursue. And no, the U.S. will not un-recognize Israel. And no, the U.S. will not adopt Islam as the national religion. And no, the U.S. will not outlaw certain lifestyles that some in both communities don’t approve of. Extreme positions lead to self-imposed obsolescence, fast. On the other hand, we can help shape U.S. foreign policy to promote respect for human rights, respect for international law, and democratic reforms which in turn can help citizens of the Arab and Islamic world chart their own destiny.

The Jewish lobby’s political maturity and efficiency was most evident in the 180-degree flip-flop it performed following the Likud government’s assumption of power. Known for its opposition to Labor’s land-for-peace formula, Likud soon mobilized its lobbies in the U.S. to win political support or neutrality for its campaign to freeze or reverse Oslo.

Overnight, Jewish lobbyists in the U.S. who were recently holding hands with their “brave” Arab comrades in peace while smoking the peace pipe are now decrying the policies of the Israeli Labor Party as shortsighted, and accusing the Palestinians of breaking their end of the Oslo bargain at every turn. Therein lies the power of the Jewish lobby: simplicity of objectives and commitment.

Luckily, our Arab- and Muslim-American common agenda is morally and politically correct by universal standards. Who can argue against respect for international law, self-determination, and human rights? We can’t say the same for the pro-Israelis whose agenda is to skirt international law, justify violations of human rights, and promote regional and global instability in the process.

Arab and Muslim lobbies in the U.S. draw upon a constituency that is well-educated and well-financed. But with a missing realistic and unifying agenda the impact has been less than optimum. This can change if we abandon the impractical all-or-nothing outlook in favor of seeking common ground.

Additionally, African Americans and civil libertarians have also proved helpful to our cause. Progressive Christian American organizations have also been a source of strength on the issue of Palestine and Iraq. But the Arab-Muslim American alliance is an instant coalition—just add water. And the potential for developing this alliance into a viable voting bloc is much greater than that of any other group. Unity of suffering is a greater unifier than any other incentive. What is needed is a political structure to translate the common purpose into a common political agenda.

Separately, neither community, nor sub-groups within them, project power on the political stage. Combined, a critical mass is easily reached. Together, Arab and Muslim Americans total from 6 to 8 million. The number of eligible voters within those two communities, when perceived as one bloc, can help translate our agenda into real justice, both at home and abroad.

Year 2000 may spell doom and gloom for some. To Arabs of all faiths and Muslims of various national origins living in America, it could be a harbinger to a promising century of hope if they leverage this very special partnership born of righteousness of purpose.

Copyright (c) 1998 by Muna Salman and Suliman Mustafa.