Washington Report on Middle East Affairs, October/November 1997, Pages 105-106

Book Review

India, Pakistan and the United States: Breaking With the Past

By Shirin R. Tahir-Kheli, Council on Foreign Relations Press, 1997, 156 pp. List: $17.95; AET:$15.

Reviewed by Dr. Syed Rifaat Hussain

Questioning the wisdom of a "hands-off" U.S. policy toward South Asia in the post-Cold War period, Shirin R. Tahir-Kheli, in her new book published by the U.S. Council on Foreign Relations, argues for an enhanced U.S. role in the "management of regional tensions" between India and Pakistan. Making a case for sustained U.S. involvement in a South Asian "peace process," she recommends that the "United States must break with its practice of concentrating on South Asian issues such as those caused by regional wars, Soviet occupation, or the threat of nuclear-related crisis" (p. xiii). Instead, the U.S. should seek greater involvement in the subcontinent since "there are no alternatives" to a "policy aimed at diminishing...historical tensions" between India and Pakistan. "With patience and commitment," she maintains, "the United States should be able to cut through the problems in Indo-Pakistan relations" (p. xiv).

Tahir-Kheli, currently a senior fellow at the Foreign Policy Research Institute in Philadelphia and a former member of the National Security Council under the Reagan administration, identifies seven "reasons" which make "U.S. assistance in Indo-Pak normalization" of "overarching importance" to Washington: 1) India and Pakistan are "nuclear weapons-capable," which impacts upon "American non-proliferation interests"; 2) China has a long history of involvement in the region, which "necessitates continued American involvement"; 3) the region is a "geographic neighbor of the Persian Gulf," in which the United States has a direct economic stake; 4)"the United States can only be helped by peace and security in the region and hindered by any chaos that might ensue as a result of another war between India and Pakistan"; 5) the U.S. has committed itself to promoting "human rights and democracy" in the region; 6) the U.S. has significant "economic relations" with India and Pakistan; 7) "in the absence of superpower competition, U.S. interests can be advanced at a lower cost." (pp. 125-126).

Tahir-Kheli's lucidly written analysis of the interplay between Washington, New Delhi and Islamabad is divided into five separate chapters. The first chapter deals with issues of "Government and Politics" in South Asia. Her principal argument in this section is that while India's large size coupled with its "diverse ethnic and religious mix" have often strained its "political fabric," as demonstrated by the violent killing of its top political leaders, there has been no breakdown of the political order in India and the "Indian institutions have endured" (p. 12). Describing India's "free press" as a "vibrant part of Indian democracy" and a mirror reflecting "the performance of the political systems and its leaders," Tahir-Kheli concludes that India at the end of this century "appears to be in the throes of a coalition age politics where politics is determined not by one or two main parties with representative strength across the nation but by a plethora of regionally specific parties." (pp. 17-18).

She is less optimistic about the direction of political change in Pakistan which, in her view, has yet to find a solution to its recurring political instability. Commenting on the last elections in Pakistan and the country's elusive quest for a stable political order, she writes: "The February 1997 change of government in Pakistan will not resolve the urgent problem facing the country....Even if the political process is once again set aside and Pakistan goes into a period of martial law, the nature of the problems will remain largely unchanged" (p. 29).

In the second chapter, entitled "Foreign Policy Choices," Tahir-Kheli gives a good account of the evolution of Indian and Pakistani foreign policies during the East-West Cold War which made it "easier for Washington to support Pakistan" (p. 32). The latter "offered tangible benefits to the United States" because of its geographic proximity to the Soviet hinterland. By contrast, New Delhi, under Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru, was viewed as "decidedly pro-Soviet," "arrogant," and prone to "lecturing" Washington.

The U.S. encountered no such problems in its interactions with Pakistan which, because of its own "fixation on India and its need for a powerful friend," had "enthusiastically rushed to the U.S. corner" (p.33). Pakistan joined the U.S.-sponsored SEATO and CENTO regional military alliances in the mid-'50s and thus became the "most allied ally of the United States" in Asia.

Tahir-Kheli notes the "steep cost" which Pakistan "willingly" paid for its policy of "alignment." Pakistan's influence, she points out, not only "diminished with the developing countries such as Indonesia and Egypt," but it turned the Soviets into "suppliers to India of aircraft and armor, along with the other [military] hardware that India requested" (p. 33).

U.S. reliability as Pakistan's friend was severely strained during the 1965 India-Pakistan war. In response to Pakistan's request for American assistance during the war, U.S. Secretary of State Dean Rusk declined, saying bluntly that "the United States was being invited in on the crash landing without having been in on the take-off" (p. 35). After the 1965 war, the U.S. lowered its profile in the region, leaving the field wide open to Soviet diplomatic maneuvering and machinations. The U.S. did not again become actively involved in the region until the December 1979 Soviet military invasion of Afghanistan. The enunciation of the Carter Doctrine in January 1980 initiated the "second Cold War" and the formal launching of American global efforts to contain the geopolitical reach of the "evil empire" in the direction of the oil-rich Persian Gulf.

Tahir-Kheli's discussion of the efforts made by the Reagan administration to get the Soviets out of Afghanistan is most revealing in terms of the India-Pakistan-United States triad. Writing from the vantage point of a participant observer, she points out that the American regional strategy for getting the Soviets out of Afghanistan went beyond Pak-U.S. strategic collaboration against Moscow. It involved attempts by Washington to "improve relations with India and Pakistan simultaneously and to use that improvement to better their relations with each other" (p. 42). She writes: "By 1984, a steady stream of official American visitors regularly traveled to Pakistan in support of the Afghan effort. These visits incorporated stops in India to discuss a growing list of issues. All American conversations at the senior level actively encouraged good relations between India and Pakistan. Throughout the Reagan years, South Asian leaders had unusual access to the top leadership in Washington. The president himself was actively involved, meeting officially with Indian prime ministers and with Pakistani leaders on four occasions.

The third chapter, entitled "Nonproliferation: A Mirage," focuses on the difficulties Washington confronted as it tried to perform the nearly impossible task of "managing the twin problems of nuclear nonproliferation and the Afghanistan war" (p. 74). Characterizing the May 1974 nuclear explosion by India as a seminal event in the nuclearization of South Asia, Tahir-Kheli notes its grave implications for Pakistan's national security: "The Indian explosion stimulated thinking in Pakistan about the questionable dependability of conventional arms supply and the independent nuclear option...The [Pakistani] political elite saw the nuclear option as the instrument of national salvation, by providing a reliable strategic deterrence against superior Indian conventional capability. National prestige was less weighty a factor in Pakistani thinking than in Indian. For Pakistan, the nuclear weapons option was more an act of desperation to build a weapon of "last resort" (pp. 71-72).

According to Tahir-Kheli, the Reagan administration fully understood Pakistan's security compulsions in the wake of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. Islamabad, for its part, in deference to U.S. non-proliferation concerns, repeatedly "assured" Washington that "no nuclear weapons existed" (p. 76). Thus, a situation of tacit but clear understanding developed between the two sides whereby the continuation of American military and economic assistance to Pakistan was tied to the latter not "performing any nuclear experiments for military purposes" (p.79).

"All of the key political actors in Islamabad understood that to cross the nuclear threshold meant the immediate termination of assistance," Tahir-Kheli writes. "Perhaps, more than others, Zia understood that Pakistan could not withstand the pressure from the Soviets without the relationship with the United States; therefore, he was willing to engage the United States in serious promises on a matter of importance to American policy. The United States felt that while expecting Pakistan to abandon its nuclear policy was not realistic, Pakistani capability could be capped and Pakistani leaders could be relied on to keep their word" (pp.76-77).

"Special Relationship" Ends

Tahir-Kheli blames former Pakistani President Ghulam Ishaq Khan, whom she uncharitably describes as a "longtime bureaucrat with a reputation for inflexibility," for "ending" this "special relationship between the United States and Pakistan" (p. 89). She concludes that the nuclear issue has not only "complicated the U.S. relationship with Pakistan" but also "lowered the level of American political and strategic dialogue with the subcontinent" (p.95).

Tahir-Kheli's observation regarding the negative role played by post-Zia Pakistani leaders in "disrupting" the Pak-U.S. entente cordial is factually incorrect. The strains in Pak-U.S. ties at the end of the 1980s were the direct outcome of changed U.S. priorities in the region following the end of Soviet involvement in Afghanistan, which had led to denigration of Pakistan's strategic position as a "front-line" state.

The U.S. downgrading of Pakistan, therefore, had little, if anything, to do with Islamabad's inability to keep the so-called "nuclear promises." What further compounded these difficulties stemming from termination of the Soviet-Afghan war was a successful and systematic anti-Pakistan campaign mounted by "nuclear hawks" in the U.S. Congress, in the intelligence and policy communities and their surrogates in the U.S. media. The Pressler sanctions imposed on Pakistan in October 1990 reflected the dominance of this anti-Pakistan mood in Washington.

The fourth chapter, entitled "Economic Imperatives," highlights the growing importance of economic considerations in the "overall nature of U.S. relationships with India and Pakistan" (p. 97). Despite the slow pace and the uncertainty surrounding the staying power of ongoing economic reforms and liberalization policies in India and Pakistan, Tahir-Kheli argues, the United States will remain attracted to these countries "in response to its search for markets for goods, technology" and "investment opportunities" (p. 97). This U.S. desire to forge greater and closer economic linkage with New Delhi and Islamabad, must, however, be tempered by "declining popularity of political leaders" in these countries and the "turbulent politics" that lie ahead.

In the final chapter, Tahir-Kheli offers a "blueprint for action" to policymakers in Washington. Arguing against an isolationist policy, she calls it "unwise for the United States to ignore developments in India and Pakistan" (p. 130). She defines "regional stability" as an important U.S. foreign policy goal which must be defended against the "march of religious fundamentalism" (p. 127). Noting also that the "nuclear policies of India and Pakistan" impinge directly on global security, Tahir-Kheli calls for a strategy of sustained American "reengagement" with both New Delhi and Islamabad.

A key component of this approach, according to her, is the "U.S. support for economic collaboration between India and Pakistan" (p. 131) and the effort to "reengage India and Pakistan on the U.S. proposal for broader talks on South Asia and nuclear issues pertaining to the region" (p. 135).

In trying to maintain "cold peace" between India and Pakistan and to help promote their security dialogue, Tahir-Kheli argues, Washington must accept certain basic realities. First, "Threats and the cut- off of assistance have not led to a rollback of the Pakistani program. Neither have the incentives, such as large programs of security and economic assistance" (p. 133). Second, "the underlying sense of insecurity that forces the maintenance of a nuclear weapons option [by both India and Pakistan] is likely to continue." Third, a punitive approach to nuclear proliferation with its focus on sanctions has been a total failure. Therefore, "more focus is needed in providing incentives for India and Pakistan to engage with each other and with the United States in beginning a serious dialogue that can meet the goal of a secure South Asia" (p. 139). Fourth, "there cannot be real peace and stability in the subcontinent until the core issue [Kashmir] is resolved" (p. 140). While recognizing the fact that the "U.S. can play only a limited role in resolving the dispute in Kashmir" (p. 141), Tahir-Kheli maintains that Washington must do two things to help ease the situation. One, it must "put human rights violations in Kashmir on its bilateral agenda and press India to open the state to the monitoring agencies." Two, "with Pakistan, the United States must continue to insist that terrorism from any source will not be tolerated" (p. 141).