Bad News From Saudi Arabia Strengthens Ciller’s Hand in Turkey

By James Dorsey

Prime Minister Tansu Ciller entered the third quarter of 1995 seemingly stronger than at any previous point in her two-year tenure as head of government. She was so confident that, when a member of her cabinet resigned, she resigned herself. The idea was not to bring down her government and call for new elections, but instead to wipe the slate clean so that she could form a new cabinet.

Her newly found strength is the result of skilled outmaneuvering of her political opponents and sheer luck. If Ciller succeeds in guiding Turkey during the coming months into a planned customs union with the European Union, she is likely to emerge strong enough to impose badly needed privatization measures which have hitherto been complicated by widespread conservative opposition.

The recent beheading in Saudi Arabia of four Turkish nationals charged with drug smuggling could not have come at a more politically opportune moment for Ciller. It strengthened her hand vis à vis the one party against which she had had little leverage: the Islamist Refah Party, which last year won municipal elections in Istanbul, Ankara and other major cities.

Feeding popular outrage over the beheadings, Turkey’s secularist and the sensationalist press argued that Saudi Arabia’s interpretation of shariah law could sweep Turkey if Refah were to gain power. The executions therefore put Refah on the defensive just as it had been doing very well in opinion polls. Refah itself has not specifically said it would implement shariah, which was abolished as part of the Westernizing reforms of the 1920s. But critics of Refah charge it wants to turn Turkey into a strict Islamic state. As a result, the anti-Saudi backlash in Turkey is helping Ciller win back some of the support her conservative True Path Party (DYP) is believed to have lost to Refah.

At the same time, Ciller seems to be getting the upper hand over opponents within the ranks of the DYP itself. These include President Suleiman Demirel and parliament speaker Husamettin Cindoruk. Called back in August from its three-month recess to discuss Bosnia as well as domestic problems, parliament defeated calls by Ciller’s opponents for an early election or even the holding of by-elections. National elections are not scheduled until the fall of 1996.

Nonetheless, a vicious battle for control of the DYP continues, with Ciller using everything in her power to remove her opponents from the party. Many of the 180 DYP deputies were elected when Demirel was still party leader, so Ciller’s efforts are more than simple power politics. She hopes to ensure that the DYP is based not primarily in rural areas, but also in the country’s major urban center. This has become all the more important with several million young Turks eligible to vote for the first time after parliament in July amended the constitution to lower the voting age from 21 to 18.

Turkey’s political map could change when Cindoruk steps down as parliament speaker and the assembly returns from recess in October. Cindoruk, a widely respected politician, insists that he will not join the DYP parliamentary faction. Instead, some analysts suggest that he may try to boost the fortunes of the conservative opposition Motherland Party (ANAP) by joining its ranks. This would enhance Ciller’s grip on her own party but confront her at the same time with a formidable opponent in the ranks of the opposition who may be capable of considerably complicating her political life.

Few observers meanwhile expect that the change of guard in Ciller’s minority coalition partner, the Republican People’s Party (CHP), will affect the future of the coalition. Despite widespread grassroots criticism of the coalition within the CHP, it is likely to continue its alliance with Ciller’s DYP, even though Deniz Baykal is replacing Hikmet Cetin as CHP party leader and deputy prime minister.

To prove his worth to leftist voters in advance of general elections scheduled for next year, Baykal is pressing Ciller to implement further democratic reforms. His demand that the prime minister live up to promises to scrap or change the anti-terrorism law’s Article 8 coincides with European warnings that such changes are necessary to secure a coveted customs union between Turkey and the European Union scheduled to come into effect next year.

The fate of the customs union is likely to shape the nature of Turkish domestic politics in coming months. While Ciller successfully bludgeoned democratic amendments to the constitution through parliament at a moment when nobody thought she would be able to overcome opposition to the changes, Turkey still has a way to go to meet uropean calls for enhanced freedom of expression.

Freedom of Expression

Article 8 restricts freedom of expression by banning all forms of separatism. Under it, scores of writers have been jailed for their erceived support for Kurdish separatists.

Scrapping the article is one of the reforms sought by European Parliament members in exchange for ratification of the customs union agreement. EU foreign ministers meeting in Spain recently said that they would step up pressure on Ankara to speed reforms while pressing the European Parliament to approve the customs deal.

The customs accord, freeing up major funds for Turkey and stripping away layers of trade barriers, is aimed not only at boosting the Turkish economy but, more importantly for the EU, at laying a cornerstone in the wall of security the bloc is attempting to construct along its southern flank.

European parliamentarians suggest that Turkey not only will have to lift Article 8, but also release six Kurdish MPs from jail to achieve European Parliament approval of the customs union deal.

The jailing last year of parliament members from the pro-Kurdish Democracy Party (DEP)—mostly for speeches connected to an 11-year Kurdish insurgency in the southeast—has angered rights-conscious European deputies.

The DEP MPs were jailed for up to 15 years for links with the rebel Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK), whose fight for autonomy or independence in the southeast has claimed over 18,000 lives. A Turkish prosecutor rejected an appeal from some of the disenfranchised deputies to be allowed to return to parliament under recent changes to the constitution.

At least two of the deputies would have been released from jail, thus improving Turkey’s case before Europe, had the constitutional court accepted their appeal.