Moderates, Radicals Drifting Apart as Islamism Enters New Phase

By Greg Noakes

The Islamist movement is in flux. Predictions of a quick victory over the shaky military government in Algeria have proven premature, while once-bright prospects for the realization of the "Islamic solution" in Egypt, Jordan, Tunisia and other nations have dimmed.

For Islamists, increased activity has resulted, paradoxically, in fewer and fewer gains. Frustration has begun to set in, and with it fragmentation. The Islamic movement is starting to split into a large moderate wing that has turned its attention to grassroots efforts, and a smaller radical wing that has opted for the gun in politics.

Although many observers have tried, it is in fact impossible to speak of a single, monolithic "Islamic movement." Islamism—or political Islam—has a very different form and content in Egypt than in, say, Yemen, Turkey or Pakistan. Even within a single region or nation there frequently is a wide diversity of opinion among both the Islamist leadership and the rank-and-file on the means and ends of Islamic activity.

The current trend in Islamist politics toward a greater polarization between moderates and radicals is important and may signal the beginning of a new era of politics in the region. Or this shift, which recalls earlier events in Islamist history, may be only a cyclical phase in Islamic politics.

Rethinking Islamism

Many Islamists are rethinking their tactics. In their quest to create a truly Islamic society, most Islamists have devoted their efforts to achieving control of the state. With the power of the central government in their hands rather than at their throats, many Islamists reasoned, substantive changes could be implemented using a "top-down" approach. They would, quite simply, legislate morality and implement their vision of a righteous society.

Throughout the Arab and Muslim worlds, however, the state has proven more resilient than expected. Arab kingdoms, emirates and sultanates from Morocco to Oman have been described as relics of the past, yet no Arab monarchy has been overthrown for over a quarter-century. In fact, these hereditary governments have proven more durable and enjoy more popular legitimacy than most of their republican counterparts in the region.

Equally impervious to Islamist destabilization are the narrowly based and brutal military regimes in Syria and Iraq, the often-inept but nonetheless durable Egyptian government that has been in place for 45 years, and even the largely isolated military junta in Algiers.

As a result, a number of Islamists have begun to ask themselves: How realistic are the prospects for change? Some of them have concluded that the resources of the state are still too overwhelming, and the cost of the struggle to replace that state too steep, to continue with the old goal of gaining control of the levers of power.

The state has proven more resilient than expected.

Another sobering factor for Islamic thinkers and activists is the dismal record of the two states where contemporary Islamism has gained power: Iran and the Sudan. The 1979 Islamic Revolution in Iran was greeted with an initial outpouring of interest and goodwill from many Islamists in the region, who saw the fall of the once-powerful Pahlavi dynasty as proof of what could be accomplished elsewhere. If the Shah, America's anointed surrogate in the Gulf, could be toppled despite his billions of dollars in U.S. weapons, what about the Muslim world's other strongmen?

However, as the "mullahcracy" in Tehran groaned under the weight of a bruising war with Iraq and growing intolerance and corruption within its own ranks, the experiment in Iran increasingly was seen by Islamists as a scenario to be avoided rather than emulated. In addition, the Islamic Republic's deep roots in Shi'i thought and tradition severely limited its appeal for most of the population of the predominantly Sunni Islamic world.

While the Iranian Revolution had at least its moment in the sun, this was denied to the current Sudanese government, which from the outset was simply a military regime with Islamist overtones. Whereas the Islamic Republic grew out of a widespread popular uprising in Iran, the National Islamic Front-dominated government in Sudan was the product of a military coup that overthrew not a bloodthirsty despot but a democratically elected (albeit impotent) parliamentary government. The ensuing six years have been marked not by the piety and prosperity for which the Islamists hoped, but by human rights abuses, an ongoing civil war and economic decline.

Faced with little chance of assuming the reins of power and, judging by Iran and the Sudan, an even smaller chance of quickly and efficiently implementing their programs for Islamization if they should succeed, growing numbers of Islamists are turning from the "quick-fix" of state power to the long-term, social activist approach to change. By working at the neighborhood or village level, Islamist groups play to their strengths: the commitment and idealism of their members, the often considerable personal charisma of their leaders, their ability to adjust quickly to pressing social needs in advance of the government bureaucracy and, most importantly, the ability of their religious, social and political message to transform individuals' lives.

The battle for an Islamic society now is being waged with schools and clinics, not popular manifestos and protest marches. By using a "hearts-and-minds" approach, Islamists not only are building contacts and influence at the popular level, but also making society more receptive to the Islamist program through education, community involvement and an increased emphasis on religious practice, terminology and social norms. Even those who vehemently oppose the Islamists' program admit the efficacy of their tactics and the impact of their efforts on the daily lives of ordinary citizens who have fallen through the state's often frayed social welfare net.

Turning Up the Heat

If the majority of Islamist political organizations are moving toward greater involvement in social, cultural and educational activities, a small minority has taken the opposite tack in trying to overcome the current stalemate of Islamic politics. These factions, many of which broke away from larger groups when the parent organization adopted a more moderate stance, believe that if the Islamist "sword" has been blunted against the unexpected durability of the state, what is needed is simply a sharper blade.

Thus their disturbing tendency to use terror to induce social and political upheaval and clear their way to power. The tactics of Islamist violence have changed, growing more deadly and indiscriminate.

Five years ago the "fundamentalist" with bombs strapped to his or her body was considered a uniquely Shi'i phenomenon, generally limited to south Lebanon. Now the suicide bombing is the tactic of choice among some extremist Sunni groups in the West Bank and Gaza, and Algerian Islamist radicals are resorting to massive remote-controlled bombs detonated in crowded public places in both Algeria and France. Islamist commandos are waging vicious wars with the governments of Algeria and Egypt, and armed unrest in Afghanistan, Pakistan, occupied Kashmir and the Philippines indicate the phenomenon is not limited to the southern coasts of the Mediterranean.

Apart from the extraordinary suffering and needless devastation such tactics produce, the biggest argument against them is their utter futility. No Arab government was ever overthrown by such minuscule factions of fanatics, and most who might be sympathetic to the radicals' cause are repulsed by their methods. Blind violence committed in the guise of Islam only serves to blacken the international image of one of the great world faiths, playing into the hands of those enemies of Islam and of Muslims who seek recognition and power as "bulwarks against fundamentalism." Wasn't this, after all, the claim made by the Bosnian Serb leadership? Civilized nations should have no truck with such criminals whatever their avowed motives, but the actions of a handful of equally culpable Muslims who blow up buildings, skyjack airliners or kidnap innocent bystanders in the name of religion give such claims by the enemies of Islam an unwarranted veneer of credibility.

Nothing New Under the Sun?

For all of these recent developments and shifts, the polarization of Islamist movements is not a new phenomenon. Rather, it is part of a familiar cycle of activity, frustration, polarization, reorganization and then again activity—a cycle which has been repeated several times over the past century in the Middle East.

First, Islamists engage in political activity, whether through electoral races, professional associations or public advocacy groups. When the government slams the door on peaceful political change—and often on simple reform—the Islamists grow frustrated. Some throw in the towel on politics, while others resort to the gun to effect the changes they desire. Through meaningless violence these radical factions eventually lose whatever support they once had and finally cease to exist as effective groups—but not before exacting a gruesome toll. Meanwhile some activists and thinkers who have involved themselves in social and educational activities at some point either grow disenchanted with the slow pace of change these methods entail, or see an opening in more traditional political activities. Thus the cycle begins anew as Islamists engage again in national political life.

Is Islamic politics then destined to be a story of frustration, disenchantment and violence? Not necessarily, if two things happen to break the cycle.

First, Islamist leaders and thinkers must raise their level of discourse if they wish to be taken seriously. Demagoguery and simplistic slogans are not sufficient; instead, Islamists must produce concrete, realistic plans for the future and demonstrate how their Islamic model will work in practice. Most Islamist platforms are long on generalities and short on specifics. Future Islamists must be more stringent in filling in the details of their political, economic and social programs for the nation while still maintaining their commitment to the larger ideals of Islam.

For their part, existing governments in the region cannot continue to block peaceful avenues of change and simply hope the top won't blow off the simmering pot. Radical groups draw whatever strength they enjoy from the fact there are no viable alternatives for those disaffected with the system. Armed force and multiple security services can postpone the day of reckoning, but only for so long. If governments truly wish to encourage political moderation and cut the legs out from under the radicals, they must offer some reason for moderates to become involved. This means giving up the notion of total control and instead bringing the opposition, whether secular or Islamist, into the equation.

Otherwise, the regimes currently in place can look forward to increased violence and greater instability; the Islamists can expect greater factionalization and with it growing marginalization; and the peoples of the Muslim world will experience even more suffering with even less justification.

Greg Noakes, an American Muslim, is a former news editor of the Washington Report.