The October War: Has the US Learned From Its Mistakes in 1973?

By Karen Healey

The death of charismatic Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser in September 1970 was a turning point in the history of the Middle East. His successor and longtime associate, former Vice President Anwar Sadat, began to search for an acceptable solution to Egypt's conflict with Israel soon after assuming the presidency.

This was a pragmatic rather than a political move. Egypt's enormous economic difficulties could be eased if its military budget were reduced and the Suez Canal reopened. In addition, Sadat hoped that peace would lead to improved relations with and economic aid from the United States. As early as November 1970, the newly installed Egyptian president indicated his interest in the talks then being conducted by United Nations mediator Gunnar Jarring, based on implementation of the land for peace formula in UN Security Council Resolution 242. Israel, however, refused to consider returning to its pre 1967 borders.

In an effort to entice the United States to intervene and jump-start the talks, Sadat announced two new Egyptian initiatives in February of 1971. He promised to rebuild and reopen the Suez Canal, closed since the Six Day War of 1967, if Israel would remove its forces from the east bank of the canal. He also promised to sign a peace treaty with Israel, if Israel would return to its pre 1967 borders. In addition, Sadat sent a message to US President Richard Nixon promising to expel his Soviet military advisers if a settlement was reached.

This seemed to be an incredible opportunity for the US president, since he feared the Soviet presence in the Middle East. However, the Vietnam War occupied a considerable amount of Nixon's energies. In addition, American policy in the Middle East suffered from political infighting between then National Security Adviser Henry Kissinger and Secretary of State William Rogers. According to US author Seymour Hersh's book The Price of Power, while Rogers pursued an agreement based on Sadat's proposals, Kissinger worked against it.

Colleagues in both the State Department and the National Security Council at the time suspected that Kissinger was driven less by legitimate policy concerns than by the desire to undermine Rogers. Kissinger sabotaged the Rogers plan for Middle East peace by turning Nixon against it, convincing the president that the reopening of the canal would benefit the Soviets. Nixon in turn made it clear to Rogers and State Department emissaries that he would not pressure Israel to come to a settlement. The death of the Rogers initiative marked the beginning of a two year diplomatic stalemate.

Realizing that Kissinger had assumed effective charge of US foreign policy, Sadat opened a back channel to him. Through it, Kissinger advised Sadat that Egypt must move away from the Soviet Union if it wanted US cooperation. Sadat pointed out that he had already indicated willingness to oust the Soviets in return for a negotiated settlement on the canal issue. Kissinger, however, ignored Sadat's overtures.

Sadat felt understandably betrayed by the arms sale.

Sadat was disappointed and angry. In his campaign to get Israel out of Sinai, he had pledged that 1971 would be "a year of decision, " but the year ended with the continued stalemate. Frustrated by the lack of progress, and facing pressure from his own military, Sadat decided to force the issue.

He ordered all Soviet advisers out of Egypt on July 8, 1972. Nixon made no public response, but privately he promised Sadat that he would concentrate on the Middle East after his reelection and the resolution of the Vietnam conflict.

The Nixon administration's attention finally turned to the Middle East in February 1973, when Kissinger met secretly with Hafez Ismail, Egypt's national security adviser. Although Kissinger insisted on more concessions from Egypt, Sadat believed that the US finally was committed to resolving the Arab-Israeli issue. A few days after Ismail's meeting with Kissinger, however, the US announced a massive new arms sale to Israel.

Sadat felt understandably betrayed by the arms sale. He also believed that Kissinger wanted an Egyptian-Israeli war. In Sadat's book, In Search of Identity, he claimed that "the drift of what Kissinger said to Ismail was that the United States regrettably could do nothing to help so long as we were the defeated party and Israel maintained her superiority." To achieve peace, it would be necessary to go to war.

It appears that Nixon and Kissinger had ignored Sadat's peaceful overtures because Kissinger believed that the stalemate of "no peace, no war" could continue indefinitely and served to strengthen both the American and Israeli positions. Sadat's pledges to break the stalemate were dismissed as mere rhetoric by Kissinger.

Increasing Israeli Intransigence

Believing that Israel would only make peace when it felt secure, and would only feel secure when it was invincible, Kissinger actively pushed for increased military shipments to Israel. When some in the State Department warned him that Israel's growing strength was making it more intransigent, Kissinger ignored them. Kissinger also ignored warnings by King Hussein of Jordan and King Faisal of Saudi Arabia that war was imminent. By his own admission, both he and Israel were surprised by the Egyptian Syrian attack for the stated purpose of recovering their territories occupied by Israel.

It is impossible to know what might have happened had the United States aggressively pursued a peace plan. Given Sadat's willingness to negotiate, as well as the willingness of some members in Israel's Labor coalition government, an accord along the lines of that later reached at Camp David during the Carter administration seemed to be more than possible. It was Moshe Dayan, after all, who initially suggested the partial withdrawal of the Israeli troops from Sinai.

Then, as now, however, there could be no settlement without pressure from the US on Israel. Egypt, which, in addition to expelling the Soviets, had accepted all US and UN sponsored peace initiatives, was asked to give up more. By contrast, Israel, which rejected all of the peace initiatives, was rewarded during the Nixon Kissinger era by receiving increased US military aid.

The pattern of rewarding Israel for intransigence has continued until this day. Again there are bold moves toward the peace table, and this time not by one Arab state but by several. As in the past, however, the chance for peace depends on Washington. Will a president facing reelection again be reluctant to link aid to Israel to Israeli concessions to its Arab neighbors and to the Palestinians? Or do the lessons learned from past US mistakes, and George Bush's comfortable margin in public opinion polls, pave the way to pressuring Israel for progress toward peace?

Karen Healey is a graduate student at Georgetown University's Center for Contemporary Arab Studies.