October 1991, Page 29
To Tell the Truth
David Kimche: Israel's Leading Spy and Would-Be
Mossad Chief
By Leon T. Hadar
The name David Kimche became vaguely familiar to Americans who
followed the Iran-Contra scandal, yet few now can recall exactly
what role he played. It's just the way this shadowy Israeli intelligence
official and spin control artist operates. Since he figures prominently
in many of his government's more spectacular "dirty tricks,"
it was no surprise to hear from a US television team that returned
from Tehran this summer that, "whenever we went to interview
Islamic revolutionary government officials, David Kimche seemed
to be just leaving their offices. "
This quiet but influential Israeli official's name first surfaced
frequently in the world press in connection with the 1982 Israeli
invasion of Lebanon, three years before the Iran-Contra revelations.
Throughout the 1980 to 1988 administration of US President Ronald
Reagan, Kimche was one of the leading figures in the efforts to
cement the "strategic alliance" between Israel and the
United States. Today, as a "private businessman, " he
undoubtedly is still at the center of some Israeli covert activities
abroad.
Kimche is a descendant of an aristocratic Jewish family that settled
in Switzerland and produced several famous rabbis. His own parents
moved to England, where both he and his older brother, Jon, were
active in Zionist politics after World War II.
Jon pursued a successful career as a journalist, writing in Western
publications on Middle Eastern affairs. His close ties with the
leaders of the new Jewish state, including Israel's first prime
minister, David Ben-Gurion, helped him secure Israeli government
funding for a magazine on Middle Eastern affairs which he began
to publish in London in the late 1950s.
The magazine folded in 1965 after Israeli financial support was
withdrawn. The withdrawal resulted from Israel's Byzantine politics
and espionage activities. After the ruling Mapai party split over
responsibility for the "Lavon affair" (the firebombing
of US diplomatic establishments in Cairo and Alexandria by Israeli
agents in July 1954 in order to poison US-Egyptian relations), Jon
Kimche sided with BenGurion. As a result, Kimche incurred the wrath
of the Old Man's more moderate political rivals who, under the leadership
of Prime Minister Levi Eshkol, took control of the party and the
government in the mid 1960s.
What directly triggered the decision to stop the funding for the
magazine, however, was an editorial written by Kimche which accused
Eshkol of ordering the Mossad to assassinate the Moroccan opposition
leader, Mehdi Ben Barka, in 1965. (Eshkol argued that it was Mossad
chief Meir Amit, Ben-Gurion's ally, who gave the order without consulting
Eshkol, even though he was prime minister at the time.)
Kimche was a rare breed among the rough and tough
Mossad crowd.
Although his magazine is defunct, Jon Kimche is currently an editor
of a London newsletter that deals with Afro-Asian affairs, a topic
that was always of interest to his brother David, who immigrated
into Palestine in 1946. The two collaborated in the early 1950s
in writing a book about the 1948 Arab-Israeli war, in which "Dave"
served in a combat role.
Following that war, the young David Kimche worked for a while as
a night editor at the Jerusalem Post. After failing to pass
an entrance exam for the Israeli foreign ministry (his sweet revenge
was to return to the ministry as a director general almost 40 years
later), he pursued an academic degree in Middle Eastern studies.
In 1953 he was asked to join the newly organized Mossad.
Kimche, with his British accent, aristocratic European mannerisms
and low key personality, was a rare breed among the rough and tough
Mossad crowd. At that time most were either Eastern European aparatchiks;
or Israeli born military officers. In that environment the young
spy, who was not tied to any of the political cliques that dominated
the Israeli security service at the time, developed a reputation
as a detached and sophisticated professional. His colleagues described
him as "urbane" and "brilliant."
The Mossad sent him abroad where, in the 1950s and 1960s, he appeared
mainly in Africa and Asia, either as an Israeli diplomat with the
cover name " David Sharon " or, at other times, as a British
businessman. Journalists who covered Africa during that period remember
"Sharon" as a source of information (and disinformation)
on the politics of the newly emerging states.
Kimche's activities were part of an Israeli effort to establish
ties with non Arab entities on the "periphery" of the
Middle East such as Iran and Turkey. He traveled frequently to Iran
during the shah's reign, where he developed a close friendship with
Ya'akov Nimrodi, then the Israeli military attaché in Tehran,
who became an arms dealer after his retirement. Nimrodi and David
Kimche emerged later as central characters in Irangate. Kimche also
served for several years as the Mossad liaison with the Maronite
community in Lebanon, a role that would come to haunt him later.
David Kimche's real "baby" for several years, however,
was Africa. He made a major effort to shore up the power of Christian
ethnic groups, and other approachable entities in Africa, by befriending
military cliques affiliated with them.
The "Man with the Suitcase"
The "man with the suitcase," as Kimche became known by
colleagues in Israel, would appear in an African country a day or
two before a major coup, and leave a week later after the new regime
was firmly in control, often with the aid of Israeli security teams.
(One of Israel's protege allies in Africa whom Kimche helped to
groom was none other than the continent's most infamous ruler, Col.
Idi Amin of Uganda.)
As many emerging Third World countries, under the influence of
Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser, adopted an increasingly hostile
attitude toward Israel, Kimche's reach expanded. He used Israeli
aid packages, which included military training and support (financed
occasionally by the CIA), to establish Israeli footholds in developing
nations as far afield as Costa Rica, Panama, Singapore and Thailand.
Kimche used his knowledge of the Third World in preparing his doctoral
dissertation, written under the auspices of the Shiloah Institute
at Tel Aviv University. It included profiles of the new leaders
of several developing nations. His dissertation was edited into
a book that is used today in academic courses on Third World issues
in the US and Europe. Kimche also taught Third World politics in
the intelligence community's special academy in Jerusalem.
The coming to power of the Likud in 1977 initially posed a dilemma
for Kimche. Although regarded as apolitical, his professional and
personal ties were with the Labor oriented leadership of the Israeli
defense establishment. Like many other Israeli national security
professionals, Kimche worried that the crude ideological orientations
of Israel's first Likud prime minister, Menachem Begin, would endanger
their more pragmatic approach, based on close intelligence ties
with the US and on covert understandings with two or three moderate
Arab leaders. On a more personal level, Kimche and his intelligence
and security colleagues were concerned that the Likud government
would replace those of them who had worked closely with such Labor
figures as Shimon Peres and Yitzhak Rabin.
That, however, did not happen. Instead, one of Begin's first steps
was to nominate Moshe Dayan, a Labor politician as well as a military
figure, as foreign minister. Moreover, Begin was an admirer of the
Israeli military and fascinated by the Mossad's glamorous covert
work. Aware of his own reputation as an extremist, and determined
to coopt the Labor oriented intelligence chiefs, including Kimche,
Begin provided them with more professional latitude than they had
enjoyed under Rabin and Peres. Unlike the latter, Begin had little
familiarity with the personal and political intrigues in Israel's
security services. Hence, with weakened civilian control, the intelligence
operatives expanded their professional turf and increased their
influence over Israel's foreign policy.
Only a few months after Begin came to power in the 1977 election,
Kimche was able to present him with the opening to Egypt. Serving
as deputy to then Mossad director Yitzhak (Haka) Hofi, Kimche utilized
ties he had developed within the Moroccan secret service to convince
King Hassan to play the role of middleman between Begin and Sadat.
The way had been paved by Mossad intelligence reports provided Egyptian
President Anwar Sadat, through Morocco, concerning an assassination
attempt against him, and a Libyan campaign against Sadat's regime.
Morocco was the site of several secret meetings between Israeli
and Egyptian officials that preceded Sadat's visit to Israel, and
the Egyptian-Israeli peace process. In particular, Kimche accompanied
Dayan to a critical meeting in Morocco with an Egyptian presidential
aide, Hassan Tohami, in which the Israelis promised to return all
of Sinai in exchange for peace.
These successes, however, were offset by the lowkey Kimche's poor
relationship with the cruder Hofi. Begin was inclined to select
Kimche as Hofi's successor as chief of Mossad. Likud's other major
leader, and former Mossad European operator, Yitzhak Shamir, also
supported the move. The Mossad chief, however, vetoed the plan,
accusing Kimche of intriguing against him and of trying to establish
a personal bureaucratic and financial empire within the Mossad.
When the struggle between the two threatened to turn into a major
scandal, Kimche resigned from the Mossad in 1980.
After his resignation, Kimche first looked for employment to the
Jerusalem Post to which, writing under various pseudonyms,
he had contributed many articles, particularly on Third World issues,
during his Mossad service. The newspaper was looking for an editor
and its owners hoped that Kimche's international reputation would
help turn the Post into a major global media organization.
The newspaper's editorial staff, however, rebelled against the
nomination of a former intelligence official, with one writer comparing
it to the selection of a former CIA head as an editor of The
New York Times.
Kimche then accepted an offer from his former Mossad colleague,
Shamir, who became foreign minister in 1980, to serve as foreign
ministry director general. Shamir promised in return to lobby for
Kimche's future appointment as Mossad chief.
Selling His Soul to Sharon
In his new position, Kimche cultivated ties with his friends in
the different secret agencies. However, so ` me of his critics later
charged, with the goal of becoming Mossad chief uppermost in his
mind, Kimche also sold his soul to the devil, personified by then
Minister of Defense Ariel (Arik) Sharon, who regarded himself as
a natural successor to Begin as Israel's prime minister.
Sharon was developing a far-reaching blueprint for Israeli "security,"
suggesting in one of his major speeches that the Jewish state's
interests extended beyond the Arab Middle East to Pakistan, North
Africa and most of sub-Saharan Africa.
During the presidency of Ronald Reagan, Sharon tried to market
to the heads of American anti-Communist extremist groups such fantastic
ideas as establishing Israeli military and diplomatic alliances
with Saudi Arabia, Zaire, and the military clique in Argentina,
along with the formalizing of Israel's clandestine ties with South
Africa. Sharon also advocated toppling the Khomeini government in
Tehran, returning the Pahlavi dynasty to power, and expanding Israeli
ties with the Maronite Christian leaders in Lebanon.
Kimche's former colleagues in the Mossad treated such ideas with
disdain, pointing to their impracticality and suggesting that they
might clash with American interests in the region. They cited reports
prepared by Kimche himself, as Mossad liaison with the Maronites,
stressing the unreliability of the Lebanese Christian leaders and
warning the Israeli government against trying to base its policies
in Lebanon upon them.
Kimche, however, abandoned his low profile and pragmatic approach
to join Sharon's effort to develop his own independent cadre of
foreign policy experts in the Defense Ministry. Among Sharon's cadre
of "Wise Men," who clashed occasionally with the Mossad
over various covert operations, were Kimche, and such shadowy figures
as Nimrodi; Al Schwimmer, another arms dealer; and the director
general of the Defense Ministry, Abraham (Abrasha) Tamir.
With their ties to such shadowy Saudi and Iranian figures as Adnan
Khashoggi, the members of "Arik's kitchen," as they came
to be known, envisioned the formation of an Israeli-Saudi-Iranian
alliance under US sponsorship which would counter radical forces
in the region and, not incidentally, enrich the alliance's creators
through arms deals and economic reconstruction projects.
Sharon's global plans, contrary to the Mossad's earlier predictions,
attracted some backing from highly placed and politically naive
Cold Warriors within the Reagan administration. They, too, fantasized
about formation of an Arab-Israeli anti-Communist "strategic
consensus." Together these Israeli and US officials took the
military forces of both countries to major and bloody defeats, particularly
in the Lebanese quagmire.
The First Nail in the Coffin
Kimche's role as one of the architects of the 1982 Israeli invasion
of Lebanon destroyed his reputation as a cautious operator. Using
his connections in the Israeli press, however, he tried, with little
success, to distance himself from some of the most adventurist aspects
of Sharon's policies. Nevertheless, Sharon's war in Lebanon put
the first nail in Kimche's professional coffin.
It was Irangate, however, masterminded by Kimche and the other
members of "Arik's kitchen," their Saudi and Iranian friends,
and their influential American allies, that destroyed what was left
of the career of Israel's "sophisticated spy."
As early as 1982, Kimche, together with Nimrodi, Schwimmer and
Khashoggi, and with Sharon's blessing, had tried unsuccessfully
to trigger an anti-Khomeini coup that was supposed to bring the
shah's son to power in Tehran. In 1985, Kimche and company, again
bypassing the Mossad, succeeded in winning support for the more
complex idea of an Israeli-American opening to Tehran from then
Prime Minister Peres (who presided over a national unity government),
as well as from such intelligence and national security managers
in Washington as CIA Director William Casey, Nat Security Adviser
Robert McFarlane NSC staff member Oliver North.
The major outlines of Irangate revealed in 1985. They included,
among other things, the sale of American weapons through Israel
to Iran to free US hostages held by Iran funded militias in Lebanon
to strengthen the role of present Iraqi President Ali Akhbar Rafsanjani
in Iran's chaotic Islamic Revolutionary government. It was Kimche's
reputation as a serious effective intelligence operator that he
convince both Peres and Reagan administration officials to support
the plan.
Kimche apparently participated in of the critical meetings involving
Americans, Khashoggi, and Iranian dealer and Israeli agent Manoucher
Ghorbanifar, which took place in Europe Middle East and Washington.
Moreover according to various reports, Kimche us contacts in Latin
America, especially Panama, to develop the Central American component
of what developed into the Iran Contra affair.
Still a Formidable Manipulator
As implementation of Kimche's general game plan reached a dead
end, largely result of Kimche's total misunderstanding of the Iranian
leadership and its interests in the deal, and as the information
on Iran began to leak to the American press, Kimche showed that
although he had lost touch as a spy, he remained a formidable media
manipulator. He began to leak stories to the Israeli and American
press, blaming failure of the operation on one of the participants
in the affair, Peres aide Amiram Nir. As a result, despite his own
obvious involvement in Irangate, and his knowledge of its evolution,
Kimche, thanks to string pulling by some of his friends Washington,
was not called to testify be the Iran-Contra congressional committees.
Irangate revealed Kimche's enormous power in the Israeli foreign
policy establishment. But it also exposed his series of m blunders.
Behind the facade of the urbane British gentleman lay a compulsive
conspirator whose political and professional ambitions helped produce
a bizarre tragicomic intrigue that greatly weakens US-Israeli ties
and cast a sinister shadow over Reagan's second presidential term.
The affair also derailed Kimche's dream of becoming the chief of
Mossad. After moved from the prime minister's office foreign ministry,
Kimche resigned from foreign ministry post to enter "private
business. " Since then, he has been working with another mystery
man, Shaul Eise whose arms dealings are said to have made him the
richest man in Israel. Eisenberg helped his government establish
trade and military ties throughout the Far East, including the lucrative
transfer of Israeli (and American) technology to China, with which
the Jewish state does not have diplomatic relations.
According to various press reports, Kimche has been instrumental
in his new job in expanding Israeli arms exports to China, now estimated
to have totaled nearly three billion dollars over the past decade.
Kimche is a frequent visitor to the United States and, in recent
interviews with the Israeli press, has been warning that, based
on his talks with administration officials, President George Bush
has not given up on his goal of pressuring Israel to adopt a more
moderate posture on the Palestinian issue.
Such pressure is bound to set off new upheavals in Israeli politics,
as Labor coalition leaders seek to blame Likud intransigence for
the downward spiral in US Israeli relations, and the Likud seeks
to ignite new geopolitical explosions to arrest it. Such an environment
favors operators like Kimche, whose frequent sightings in Tehran
indicate that, perhaps, he has never quite abandoned his dream of
heading Israel's resilient and unpredictable Mossad, and sees now
as the time to make that dream come true.
Leon T. Hadar teaches at the School of International Service
at the American University and is the author of the upcoming From
the Cold War to the Gulf War: Romancing the Middle East Paradigm.
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