October 1991, Page 14
What Can Be Expected from an October Middle East Peace Conference?—Two
Views
Nothing Without US Pressure on Israel
By Rachelle Marshall
If Middle East peace talks take place as scheduled this October,
it would be safe to predict that Syrian President Hafez Al-Assad
and Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir will share the 1992 Nobel
Prize for Peace. It's true that neither man has ever shied from
using terrorism, assassination, torture, or indiscriminate violence
in pursuit of his goals, but the same was true of a 1978 peace prize
winner, Israeli Prime Minister Menachern Begin.
Although the 1978 Camp David agreement left the fate of the Palestinians
in limbo, it was hailed in the West as an historic breakthrough
in settling the Middle East conflict. Now, 13 years and three devastating
wars later, another "historic" breakthrough seems imminent:
a compromise between Israel and Syria over the Golan Heights, which
Israel captured in 1967, and a peace treaty between the two longstanding
enemies. But in 1991, as in 1978, any agreement reached through
such negotiations will only be a partial one, and the peace it offers
will be a sham.
Just as the Palestinians were shunted aside when Egypt came to
terms with Israel at Camp David, they are likely to be similarly
shortchanged in the upcoming negotiations. Between them, the fiercely
defiant Shamir and the bland and diplomatic US Secretary of State
James Baker set up a squeeze play that left the Palestinians no
choice but to give up the right to choose their own spokespersons
at the negotiations or not take part at all.
As most of the world's leaders acknowledge, and repeated opinion
polls show, the Palestinians regard the PLO as their only legitimate
representatives. One could even argue that the PLO is better qualified
to speak for the majority of Palestinians than is the present Israeli
government to speak for a majority of Israelis, since Shamir heads
a coalition that depends for its survival on the allegiance of extremist
minority groups. Nevertheless, since June of this year Baker has
privately assured Shamir that Washington would support Israel's
insistence that no Palestinians linked to the PLO or who live in
East Jerusalem or abroad may attend the peace talks. (The onesidedness
of the US position was highlighted in early August when the press
reported that Pol Pot, genocidal leader of the Khmer Rouge, had
been taking part in the USbacked negotiations on Cambodia, without
a murmur from Washington. And, as PLO Chairman Yasser Arafat has
pointed out, the US permitted Saddam Hussain to choose the Iraqi
negotiators who met with General Schwarzkopf after the Gulf war.)
As a further concession to Israel, Baker also told Shamir that
the US would veto any UN Security Council resolution affecting the
peace process as long as negotiations were under way. But when the
Palestinians asked Baker for guarantees that peace talks would result
in Israel's withdrawal from the land it occupied in 1967, he refused
to give any. Nor would he modify past statements by the Bush administration
opposing an independent Palestinian state in the foreseeable future.
On the contrary. Last April Baker told Soviet officials that his
preferred plan for the West Bank called for joint Jordanian-Israeli
dominion over the territory—a plan clearly counter to the
Palestinians' desire for self-determination.
So when Israel announced on July 31 that although it would never
yield an inch of territory it would agree to enter Middle East peace
talks, the resulting jubilation in Washington was unconvincing.
The Palestinians were being asked to take part in a contest for
which the other side had drawn up the rules, could choose all the
players, and had determined the outcome in advance. Negotiations
under these conditions could only be a charade.
Baker turned the Palestinians' predicament into an ultimatum when
he warned their leaders on August 2: "In our view at least,
Palestinians have the most to lose if there is no peace process.
" But Baker did not say what the Palestinians could hope to
gain from the peace process in its present form. Many Palestinians
are pessimistic. Mayor Elias Freij of Bethlehem commented last April
that unless Israel stops its "creeping annexation" of
the West Bank through settlement building, "who will believe
it wants peace?" Another moderate, Othman Halaq, editor of
the Jerusalem newspaper AnNahar, predicted in an interview
with San Francisco Examiner correspondent Elaine Ruth Fletcher
that appeared on August 4 that the Arab states and Israel would
resolve their conflict and "drop the Palestinian question.
And if the Palestinians get anything it will be less than even real
autonomy: they'll get an enhanced version of the current Israeli
administration of the territories. " With Israel about to spend
$1 billion next year on new settlements in the West Bank and Gaza,
and the Housing Ministry making plans eventually to house 4 million
Israelis in the occupied territories, Halaq's pessimism seems only
realistic. Autonomy without control of land or water is meaningless.
Even the promise of future negotiations on independence would offer
little hope to the Palestinians unless the US is prepared to force
Israel to stop seizing land for new settlements. But Baker told
Palestinian leaders in April that the US would apply only political
pressure, not sanctions, in its effort to change Israeli settlement
policy. In other words, Washington will continue to oppose new settlements
and urge the exchange of territory for peace—in principle—while
at the same time it continues to hand out billions in aid to an
Israeli government that considers the West Bank and Gaza part of
"greater Israel. "
If the upcoming negotiations result in peace between Israel and
Syria but produce only empty promises for the Palestinians, there
will be a period of euphoria in Washington and Jerusalem, but chances
are it will be short-lived. Sham negotiations cannot lead to real
peace, they can only arouse a sense of betrayal and intensify existing
grievances.
Another outcome is possible, however. The Bush administration is
in an unusually favorable position to pressure Israel into changing
its policies toward the Palestinians. Israel desperately needs funds
to absorb Soviet immigrants and keep its shaky economy afloat. Although
Congress is almost certain to approve the $10 billion in loan guarantees
Israel has requested, a number of senators and representatives are
disturbed about use of the loans for new settlements and might be
willing to follow an administration lead in opposing the guarantees.
According to Rep. D Fascell (DFL), if the House voiced opposition
of people would hide behind At the very least President Bush should
demand major cessions from Israel before approves the loan request.
In addition he must recognize a just settlement of the Israeli-Palestinian
conflict is the essential to lasting peace in the Middle East, and
that America's true interest lies in achieving such a peace rather
than coming to support an oppressive Israeli government.
Rachelle Marshall is a free-lance editor living in Stanford,
CA. She is a member of New Jewish Agenda and writes frequently on
the Middle East. |