Polls Show Dramatic Shifts in US Support for Israel and Palestinians

By Fouad Moughrabi

The Chicago Council on Foreign Relations conducts a major survey of elite attitudes on foreign policy every four years. Its most recent study documents a steep decrease in sympathy for Israel and a comparable increase in sympathy for the Palestinians among US opinion leaders. The study cautiously points out that "among the leadership sample, sympathies were about evenly divided." In fact, 33 percent sympathized with Israel and 35 percent with the Palestinians, a dramatic shift from 1982, when leaders sympathized with Israel by 42 percent versus 26 percent for the Palestinians.

On a "feeling thermometer" Israel was rated mildly favorably at 54 degrees, down from 59 degrees in 1986 and 61 degrees in 1978. This is the first time since 1948 in which sympathy for the Palestinians has exceeded sympathy for Israel in any survey of American public opinion. It is especially significant that it was recorded in a survey of opinion leaders, whose views tend to fluctuate less than those of the general public, and also tend to be reliable harbingers of major public opinion trends. Perhaps of greatest immediate policy significance, a 54 percent majority of the leaders surveyed favored cutting back or stopping economic aid to Israel, and in answer to a similar question, 50 percent favored reducing or altogether stopping military aid to Israel if it fails to participate in the peace process.

General Public Still Favors Israel

After years of hearing only Israel's side, the US public became more critical of Israel after the Likud party came to power in 1977. A gradual decline in pro Israel sympathy reached its lowest point following Israel's 1982 invasion of Lebanon, and its involvement in the massacres of Palestinian civilians in the Sabra and Shatila refugee camps.

Since then, polls have recorded fluctuating feelings toward Israel. Another low point was reached early in the Palestinian uprising, with the Israeli army engaged in ruthless repression. Sympathy for Israel rose as a result of its role in the Gulf war, however, and because, by then, media coverage of the intifada had tapered.

Public opinion polls support some basic conclusions. First, the general public continues to sympathize more with Israel than with the Arabs, or with the Palestinians. The majority do so, however, in a critical manner. They distinguish between Israel's right to exist within secure borders and its territorial ambitions in trying to hold on to the occupied West Bank and Gaza Strip.

Public opinion elites (defined by occupation, income or educational levels), now are more understanding of Palestinians and more supportive of their right to a homeland of their own. Among these groups, calling for a Palestinian homeland is not seen as anti-Israel.

Perhaps most significant in terms of decisions facing the president and Congress is the fact that a majority of respondents favor putting more pressure on the Israeli government to bring it to the negotiating table. They are not reluctant to link the question of US economic and military aid to Israel's participation in the peace process.

Since few readers are trained to interpret complex data for themselves, media analysts and reporters usually interpret surveys for the public. In doing so, they may manipulate the numbers to support their own agendas.

For example, the statement is often made that the Palestinians have lost a great deal of sympathy because many took a pro-Iraqi position during the Gulf war. The general conclusion is that they came out as losers.

The Palestinians may, in fact, have lost the support of some key Arab governments and earned the displeasure of some Europeans in addition to the Bush administration. Nevertheless, there has been a gradual increase over time of appreciation for their plight, and an acknowledgment of the morality of their case even among people who remain critical of the organization that represents them.

It is, therefore, incorrect to say that Palestinians have lost a great deal of sympathy at the level of American public opinion. A careful look at the polls reveals that, although pro-Israel sympathy has increased among the general American public, this does not translate into a decrease in sympathy for the Palestinians.

Regarding Israel, a February 1991 survey conducted by Martilla and Kiley on behalf of the B'nai B'rith Anti Defamation League reveals that 63 percent of a nationwide sample of voters now have a higher opinion of the Israeli government because of its role in the Gulf war. Similarly, 46 percent of respondents think Israel is a close ally of the US and another 42 percent believe Israel is friendly but not an ally. Nearly half of respondents now believe that Israel's handling of the Palestinian intifada is about right, compared to only 28 percent in a June 1990 CBS News/New York Times survey. A majority of respondents (60 percent) sympathize more with Israel than with the Arab nations (17 percent), compared to 40 percent to 19 percent in a June 1990 Roper Survey.

At the same time, however, a majority of voters (58 percent) favors giving the Palestinians a homeland in the West Bank and Gaza Strip and only 20 percent oppose it. In March 1991, Gallup asked a slightly different question: "Do you favor or oppose the establishment of an independent Palestinian nation within the territories occupied by Israel in the 1967 war?" Forty-six percent of the informed group favored it and only 31 percent opposed it. This represents an increase from October 1990 (41 percent) and 1988 (38 percent) in the numbers of those favoring an independent nation for the Palestinians. Gallup also discovered that 73 percent of the public agrees that Israel should withdraw from occupied Arab lands in return for recognition of Israel's right to exist as a nation. In addition, only 26 percent of respondents agreed that the US should not pressure Israel at all. By contrast, 58 percent favored some form of pressure. Of these, 21 percent believed that the US should exert diplomatic pressure, 20 percent opted for reducing economic and military assistance, and 17 percent called for a cutoff of all economic and military aid to Israel if it does not negotiate a settlement.

Even when the question dealing with a Palestinian homeland was phrased by Martilla and Kiley to incorporate Israel's security concerns (e.g., that the West Bank might fall under the control of Iraq or other enemies of Israel), more respondents favored it (44 percent) than opposed it (41 percent). Furthermore, despite wording that links the PLO to terrorism and to support of Iraq, 42 percent of respondents believed Israel should negotiate with the PLO, and 47 percent disagreed. It appears, therefore, that the Palestinian case is supported on its own merits and that a gain in sympathy by Israel does not necessarily mean a loss for the Palestinians.

Reading the Polls

What public opinion polls actually say and how they are interpreted by the mainstream US media are often two different things. A case in point is the New York Times analysis in its April 12, 1989 edition of a major survey of Israeli public opinion conducted on the eve of a visit by Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir to Washington, DC.

Five months before the visit, in November 1988, the Palestine National Council had adopted at its Algiers session historic resolutions accepting Israel's right to exist, renouncing the use of political violence, and agreeing to a two state solution. As a result, the US government had initiated a limited dialogue with the PLO.

Meanwhile, the Palestinian uprising was at its highest level, Israel's handling of it was widely regarded as too harsh, and Shamir was under pressure from the newly installed administration of President George Bush to produce a plan for a political settlement.

There was speculation that the US might pressure Shamir to modify his position against negotiating with the Palestinians. In fact, an Israeli intelligence report quoted by The New York Times on April 1, 1989 stated that the PLO had "undergone a genuine change and is truly interested in a political settlement with Israel."

Meanwhile, The New York Times had commissioned a survey of Israeli public opinion. Joel Brinkley, Jerusalem correspondent for the Times, declared in his Story that "an overwhelming majority of Israeli Jews oppose peace negotiations with the Palestinian Liberation Organization at this time," although "more than half say they would favor talks later if the PLO were to further moderate its behavior. " Commenting on the poll results as reported, Shamir himself said, "I was sure all the time that this was the way people were thinking. "

According to Dr. Howard Schuman, director of the Survey Research Center of the University of Michigan, however, the Times interpretation of that and other Israeli public opinion surveys was simply wrong. The theme highlighted by the Times reflected the newspaper's own political position (which opposes direct US pressure on the Israeli government).

Schuman, in an article in Public Opinion Quarterly, says that the conclusions presented by Brinkley's story were based on marginal responses to single questions apparently asked for the first time. "Answers to such questions can vary greatly as a function of the way the question is conceptualized and worded, " Schuman states. He suggests that a question which referred explicitly to the Israeli government intelligence report might have elicited entirely different results.

Schuman also points to numerous technical problems in Brinkley's interpretation of the poll, which implied that Shamir's intransigence was a product of Israeli public opinion and therefore less susceptible to US pressure. In fact, full question wording was not reported; the percentages of those who expressed "no opinion" were omitted; and cross tabulations with political party affiliation were given but other more useful information was ignored. Also significant was the omission of Arab citizens of Israel from the sample. Israeli polling organizations never include them in their samples.

What the Numbers Show

The numbers given by the Times story itself would lead an informed reader to conclude that reliable shifts in Israeli public attitudes had occurred as a result of the intifada and the moderate statements emanating from the PLO.

Dr. Schuman shows that before the intifada, in April 1987, 42 percent of the Israeli Jewish public agreed to negotiation "if the PLO officially recognizes Israel and ceases terrorist activities. " A year later, 58 percent agreed. In addition, there had been an increase from 41 percent in 1987 to 54 percent in 1989 among Israelis who responded that "Israel should be willing to give up some territory in exchange for suitable guarantees. "

Israeli public opinion has moved a great distance during the years of the Palestinian uprising. Schuman quotes studies by Israeli public opinion analysts Asher Arian, Talmud and Hermann, who argue that Israeli leaders have enormous leverage in molding public opinion to their positions.

An April 14, 1991 study by Asher Arian to gauge Israeli public opinion after the Gulf war shows an increase between 1986 and 1991 in the number of Israelis who favor returning the occupied territories as part of a peace settlement. In addition, there has been an increase in the number of Israeli respondents willing to accept a Palestinian state alongside Israel. The majority of Israelis also reject annexation and "transfer" (a code word which means the mass expulsion of the Palestinians), although a hard-core 39 percent favor annexing the occupied territories and expelling all Palestinians, even Arab citizens of Israel.

An objective Times story could have emphasized the fluidity of Israeli public opinion and that American influence could have been brought to bear on the Israelis through Mr. Shamir. Many in Israel and among Israel's supporters in the US would welcome such American pressure. The Times reports that while 81 percent of the Israeli respondents believe that American aid is vital to Israel, nearly half also believe that "the United States has the right to try to influence Israeli policy. " A recent poll of the Israeli public conducted by Hanoch Smith, reported in Davar, June 2, 1991, asked a random sample of 1,200 Israeli Jews: "Do you think there is a chance for peace negotiations with the Arabs without American pressure?" Fifty-nine percent were very skeptical. Of these, 24 percent said there would be a small chance and 35 percent said there would be no chance at all. Of 36 percent who thought US pressure was not needed, 15 percent said there is a good chance and 21 percent said there was some chance of negotiations even without US pressure.

It is uncertain whether the current US sponsored peace process will generate agreement between the antagonists in the Middle East. If it breaks down because the Israeli government refuses to negotiate in good faith, however, and if the Bush administration decides to pressure Shamir to do so, there is ample evidence from the polls that majorities of both Americans and Israelis would support such US pressure for peace.

Fouad Moughrabi, a professor of political science at the University of Tennessee in Chattanooga, writes and lectures on Middle East affairs.