Washington Report on Middle East Affairs, October 1987, page
9
Update on Congress
Saudi Arms: On-Again, Off-Again
By Dennis J. Wamsted
While Israel receives US taxpayer dollars to cancel the Lavi aircraft
program largely financed with US aid, Saudi Arabia may once again
be denied the opportunity to purchase, for cold, hard cash, a package
of much-needed spare parts and weapons upgrades.
The oft-discussed package has not yet been proposed and its exact
composition remains uncertain, but White House spokesman Marlin
Fitzwater has confirmed that a $1 billion sale is under consideration
by the administration.
This package would likely include at least two items:
• Between 12 and 14 "attrition" F-15 Eagle jet
fighters to replace aircraft lost or damaged in Royal Saudi Air
Force operations.
• Up to 1,600 Maverick air-to-ground antitank missiles valued
at approximately $360 million.
Other items that the administration had previously sought to sell
to Saudi Arabia, but then withdrew or withheld because of pressure
from pro-Israeli congressmen include 28 Sikorski Black Hawk and
Bell 406 helicopters, and electronic countermeasure (ECM) upgrades
for the F-5 and F-15 fighter aircraft currently used by the Saudi
air force. The proposals to sell the helicopters and ECM equipment
were first broached in the late 1985 as components of a lesser arms
package for Saudi Arabia. That package was never introduced, however,
and by the time an arms proposal reached Congress in the spring
of 1986, it included only missile spares of types already in the
Saudi arsenal.
Similarly, the proposals to sell additional F-15s and the Mavericks
have been bouncing around within the administration since earlier
this spring. The administration originally intended to notify Congress
of the F-15 replacement sale in May, but shrewd exploitation by
the Israel lobby of the congressional hysteria that followed Iraq's
erroneous missile attack on the USS Stark in the Persian
Gulf forced the administration to postpone the sale's introduction—even
though the Saudis would be using the aircraft to prevent Iranian
attacks and, unlike the Israelis, are willing to pay for their purchases.
Likewise, the Maverick missile sale was proposed in early June,
but then withdrawn because of seemingly overwhelming congressional
opposition.
The specific timetable for any potential sale depends upon the
congressional schedule for the remainder of the current session.
Earlier, congressional leaders had hoped to recess by the end of
October. They now expect that Congress will remain in session until
at least the end of November, and possibly well into December. The
administration therefore has at least until early October to make
a decision about when to introduce the arms proposals. Under current
procedures, the administration traditionally gives Congress 20 days
of informal notice followed by an official 30-day notification period.
Congress may act at any time during that 50-day period to disapprove
the proposal. Even with strong administration backing, any Saudi
arms sale proposal would face close scrutiny from Congress. Now,
the onset of the presidential election season further clouds the
outlook. For example, one key Republican, Senate Minority Leader
Robert Dole (R-KS), has already expressed his opposition to any
sale. Not coincidentally, Dole is locked in a heated battle for
the Republican presidential nomination with Vice President George
Bush and a number of other Republicans.
Another problem is the attitude of White House Chief of Staff Howard
Baker. The former Senate majority leader is said to be noncommittal,
worried that the battle could severely deplete the administration's
remaining political capital. Besides a potential sale to Saudi Arabia,
Congress will also consider a number of other issues of importance
to the administration this fall, including aid for the Nicaraguan
rebels. In short, the outlook for a Saudi sale is, at best, problematic.
Dennis J. Wamsted is a free-lance writer specializing in Congress
and the Middle East. |