Lebanon: Bastion for the West?

It took a long time to happen.

For many weeks, even after U.S. marine artillerymen and naval gunners escalated the American involvement in Lebanon by giving fire support to the Lebanese army, Administration officials adhered to their public explanation of the role of the U.S. marines: they were in Lebanon solely as noncombatant "peacekeepers," to assist the Lebanese government in establishing sovereignty over Lebanese territory.

The day after the massacre, however—under enormous pressure to justify the grave risks the marines were taking—President Reagan passed along to the public for the first time some other reasons why the marines were in Lebanon.

During a luncheon chat with a number of American journalists, he continued to call the marines "peacekeepers" but said they were also there to help prevent Lebanon and the entire Middle East from falling under Soviet domination.

In addition, he made it clearer than ever that an essential part of the "peacekeeping" role for the marines was to bolster President Amin Gemayel's government against its internal as well as its external enemies.

While depicting Mr. Gemayel as the man the whole free world was depending on to keep his finger in the Middle East dike, Mr. Reagan also supported Mr. Gemayel's holding of a "reconciliation" conference that would "broaden the basis of government," as he put it.

For many in Washington, the unveiling by the President of his policies—such things had already been said privately by many Administration officials for some time—caused brows to furrow and brought many questions to mind:

Q Are the groups which are in opposition to Mr. Gemayel really surrogates of the Soviet Union, even if unwittingly? Or are they interested mainly in redressing their own grievances within an independent Lebanon?

A Mr. Reagan appears to be trying to weave the events of Lebanon into a pattern colored red—but he is doing it with yarn made of gossamer. The Lebanese factions which have been fighting the Maronite-dominated government of Lebanon on and off for nearly nine years do, of course, consider that they have grievances. As part of their effort to redress them, some accept help from Syria. Why would they turn it down? They have a common aim with Syria in wanting to put pressure on the Gemayel government—but not necessarily for the same reasons. The history of the area does not show that accepting aid always brings with it an acceptance of domination.

Only President Assad knows what his ultimate objectives are in Lebanon. He most certainly wants to see a Lebanon that will not be hostile to Syria (even U.S. Secretary of State Shultz has recognized that Syria has "legitimate security interests" in its next-door neighbor). Even better, in his view, would be the emergence of a Lebanese government which is actively friendly to Syria. Would be prefer to have a "Greater Syria," with Lebanon as just a province? He might—but that doesn't mean he regards it as a practical possibility, acceptable either by Lebanon or the rest of the Arab world. Even if he wanted to impose such a solution, he does not have the military power to do so (unlike Israel, whose government not only has a dream for a "Greater Israel"—Eretz Israel, as it is known—but has been making it come true for years by its actions in such places as Golan and the West Bank). Would the Soviets join in with Assad to take over Lebanon by force? Not unless they were willing to start World War III for the sake of aggrandizing a business acquaintance in Damascus who has never pledged his undying loyalty to them or to their system.

Assad does have a "friendship" treaty with the Soviet Union, which has beefed up and improved his armed forces in the wake of the havoc wrought by the Israelis in 1982. But no one knowledgeable of Syria has ever called Assad either a Communist ideologue or a puppet. Assad has gladly accepted Soviet arms, with his own objectives in mind-one of them, obviously, being to increase his ability to defend his country better if there should ever be another war with Israel. If the past history in the area of such treaty relationships with the Soviet Union are any guide, Assad will continue the connection for only as long as he finds it convenient. Sadat abrogated his own friendship treaty with the Soviets long before Camp David, and for years Iraq has been keeping its own "friendship" treaty, signed in 1971, on the back burner. Iraq's best friends are now the French.

Q Is Gemayel a man who is likely to be able to redress the grievances of the opposition?

A Not so that you'd notice it, so far. The basic dissatisfaction among Lebanon's dissident population has for many years been the fact that the Christian Maronites, who constitute only about 20 percent of the population, hold the predominance of power. This was the root cause of the civil war, even though the war was exacerbated by some other factors.

After the coming to power of Amin Gemayel, many of the Muslims, in particular, took hope from his assurances that he favored making reforms in the sectarian system. But Gemayel then proceeded to concentrate his attention on making friends with the U.S., getting the Americans to build up his Maronite-dominated army, and seeking the withdrawal of foreign forces. Reform seemed to be forgotten.

Phalangists Running the Show

In fact, Gemayel made it clear from the beginning—in his actions, if not his words—that it was going to be Maronites of the Phalangist party who would be running the show in Lebanon for at least the time being. After he took office he put Phalangists in charge of four key areas of the government: army intelligence, the military prosecutor's office, the information ministry, and internal security. A number of ambassadorships and other bureaucratic jobs that had traditionally gone to Muslims were also given to Phalangists. An example of how the power is used: a Jordanian banker—one of the most famous and distinguished members of that profession in the Arab world—arrived from abroad at Beirut airport and was denied entrance, even after a telephoned appeal to the airport by the prime minister of Lebanon. The problem: the prime minister who made the appeal was a Sunni Muslim. The banker, with a Jordanian passport, was a Palestinian. The director of security at the airport, however, was Phalangist. Score another win for the Phalange against both the Muslims and the Palestinians.

The Phalangist militia, after a brief period of eclipse in East Beirut, is now once again walking around that Christian section, armed and in uniform. West Beirut is relatively "clean" of Muslim militia—after 10,000 troops of the Lebanese army backed by tanks and artillery, spent four days flushing them all out. In many areas, the Phalangists are cooperating on some operations with the Lebanese army, even though that army is supposed to be free of political affiliation. Many Phalangist militiamen still use their positions of power to extort and harass the residents of Muslim neighborhoods.

Much of the militia activity is believed to be a deliberate form of pressure against the president—warning him that he would be wise not to make any meaningful concessions to Lebanon's other religious sects. The President is already being sternly monitored by his own father, Pierre, founder and head of the Phalangist Party of which his son is a member. Pierre Gemayel is among those who openly advocate the continuation of a Maronite-dominated Lebanon. He would like the Americans to help. Just before the September 26 ceasefire, he said: "The multinational force must take effective action. Let it be war and let the stronger side win."

Q How good, then, is the outlook for a national reconciliation conference?

A Not terribly good. A little while ago President Gemayel told a New York Times reporter that the idea of holding a conference to re-apportion the sharing of power had been pushed on him by the Americans, and he called the whole thing a "camouflage, a distraction." This could have been his way of saying that he didn't think the opposition really wanted to talk, but preferred to get ready for more fighting. However, it was also an indication that the Phalangists themselves may feel the same way. Some Phalangists have been saying that if the government can only stall long enough for the army to be built up by the U.S into a powerful instrument, then the government will not have to bother any more with sharing the power and will be able to run a Lebanon on its own terms, whether or not the dissidents like it. But what about Syria? The Phalangists make it clear that they would count on the U.S. and/or Israel to solve that part of the problem.

Q What does the Administration think of all this?

A Well, as we already know, the Administration agrees with the Lebanese government that the Syrians are at the heart of the trouble in Lebanon. But the Administration also seems sincerely anxious for Gemayel to agree to increase the amount of political participation by the other Lebanese sects.

Q But what if Gemayel is either unwilling or unable—because of pressures from his more militant supporters—to give the other sects the degree of reapportionment that the Administration would regard as being fair and the other sects as necessary? Would we then continue to support Gemayel, right or wrong?

A We seem to be committed so fully to the support of the Gemayel government—particularly in view of what the President has been saying since the massacre of the marines—that it would be very difficult to get out of that commitment now.

Q Where would that leave the marines?

A Well, the marines are already looked upon by most dissidents as the enemy. This is because we are supporting a government which they regard not as a government for all the Lebanese but as a faction which is waging war against them. If the marines were still there, supporting the Gemayel government even after it had failed to offer a fair deal to them at a reconciliation" conference, the marines would obviously be regarded by them as enemies to a greater degree than before.

Q Oh my God....