The Outlook: Good or Bad?

Our friend came to visit our offices again.

Q Well, I hope you're feeling better about things than you were the last time we talked

A Try me.

Q Okay. How do things in the Middle East look to you now?

A Bad.

Q Oh boy, here we go again. For Pete's sake, what's bothering you this time? Things are getting back to normal in Beirut, the Syrians and Israelis have agreed to leave Lebanon, King Hussein is getting ready to negotiate on the West Bank, the Israelis are probing the Shatila massacre

A Optimism.

Q Eh?

A Optimism—like yours. That's what's bothering me. As soon as our television screens no longer show scenes of exploding bombs or prostrate bodies, lots of people begin talking as though the Middle East's troubles were just about over. But most of the root problems of the area haven't gone away. All of these situations you mentioned are full of booby traps, and they could end up one day as explosions on our TV screens once again. So why do you think I shouldn't be bothered about anything?

Q Still, it seems to me that to say things are looking bad is an exaggeration

A Okay, let's go down the list. Beirut returning to normal? Well, in contrast to this summer's events, just about anything that happens in Beirut has to be an improvement, I guess. But don't get carried away by things like rubble being cleared away or people going out to nightclubs again. The basic situation is still extremely dangerous

Q Even with the PLO gone?

A Yes, of course. As I think I've tried to tell you before, the Lebanese were carrying out bloody feuds among themselves long before any Palestinians ever arrived. And after eight years of civil war, the hatreds, as might be expected, have grown rather than receded. On top of that, there's still been no change made in a system of government which gives preponderant power to the minority Christian Maronites—a system which was one of the root causes of the civil war in the first place. Then, when you add to this the fact

Q Good grief

A Would you please bear with me? When you add to this the fact that the various factions despite all the disarmament that has been going on—still have lots of arms and ammo stashed away, you have the recipe for a later settlement of accounts which could be more vicious than ever.

Q Boy, you sure know how to spoil everything

A Now, what was the next thing you were so happy about? Oh yes, the Syrians and the Israelis agreeing to vacate Lebanon. It's certainly good to have these agreements on the record. But we still have no good reason to be confident that the evacuation will actually take place.

For one thing, many analysts have long believed that the Israelis would be happy to trade off a de facto Syrian presence in the Bekaa Valley for an Israeli one in south Lebanon. This yearning, if it exists, could be a cause for foot-dragging. But even if these observers are wrong, and the Syrian and Israeli agreements can be taken at face value, there are many political minefields left. There is the touchy issue to be settled of the order in which the forces will withdraw. In addition, no one yet knows what the several thousand Palestinian fighting men still in northern and eastern Lebanon will do. They could be spoilers, acting as a catalyst for renewed fighting between the Israelis and Syrians. Furthermore, once the foreign forces are gone, there would be no one to stop the various feuding Lebanese factions that I talked about earlier from clobbering each other once again—unless the Lebanese army can become strong enough to act as a deterrent, which seems exceedingly doubtful.

Q What about that multinational force which includes the U.S. marines?

A You're talking about less than four thousand troops, who were sent in there to provide some reassurance for the safety of Beirut's citizens until the forces of the central government are able to do it. What isn't clear is what is supposed to happen if it turns out that the central government can't do it. There's no way that this number of troops could act as a deterrent to much larger, freewheeling Lebanese militias who would not be impressed by the symbolism of the uniforms the troops of the international force were wearing. And if largescale fighting broke out among militias in Beirut and the rest of Lebanon—once the Syrians and Israelis were gone—it is certainly not in the cards for the tiny multinational force to try to put a stop to it. This is not the kind of involvement that either the Administration or Congress or the American public has in mind.

Q Hmmm. Doesn't sound good

A Bad,even?

Q For goshsakes, do you always have to say I told you so? Now tell me what's bad about King Hussein negotiating—

A I didn't say that there was anything wrong with his negotiating. I simply don't think it's a thing to be optimistic about. Because the major stumbling block on the question of President Reagan's peace plan, no matter what the Jordanians and Palestinians come up with, is going to be Israel. Keep in mind that only Israel has totally rejected Mr. Reagan's peace plan, saying it wouldn't even discuss it. Only the other day, Mr. Begin reiterated the point that is going to be the main problem. He said that the West Bank "as a right belongs to the Jewish people."

Q But isn't the U.S. going to push its plan hard?

A The Administration says so, but we don't know just how hard "hard" is. Top officials have made it clear that they don't intend to withhold economic or military aid in order to put pressure on the Israelis. They say that the advantage of getting peace should be so obvious to the Israelis that this in itself will constitute a kind of pressure. How do you rate the prospects for this kind of pressure being enough?

Q Not at all good, but—

A Let's see, what was the last thing on your list?

Q The Israeli probe on the massacre. Now you're not going to tell me that that's bad—

A No, of course not. It certainly demonstratesthe Israeli democratic process at work. But what is the best thing that can come out of it?

Q I'm not sure what you mean by the best, but it could lead to the departure of Begin and Sharon—

A Exactly. And who would take their place?

Q Well, it might eventually lead to the return of the Labor Party to power, wouldn't it? That would certainly be a great improvement—

A That's what so many people keep saying—

Q But you don't believe it!

A No, I don't. It's wishful thinking again. It's true that the Labor Party does not make biblical claims to the West Bank, as Begin does, and is willing—in theory, anyway—to return parts of the West Bank to Jordan. But when it was in power it never actually did any of the things that people are assuming it would do now. It refused to accept the Rogers Plan, which was practically the same in its essentials as the Reagan Plan. The Labor Party was unhappy with Rogers's calling for "insubstantial alterations" of Israel's 1967 frontiers, on the grounds that Israel needed more than an insubstantial amount of West Bank territory to assure its security. Just look at it this way: the Labor Party had control over the West Bank for ten years—twice as long as Begin has been in control of it—and never managed to give a squre inch of it back to Jordan, despite all the talk.

Q That's not so good—

A And do you know something else? It was the Labor Party which first began putting Jewish settlements in the West Bank, and it was Labor Party officials who first used that cynical euphemism for establishing the settlements—"creating facts," they called it.

So even though Labor Party leaders act more politely than Messrs. Begin and Sharon do, is there any real reason to think that if they get into power they'll make those concessions to King Hussein that Begin won't make?

Q The chances certainly don't look good—

A Even bad, maybe?

Q Okay, okay, have it your way: bad, BAD! Holy cow...

A Thanks for coming in. It's always enjoyable to chat with someone who looks at things the way I do.