An Opportunity for Peace

Excerpts from Remarks by Senator Charles H. Percy, September 27, 1985 at the Annual Conference of the Middle East Institute.

Over the past several decades, it has become commonplace to say that we stand at a critical juncture in the Middle East. Yet tonight, I believe that assertion is fundamental. This evening, therefore, I want to discuss the peace process by first stating that we have today an opportunity which may be gone tomorrow.

Unfortunately, at the present time, it appears that too many Middle Eastern leaders are focusing on what cannot be accomplished rather than what is possible. The effort to devise a formula that would permit the Palestinians to join the Jordanians in a delegation to the negotiations has been stymied and has diminished hopes of only a few months ago that progress would soon be made.

But today's opportunity is presented by the constellation of leadership in the Middle East and especially three important players in the process—King Hussein, Yassir Arafat and Prime Minister Peres. Each man, in my view, wants a settlement. Each man is better-positioned among his people to advance the peace process than any foreseeable alternative. Each man faces important political pressures and opportunities at home. Each man has evidenced understanding of the political constraints faced by the others.

In our frustration with the current stalemate, we should not overlook progress that has been made by each of these three men. For example, in the past, the Israelis have insisted that any peace negotiation must be based on the Camp David agreement. They have insisted that any potential Arab interlocutor must accept Camp David as a prerequisite for negotiations.

Now, in stating Israeli willingness to negotiate on the basis of U.N. Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338 and "without preconditions," Prime Minister Peres has signaled that "no declaration of support for Camp David is necessary." That is a major gesture on the Prime Minister's part.

King Hussein, for his part, has again today, at the U.N. General Assembly, expressed the Jordanian willingness to negotiate under the tenets of U.N. Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338 which are the foundations upon which Camp David are based. Both King Hussein and Yassir Arafat have recognized the political reality that Israeli leaders will not negotiate directly with the PLO before it formally recognizes Israel's right to exist.

Prime Minister Peres and many of his colleagues understand that Yassir Arafat and the internationally recognized PLO leadership retains the loyalty and support of the majority of the Palestinian people. This is particularly the case of the Palestinians living in the occupied territories and in Jordan. Therefore, although direct PLO participation is blocked by Israeli political realities, a PLO-influenced delegation should be acceptable. Developing a Palestinian-Jordanian delegation with whom direct discussions can be held would be a very positive step in the search for peace.

But each of these men faces great difficulties. Each will be asked to lead his people and their allies to make concessions which are not acceptable to many at this time. This is a very difficult task and will require great creative leadership and vision. Each leader also faces great opposition from within his own constituency.

No one can doubt the difficulties, not the least of which are constant assassination attempts, faced by Yassir Arafat. He is challenged by the renegade Fatah leadership of Abu Musa, leftist opposition of the PFLP and PDFLP, and a growing Muslim fundamentalism movement in the occupied territories. His future as the leader of the Palestinian people will be judged by how he is able to stand up to these special interest groups and is able to act in the national interest of the Palestinian people.

Arafat retains his dominant position among the Palestinian people because he is the symbol of Palestinian nationalism and has never been perceived as a pawn of some non-Palestinian power. The Palestinian people do not want to be the tools of anyone. They demand their own identity. So long as Arafat continues to strive toward these goals, he will retain the support of the Palestinian people.

A peaceful settlement is basic to the interests of the Palestinian people. Indeed, it is their only hope. Therefore, I believe the Palestinian people will support Arafat in his search for peace and a settlement of legitimate grievances.

King Hussein also faces domestic and international opposition to further progress in the peace process. Many Jordanians question whether any settlement with Israel will weaken the kingdom. He has a considerable task in maintaining Palestinian and Jordanian support for his risky search for peace. Other Arabs have criticized even the tentative steps undertaken by the Jordanians. Cowardly attacks upon Jordanian officials is only the tip of the iceberg of the opposition's tactics.

Prime Minister Peres also faces domestic challenges. Nearly half the Israeli people do not want to relinquish one inch of the occupied territories. Peres must convince them that peace with their Arab neighbors is worth the risk of giving up the security buffer of the occupied territories.

Even within his own government there are those—Shamir and Arens, for two—who voted and worked against the Camp David agreement because they thought Israel was giving too many concessions to Egypt. Even these men, however, are being outflanked to the right. The influence of General Sharon is growing, as is that of Rabbi Meir Kahane. Moreover, time is running out for Peres. Only one year remains before he must relinquish the prime ministership to the Likud.

Despite these difficulties, I firmly believe that the Palestinians, the Jordanians and the Israelis want peace. A majority are realistic enough to be willing to take risks for peace and the current leaders are men of considerable vision and leadership. Therefore, despite the problems, which are significant, I am hopeful that these difficulties will be overcome. Time is running out and the people throughout the Middle East know this.

How can Arab leaders contribute to an atmosphere which will help the peace process move forward? How can the Arabs reinforce those Israeli leaders who truly want peace and discourage those who do not?

Arab leaders must offer Israeli leaders something that can be supported by a majority of the Israeli people. This actually is easier than some perceive: witness the dramatic shift in Israeli opinion following Sadat's trip to Jerusalem in 1977 or in the aftermath of the Lebanon invasion. Peace-seeking Arab leaders should make efforts to tone down strong rhetoric. Israelis are sophisticated and realize that rhetoric often serves only domestic purposes. But rhetoric should be moderated to eliminate some of the ammunition of the Israeli right wing. Arab leaders should recognize that the current mood of war weariness in Israel makes for an opportunity for peace. Israel is strong enough to make peace and war-weary enough to want peace.

Before concluding, I would like to comment briefly on an aspect of current U.S. policy in the Middle East on which I strongly disagree with a number of my former colleagues in the Congress. The recent announcement of Saudi Arabia's plans to purchase $4.5 billion in jet fighters from Great Britain, rather than from the United States, is bad news for all parties concerned, with the possible exception of the British.

From the U.S. perspective, the bad news is a loss of influence over the defensive capabilities of a key player in the Middle East. There is the loss of a major sale that would have gone on the plus side of our trade balance and a loss of market share in an area of tremendous importance to our national interest.

From the Israeli perspective, the bad news is a loss of leverage its chief ally, the U.S., could have exerted on how and where the aircraft could be deployed. There is the added bad news that the type of aircraft offered by the British could well be viewed as a greater risk to her security than the aircraft made in America.

From the Saudi perspective, the bad news is the loss of a long-time supplier, the loss of confidence in a friend, and, as the Washington Post put it, the "need to create a whole new bureaucracy to deal with the British bureaucracy."

Can those in the Congress and the Administration who opposed the U.S. sale view this development as anything but bad news? Could they realistically have expected that the Saudis would not turn elsewhere, resulting in losses on all sides?

Granted, hindsight is 20/20. Yet earlier and no less controversial arms sales, such as the AWACs, have proven what was promised. The day after the election last year, I said that if I had known that my vote in support of the sale of AWACs or my criticism of the Israeli invasion of Lebanon would have determined whether I was re-elected, I would not have changed my vote or a single word of my criticism of the invasion. We now know that the AWACs enabled Saudi Arabia to shoot down two Iranian fighter planes attacking Saudi oil fields. Those Iranian fighter planes could have jeopardized the oil supply to the free world. Because of the role of the AWACs, U.S. intervention was unnecessary and no similar Iranian attacks have occurred since.

Just today, the Administration has submitted to Congress preliminary notification of its intention to sell arms to Jordan. But before the notification was even received on the Hill, more than seventy of my former colleagues had signed a resolution opposing any arms sales to Jordan. I'm not in the business of second-guessing my former colleagues, but I must say that in this instance, more than seventy of them are wrong.

The United States has a security assistance relationship with Jordan which began in 1950 with President Truman and continued with Presidents Eisenhower, Kennedy, Johnson, Nixon, Ford, Carter, and now President Reagan. Do we want to reverse a policy of thirty-five years standing?

We saw in the Saudi case that Israel and the U.S. were not the losers. Yet now, if my former colleagues have their way, not only will the U.S. and Israel be the losers, but progress on the peace process itself will be lost.

Whether we like it or not, arms sales and the peace process are linked. Whether we like it or not, our refusal to supply arms to our friends will force them to turn to other suppliers. Whether we like it or not, the world will question whether U.S. foreign policy is being determined in the U.S. or in Israel.

Whether we like it or not, peace is not in divine hands—it is in our hands. It is in the hands of the U.S., the Israelis, the Jordanians, the Palestinians, the Egyptians, the Lebanese, the Syrians, and others.