TRNC Washington Representative Ahmet Erdengiz

By Janet McMahon

Ahmet Erdengiz, the Washington, DC representative of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus, unlocked the door to the TRNC suite and welcomed me to his office. An intense yet soft-spoken man of 42, he is serving his second “tour of duty” in the U.S. capital. Shortly after joining the TRNC Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Defense in 1986, he spent four years—from 1987 to 1991—as first secretary of the Washington, DC office, returning in 1997 as his government’s top official in the U.S. national capital.

Erdengiz said a new U.S. initiative on Cyprus is expected to be unveiled in September, following a statement by the G-7 countries—or G-8, should Russia participate—calling on both sides to resume intercommunal talks, suspended for the past two years. According to the scenario currently making the rounds, U.N. Secretary-General Kofi Annan will support the G-8 statement, and the U.S. will then present its initiative.

While Erdengiz predicted that the Greek Cypriots will give the initiative their full support, “the Turks cannot accept G-8 involvement,” he said, “because they object to the internationalization of the Cyprus problem,” and not only on the basis of “too many cooks.” With the exception of Russia, Japan and the U.S., he pointed out, the remaining five nations “all are European Union countries.”

Not only did the EU deny Turkey’s application for membership in 1993, resulting in allegations that the EU was and always would be a “Christian club.” It subsequently approved the application of the Greek Cypriot-led Republic of Cyprus, which currently is on track for possible admission in 2003. Perhaps the pot already has been spoiled.

Indeed, Turkey and its recent history, as well as its longstanding fear of encirclement, cast a long shadow over current prospects for peace in Cyprus. These fears were not alleviated by the recent crisis over the Republic of Cyprus’ threatened deployment of Russian SAM-300 missiles. That threat, Erdengiz stated, “was one of the Greek Cypriots’ greatest mistakes,” serving only to exacerbate tensions in the Aegean. Nor is the “compromise” solution, the installation of the missiles on the Greek island of Crete, a great improvement. The result is that, in Erdengiz’ words, “a NATO country—Greece—puts on its soil Russian missiles aimed at another NATO country—Turkey.”

Not only does the presence of the missiles violate the 1923 Lausanne treaty, which prohibits military bases on any Aegean island, but, he maintained, Russian technicians eventually will be stationed on Crete—home to a large NATO base—to service the missiles.

Erdengiz also cited the building of a “military airport at Paphos” by the government of Greek Cypriot President Glafcos Clerides, as well as its purchase of fighter jets, military helicopters and computer-fired artillery as evidence of an attempt to “encircle Turkey from the Bulgarian borders from Western Thrace, through the Aegean and Cyprus, ending in Syria and the Euphrates. “All [Greek Cypriot] parties support this program,” he stated, which is based on a 1993 joint defense agreement between Greece and the Greek Cypriots.

By “trying to add Cyprus to its chain [of Aegean islands],” Erdengiz said,“Greece is trying to change the balance of power with Turkey in its favor.” He pointed out that Turkey, which borders seven countries, including Greece, and, to its north, the Russian-controlled Black Sea, “can only function freely on its southern border”—the Mediterranean.

Whatever the truth about the threat of encirclement, the Turkish Cypriot representative is clearly right when he says that a “huge gap of trust” exists both between the two halves of Cyprus and their larger neighbors, Turkey and Greece. (Nor was this gap alleviated by the events surrounding the capture of Kurdish rebel leader Abdullah Ocalan in February.)

For the past five or six years, Erdengiz said, American peace initiatives were based upon “a very important U.N. platform that considers both sides as equals.” The reason for the recent erosion of that platform, he suggested, is that, beginning with the debacles in Somalia and Bosnia, “the U.N. has been losing its grip on international issues. With the end of the Cold War, it is not being called upon to be involved. Now the whole [Cyprus] initiative comes from the U.S. and the Western side.”

In fact, it was during the last two U.S. initiatives, spearheaded by American diplomat Richard C. Holbrooke, that intercommunal talks with the Greek Cypriots ended. According to Erdengiz, Denktash met twice with Cypriot President Clerides and “put forth ideas” such as the establishment of a joint committee to deal with territorial issues, militarization, and other concerns. Denktash also requested that Greek Cypriots refrain from taking territorial disputes to the European Court of Justice (see story p. 77), contending that these should be resolved as part of an overall settlement between the two sides.

Clerides, Erdengiz said, rejected Denktash’s proposals, saying that “only a government”—i.e., the Republic of Cyprus—“can deal with these issues.” Currently all bicommunal activities have been suspended by the Turkish Cypriot government. (The controversy over the Russian SAM-300 missiles was also at its height at the time.)

Moreover, Erdengiz elaborated, “we see a certain hypocrisy in [these talks]: Turkish Cypriots—doctors, professionals, students, etc.—can meet with Greek Cypriots, but not with international organizations. We are not against bicommunal activities, but not within this context.”

“This context” is the embargo imposed on the Turkish half of Cyprus by the internationally recognized government of Cyprus. The 35-year-old embargo, Erdengiz stressed, “affects every aspect of our lives.” Its history is a sad and ironic one.

Following the intercommunal violence of 1963, which Erdengiz compared to a “mini-Bosnia” in which “Greek Cypriots overran 103 [Turkish] villages in three months,” the United Nations decided to send its first peacekeeping force to Cyprus. In order for an authorizing resolution to be passed, however, a formal government request was required. Since the Turkish Cypriots by then had been forced to withdraw from the central government, Erdengiz said, in 1964 the U.N. passed a “temporary” resolution—supposed to be in effect for 24 hours only, he said—recognizing the extant government, which would then make the official request.

After U.N. peacekeepers arrived, however, “everyone forgot” the verbal promise about the temporary status of the resolution, Erdengiz continued. It was the height of the Cold War and the West, concerned about the Soviet Union as well as the nonaligned movement, was attempting “to appease Greece and the Greek Cypriots,” he said.

In that same year of 1964, the still-recognized government in Nicosia established an embargo of “strategic forbidden material” to be denied the Turkish Cypriots. In reality, Erdengiz said, the embargoed items included everything “from shoe laces to macaroni.” For the next decade Turkish Cypriots survived on humanitarian aid from the Red Cross and Red Crescent Society and financial assistance from Turkey.

Following Turkey’s 1974 intervention and the partitioning of the island, “the Greek Cypriots internationalized the embargo,” Erdengiz said. To this day, Turkish Cypriot football teams cannot participate in international matches, for example, because they may not represent Cyprus. “Our economy is based on tourism,” he added, “but no foreign airline is allowed to fly [directly] to northern Cyprus.” Nor can Turkish Cypriot farmers export their fruits and vegetables to any EU country, he added.

“Five years ago, as another example,” Erdengiz related, “we took the initiative with the Italians to establish an organization for thalasseamia, a genetic anemia-like disease whose victims usually die by the age of 17 or 18. When the Greek Cypriots learned about it, they had us kicked out—of a totally humanitarian organization—denying information that would help save lives.”

The Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus has observer status at the Organization of the Islamic Conference. The TRNC representative told of Greek Cypriot attempts to have his government barred from the OIC altogether. “They’re even trying to get us kicked out of an international Muslim organization!” he exclaimed with exasperated disbelief.

Now, instead of the formerly agreed-upon goal of a “bizonal, bicommunal federation,” the TRNC advocates a confederational system based on the “acknowledgement of existing realities,” as Erdengiz described it, including that “the Turkish Cypriot people have a sovereign, legal, legitimate government.” While this means that in any future negotiation the two parties would have equal status, Erdengiz emphasized that the TRNC is not demanding formal recognition in the sense of exchanging ambassadors, or that the “Republic of Cyprus” no longer be recognized as a legitimate administration.

“Turkish Cypriots,” Erdengiz said, “believe that the future of talks depends upon the acknowledgement of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus, with negotiations between two states, and a confederational system where the two states can come together, cooperate, coordinate, do business—and, in time, build trust. Then we can do whatever seems appropriate,” he explained.

Although expressing “little hope for the future of negotiations,” Erdengiz affirmed that “if we are called to meet at the level of two states, the Turkish Cypriot side would be very much willing to negotiate in good faith.”

Erdengiz clearly does not consider the Republic of Cyprus’ possible membership in the EU a “confidence-building measure,” however. On the contrary, he sees it as a disincentive for the Greek Cypriots to reach a negotiated agreement with their Turkish counterparts. Should they succeed in attaining EU membership, he said, then “in the eyes of the EU, all of Cyprus would be part of the European Union. Therefore, according to the EU’s laws and regulations, Turkey, which is in Cyprus “in accordance with the 1960 Treaty of Guarantee,” would be occupying part of the EU. Once the Republic of Cyprus joins the EU,” he continued, “all its other agreements become invalid. So the EU gives them no reason to sit down and negotiate seriously.”

Nor did Erdengiz rule out the possibility that the other side might “try a limited war in Cyprus,” because a Turkish military response would be considered an attack on the EU. For this if for no other reason, Erdengiz argued that the Cyprus problem should be solved before EU membership is granted, as former U.N. Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali proposed in his 1992“Set of Ideas” on Cyprus, to be followed by separate referenda for Greek and Turkish Cypriots on whether to pursue EU membership.

Erdengiz also criticized the Greek Cypriots’ “unilateral” decision to apply for membership. Not only were the Turkish Cypriots not consulted, he said, but the Clerides government “disregarded its own people” by not holding a referendum on the question, as European countries have done. He pointed out that Greek Cypriot leftist parties, representing nearly half of Greek Cypriot voters, did not support the 1993 decision to apply for membership, although they have since changed their position.

Should a solution be reached, Erdengiz estimated that nearly 90 percent of Turkish Cypriots would support EU membership, because of the economic benefits it would bring. For over 35 years, he said, Turkish Cypriots “haven’t received a single dime in international aid.” Their only assistance comes from Turkey—“which is not a rich country,” he noted. By comparison, the Greek Cypriots, who have received “billions and billions” in aid, he said, attribute their average per capita income of $16,000 to the “economic miracle” they have achieved in the last quarter-century.

“But the real economic miracle,” he maintained, “has been that of the Turkish Cypriots, whose current per capital income of $6,000 is up from a mere $150 in 1963-64. We’ve done that as a small community under embargoes, with no international aid. From 1963 to 1974, in fact, we were not allowed to build factories or trade with the outside world—we were just consumers” of Greek Cypriot products, he said.

As things stand now, however, Erdengiz is convinced that the Clerides government is seeking to join the EU “for political rather than economic” reasons—specifically, “to put pressure on Turkey.” That EU membership would bring, in his view, “no economic gain for the Greek Cypriots, but rather a loss” is additional evidence of a political motive.

In the event that the Republic of Cyprus actually becomes a member of the EU, “We’ll have to completely change our Cyprus policy,” Erdengiz said, “and push for full recognition” of the TNRC.

“Our story is not heard in this country,” The Turkish Cypriot representative said with regret. “It is very difficult to tell your story to Congress. They want to know how many Turkish Cypriots are in their district.” He estimated that fewer that 2,000 Turkish Cypriots live in the U.S., compared to between two and two and a half million Greeks and Greek Cypriots, who have a powerful lobby. “For every initiative we do, the Greek Cypriots can do 100 times as many,” Erdengiz said. “If we write one letter, they write 500.”

In addition to the financial, organizational and media limitations faced by most small countries—Israel leaps to mind as an exception—the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus, because it is not an internationally recognized government, is required to function in the United States under the Foreign Registration Act. This means that its Washington and New York offices must report all their activities—including meetings with government officials and all expenditures—to the Justice Department.

“I don’t mind reporting to the U.S. government,” Erdengiz commented, “but everything is on the public record and available to the Greek Cypriots. We must be the only government, with the possible exception of Taiwan, that in effect is submitting reports to the opposing government.”

The Foreign Registration Act, which regulates lobbyists and businesses, was strengthened by the late Sen. John Heinz of Pennsylvania in the 1980s, when Japanese companies such as Sony and Hitachi were actively buying up American businesses. The legislation made it easier to keep tabs on the financial moves of foreign competitors, and on the noncommercial endeavors of lobbyists for foreign governments.

“It puts us in a very difficult and untenable situation, to say the least,” Erdengiz said. “For example, I’ll meet with a congressman, and after awhile he starts getting all these letters. Now I tell them in advance what they can expect if they meet with me.”

Ahmet Erdengiz is a native of Nicosia, as is his wife. When he does not volunteer additional information, one might easily assume that his family was one of the lucky ones to escape Cyprus’ legacy of violence and tragedy. It may well be, however, that no such ‘lucky” families exist.

For upon further questioning, one learns that the tragedies in Erdengiz’s family predate even the events of 1963. In 1957, his paternal grandmother was the first Turkish Cypriot woman to be killed by Greek Cypriot extremists. His paternal grandfather, the imam of Nicosia’s Omerge mosque, lost an eye in an assassination attempt that same year, and his mosque was “looted and desecrated.”

In fact, Erdengiz said, “My family became refugees three times—in 1957, 1963 and 1974.” Relatives living in Paphos were abducted in 1964; in Nicosia, his family home and shops—what constituted their “wealth”—were on the Greek Cypriot side of the city, and hence lost to them.

“As a family,” he said, both he and his wife “suffered immensely.” She lost family members in a 1974 Greek Cypriot attack on Beykoy, near Nicosia. His wife’s nephew and other close relatives are among the 803 missing Turkish Cypriots—buried, they believe, in unmarked mass graves. However, he emphasized, “Our story is not unique. You cannot find any Turkish Cypriot family that did not suffer in 1963 or 1974.”

Erdengiz himself remembers “fighting over a piece of bread” and trying to survive without shelter in 1963. “For 11 months, through a cold and rainy winter, people lived in caves and in animal shelters. Sixty-one percent of Turkish Cypriots became refugees,” he said, a figure “that even a superpower could not handle.”

Erdengiz stated that “the Republic of Cyprus as a bicommunal government ceased to exist in 1963.” When U.N. peacekeeping forces arrived in 1964, moreover, it became apparent that their function was “only to report, [not] to stop” human rights violations in Cyprus.

As a result, Turkish Cypriots “do not really trust international peacekeepers,” Erdengiz said. Aside from their Turkish protectors, “no one is going to fight for you and die for you,” he stated.

The Erdengiz family includes two daughters, 14 and 6 years old. The older one is enjoying her stay in America especially because, having attended Cypriot schools with their British-based curriculum, “she finds school here very easy.”

Erdengiz, a graduate of the American University of Beirut, is mystified by the small amount of homework his daughter is assigned. “In northern Cyprus—which has the world’s second-highest number of per capita university graduates—students have four to five hours a day of homework,” he explained, “and the teacher rules supreme.”

So that she will not have fallen behind when she returns to school in Cyprus, Erdengiz and his wife are having their older daughter do extra work in math and science, and she visits Cyprus “as often as possible.”

Asked how he envisions his daughters’ future as Cypriots, Erdengiz replies, “If we cannot solve the Cyprus problem and EU accession, then we have no other alternative but to become an independent and fully recognized nation. If that does happen, at least future generations of Turkish Cypriots won’t have to worry about their future. Now we have peace and security, but we don’t know what the future holds.”

Janet McMahon is the managing editor of the Washington Report.