Washington Report on Middle East Affairs, September 1999, pages 32, 136

United Nations Report

Diplomats at United Nations Spar Over Iraq, Libya, Western Sahara and Israeli-Occupied Territories

By Ian Williams

The summer months at the U.N. have been a combination of shadowboxing and wielding of symbols in the Middle East. But as in a medieval tournament, the symbols are often very important, revealing shifts of policy and allegiance.

For example, without much fanfare, there has been a shift in U.S. policy toward Iraq. In June the U.S. delegation to the U.N. implicitly agreed that it would not veto the lifting of U.N. sanctions on Iraq if Baghdad actually complied with U.N. Resolution 687 strictures on disarmament and the return of Kuwaiti property and missing people. Previously, under both Presidents George Bush and Bill Clinton, the U.S. had implied that the sanctions would last for at least as long as Iraqi President Saddam Hussain’s grip on power.

The shift came in the form of U.S. support for the Anglo-Dutch resolution that is working its way very slowly through the Security Council. The resolution was based on a Brazilian initiative in January to set up working groups on sanctions, disarmament, and the Kuwaiti prisoners and property in Iraq. The draft now has eight countries supporting it, but still faces opposition from the French, Russians and Chinese.

Basically, the resolution envisages a progressive relaxation of sanctions after the Iraqis have demonstrated cooperation with a new arms inspection and monitoring body, UNCIM, that would be set up to replace UNSCOM.

The draft mandates UNCIM to produce a list of “key remaining tasks” for Iraq to finish within 90 days after UNCIM begins work in the country. After 120 days of cooperation, export sanctions on Iraqi products would be suspended for renewable periods of 120 days, dependent on Iraqi cooperation with the arms inspections.

It also promises measures to help Baghdad sell more oil, asking the secretary-general to draw up plans that would involve using foreign oil companies to boost production. However, in some ways it makes controls on the regime even stronger than now, by, for example, taking the revenues from oil sales to Turkey and putting them into an escrow account.

In contrast, the Russians, Chinese and the French want sanctions lifted, in return for which the Iraqis would cooperate on arms monitoring. Even they, however, admit to worry about Saddam Hussain’s ability to revive Iraq’s proven expertise in chemical and biological warfare.

At present, Iraq shows little interest in taking up the Dutch and British offer. This prompts British diplomats to accuse the Iraqis of “looking a gift horse in the mouth,” by not taking up the offer before someone else takes it off the table.

The much-reviled UNSCOM is still having a shadowy half-life.

The acting U.S. ambassador to the U.N. is Peter Burleigh, a well-liked and respected career diplomat. The arrival of Richard Holbrooke, whose appointment, at this writing, still is being held up in the Senate, may make a difference in that he clearly has political ambitions that would not necessarily be furthered by concessions to Baghdad.

British policy, too, is shifting. Once slavishly tied to the U.S. on almost everything except the Palestine issue, the Labor government clearly is staking out its own distinctive positions.

The resolve of British Prime Minister Tony Blair over Kosovo has given the U.K. more leverage for its other policies, which began earlier. Perhaps the first sign was the compromise over sanctions on Libya resulting from the explosion of Pan American Flight 103 over Lockerbie, in which London pulled over the American position.

This month’s resumption of British relations with Iran showed a similar shift. Now, British diplomats do not conceal their concern at the humanitarian damage caused by sanctions on Iraq. Hence their eagerness to find a way out that satisfies the other objective of stopping Iraqi rearmament.

The abject failure of the present policy to shift Saddam Hussain and the absence of UNSCOM inspectors from Iraq since last year show that a new policy is needed, quite apart from any humanitarian considerations. For the time being Baghdad seems to be able to live with the oil-for-food regime if that is the price to pay for keeping the arms inspectors at bay. However, the long-term cost to the country and its people will become higher with each passing year.

The much-reviled UNSCOM itself is still having a shadowy half-life. Its last executive chairman, Australian diplomat Richard Butler, now has moved to become “diplomat in residence” at the Council on Foreign Relations, where he is more appreciated than he was at the U.N. There, the Russians refused to recognize him and Secretary-General Kofi Annan’s office was scarcely more welcoming by the end.

The final act has an element of farce. UNSCOM inspectors remembered that when they left Baghdad in such a hurry last December, they shut down their laboratory, which contained samples ranging from a tenth of a milligram of VX to a kilo of mustard gas. They raised this in the U.N. and suggested a visit to secure the lab. Iraq, which had, after all, admitted to making tons of this stuff, and had used it against the Iranians without overmuch concern for safety, complained, and got its friends, the Russians, to raise the issue.

However, when UNSCOM offered to go to clear out the lab, the Iraqis and the Russians protested. Instead the U.N. assembled a non-UNSCOM team of experts to go, accompanied by the Russian, Chinese and French ambassadors to Baghdad.

An Opportunity to Complain

However, in the meantime, that gave the West, already disgruntled, an opportunity to complain because the U.N. had chosen Iraq’s three closest friends to provide diplomatic coverage. It also gave Western diplomats a chance to score one on Russia by arranging for Charles Duelfer, the American acting head of UNSCOM, to report to the Security Council. The Russians protested, since they have decided that they don’t recognize the “former” UNSCOM, but on the other hand they could not boycott the meeting since the whole circus had been called at their bidding.

Prakash Shah, Kofi Annan’s point man on Iraq, then politely rebutted Western protests at the choice of diplomats by pointing out the U.N. had invited Poland, which represents U.S. interests in Baghdad. The Poles had declined the offer, but also had declined to tell Washington what they had done.

Iraq’s imaginative accusations are going against the trend for its economy. In June, Baghdad accused a New Zealand de-mining worker, Ian Broughton, of planting boxes of locust eggs to destroy plants.

U.N. officials deny the accusations about the locust eggs and point out that the Iraqis have always been unhappy about the de-mining effort, which is concentrated in the Kurdish areas over which Baghdad has no control. The U.N. is mandated to respect the “sovereignty” of Iraq even in areas where Iraq has no control, so the U.N. withdrew Broughton on the grounds that his contract was up.

Libyan Sanctions Suspended

While the sanctions on Iraq remain, those on Libya are suspended, since the two Lockerbie suspects were handed over to the ad-hoc Scottish court in The Hague. The issue is purely symbolic, since there is no way that they can be reimposed, but getting them removed finally and ritually is as important to the Libyans as retaining them is to the Americans. On Friday June 11 the first American-Libyan meeting took place at the U.N., moderated by Kofi Annan and with the U.K. ambassador, Sir Jeremy Greenstock, listening in.

Libyan Ambassador Abuzed Omar Dorda drew comfort from the date, which was the 29th anniversary of the American evacuation of its bases in Libya. However, there was little else on offer save portents.

The State Department had already announced that it would veto any attempt to lift the sanctions, no matter how symbolic they now were, unless it is satisfied that all conditions are met. Repeating the form of earlier British contacts over Libyan support for the IRA, the U.S.’s Peter Burleigh apparently broached terrorist organizations previously supported by Tripoli and asked for details of what had happened.

The Non-Aligned members of the Council tried hard to get even the symbolic suspended sanctions lifted, but ran up against the technicality that one of the conditions is the payment of compensation to the families of the Lockerbie survivors. Since the beginning of the trial has been put back until next February in order to give the defendants a chance to prepare their case, this would require a prior admission of guilt by Libya.

It could have been overlooked, of course, but the American families of the victims are not in a forgiving mood. They already regard the present arrangement as a sell-out.

Snail’s Pace in Western Sahara

In July, another snail-speed process took a slight slither forward. The U.N. sent Morocco and Polisario the provisional list of eligible voters for the Western Sahara referendum, containing some 85,000 names. The appeal process for the many who have been excluded has already begun at centers all over the region.

However, things are not that easy. MINURSO, the U.N. operation in Western Sahara, is still examining the claims of would-be voters from among the so-called “contested tribes.” That list is expected soon, and then the appeals will begin.

The U.N. announced that “The final list is expected out in March 2000, allowing time for the repatriation and referendum campaign. The vote itself will be held at the end of next July.”

That would have looked like pie in the sky until the announcement of the death of Morocco’s King Hassan II July 23. The whole Western Sahara invasion was such a personal project for him that most observers assumed he would never allow a referendum to take place that he could lose. His son and heir is presumed to be more pragmatic, and he might well question the huge cost of maintaining the occupation.

Fourth Geneva Convention Meeting

One event that did take place, albeit in the blink of an eye, was the Geneva conference of parties to the Fourth Geneva Convention. Everyone came away feeling vindicated—except the U.S. and Israel, who did not go at all, and who were not happy with what the 100 or so delegates of other member nations did support.

The Arabs were wrestling with the European Union on whether the conference should adjourn with a fixed timetable that would serve notice to the new Israeli government that it was still under scrutiny, or whether it would adjourn sine die.

In the end, the conference met briefly and chose the latter alternative, adjourning without a specific date. In doing so, however, delegates declared the applicability of the Conventions to the occupied territories, including East Jerusalem.

Since everyone except the Israelis (and latterly the U.S.) had always maintained that anyway, it may seem like a minor victory. However, the considerable efforts the U.S. and Israel made to thwart the conference suggest that they think it very important, and in a way their opinion vindicates the importance the Palestinians have placed on this legalistic field of combat.

Ian Williams is a free-lance journalist based at the United Nations, and the author of The U.N. for Beginners , available through the AET Book Club.