Washington Report on Middle East Affairs, September
1999, pages 30-31
The Subcontinent
Kargil Crisis Recedes in Wake of Clinton-Sharif Meeting,
But Menacing Kashmir Problem Remains Unsolved
By M.M. Ali
The State of Jammu and Kashmir does not belong to either India
or Pakistan. This is a fact that many outside the subcontinent do
not know, and some do not care to recognize. Anyone who is even
remotely interested in resolving the menacing Kashmir dispute, however,
needs to remember that in this case the devil is not in the details
but in the basic underlying facts.
The issue is not Kargil or Daars, as it has been made out to be
in recent weeks in the international media. It is the entire State
of Jammu and Kashmir which is contested in a dispute that jeopardizes
the peace of one of the most heavily populated regions of the world.
Further, the organized international community needs to be reminded
that it pledged through the United Nations in 1948 to let the 13
million people of Kashmir determine their own political future.
It is a promise that has gone unredeemed for the past half-century.
The subcontinent has paid a heavy price in economic and human terms
for this denial of the right of self-determination–a principle honored
by great powers all over the world in the abstract, but repeatedly
denied to all who are prepared to fight and die for it. The Kargil
crisis, it must be recognized, is just the latest example of the
willingness of Kashmiris to lay down their lives for their freedom.
Unfortunately, there is more hypocrisy than honesty in international
relations. Depending on who is defining them, the groups that have
revived the demand for an independent Kashmir are identified as
mujahedeen, freedom fighters, intruders, infiltrators or
mercenaries. Whatever they are called, they are people dying for
their own independence, a cause with which Americans, only two centuries
after their own similar struggle, should easily empathize. This
is particularly so since, until it is resolved, the Kashmir dispute
presents the world’s greatest threat, by far, of nuclear war. The
half-century-old Kashmir dispute has proven, beyond a shadow of
doubt, that time is no healer, as it has defied all manner of delaying
tactics over the years.
New Delhi has been able to avoid a settlement only by deploying
more than 700,000 army and paramilitary troops to “keep order” in
the Indian-occupied two-thirds of Kashmir. Nor has any amount of
counterfeit democracy reduced the demand for freedom in the state.
India has arrested prominent Kashmiri leaders belonging to the All
Parties Hurriyat Conference, a conglomerate of groups fighting for
freedom, and India’s puppet Kashmiri chief minister, Farooq Abdullah,
has accused his fellow Kashmiris living in the Kargil-Daars area
of supporting alleged mercenary intruders. However, none of this
theater or fakery has changed the mind-set of the local population,
who have suffered deeply under severe repression. Their struggle
for freedom continues unabated.
The Kargil Crisis
Pending final settlement of the Kashmir dispute, a temporary Line
of Control (LOC), was set up some 27 years ago demarcating the Indian-
and the Pakistani-controlled parts of the State of Jammu and Kashmir.
Ever since, the LOC, which marks the front lines at the time a cease-fire
was negotiated, has been monitored by a U.N. peacekeeping force,
although the artificial boundary has been porous, especially during
the short summer when snow and ice do not impede passage.
India accused Pakistan of aiding and abetting “intruders” who breached
the LOC and occupied high ground on the Indian side, shooting down
at the Indian troops trying to regain the lost territory. It is
snow-clad and treacherous terrain and, by New Delhi’s own admission,
the Indian army suffered major casualties.
Military skirmishes and exchanges of fire began in mid-May, with
both sides making contradictory claims. The United States called
only for a return to the status quo, and respect for the LOC. India
quotes the Simla Agreement of 1972 wherein the two countries had
agreed to “resolve” all issues, including the Kashmir dispute, through
bilateral negotiations. And Pakistan, which acknowledges no control
over the mujahedeen, has lost trust in bilateral talks and
accuses India of “stalling” instead of negotiating sincerely to
resolve the dispute. Pakistan wants third-party (preferably American)
mediation. But the stalemate remains.
The mujahedeen succeeded in tying up a vastly larger Indian
force. But even with the support of Pakistan it is not clear that
they can win the war. Nor is it clear how long India can sustain
the human and economic costs of maintaining positions in Kargil,
especially in view of the impending snowfall that will begin in
late September. Will Indian Prime Minister Atal Behari Vajpayee
pay a political price in India’s September elections for the huge
military strain in Kargil? Mujahedeen withdrew from Kargil
and the Indian army has re-occupied its lost posts. Tensions have
been defused for the time being.
Internal Realities
Atal Behari Vajpayee’s caretaker government (BJP) is faced with
mid-term national elections in September, but he cannot afford to
call for a delay in the voting because the opposition will interpret
it as a departure from democratic procedure and a confession of
political weakness. Pakistani Prime Minister Mian Nawaz Sharif also
rides a tiger and faces a difficult task. Pakistan’s economy is
still heavily dependent on external assistance for survival. Therefore
he cannot afford a costly, extended conventional war with India.
He also faces the reality that his own powerful army will not be
happy if he surrenders the upper (literally) hand that has been
achieved in the heights of Kashmir. But the option of opening up
alternative military fronts on the lengthy India-Pakistan border
to take pressure off the combatants in Kashmir risks a nuclear war
that no one wants. Ironically, as happened in the Soviet-U.S. Cold
War, the nuclear capability on both sides has become a deterrent
against the outbreak of a full-fledged war like the three that already
have been fought in the second half of the 20th century between
India and Pakistan. But if mutually assured nuclear destruction
becomes the only bulwark for peace between the two governments,
the next millenium will become a perilous one in the subcontinent.
Indian Media Blitz
The crisis began with physical evidence that close to 1,000 men
equipped with heavy artillery had crossed over into the Kargil and
Daars area on the Indian side of the LOC. The U.S. and others asked
Pakistan to seek a withdrawal of the intruders and to respect the
sanctity of the LOC.
Meanwhile India, although suffering militarily, took advantage
of the favorable tilt in public opinion and launched a media blitz.
It first played on American fears by charging that the men occupying
Kargil and Daars were “terrorists” associated with Osama bin Laden
and trained by the Taliban in Afghanistan. Then it charged that
they were regular soldiers from Pakistan’s army. An expensive full-page
advertisement in leading U.S. and European dailies called Pakistan’s
military a “Rogue Army” and Indian emissaries were dispatched to
major capitals of the world with the same kind of message. Prime
Minister Vajpayee vowed to continue military operations until all
the lost ground had been recovered. Pakistan provided its own version
of events and disassociated itself from the actions of the mujahedeen.
This was the background to Pakistani Prime Minister Sharif’s urgent
request for an emergency meeting with President Clinton in Washington
on July 4th—a move that caught U.S. officials by surprise.
The joint U.S.-Pakistani communiqué issued after the talk said
that Sharif agreed to ask the “intruders” to withdraw from the Indian
side of the LOC. New Delhi described the statement as vindicating
its version of events. But Islamabad interpreted it as drawing the
United States into settling the dispute. This, too, would be a victory
because internationalizing the Kashmir issue has been a long-term
Pakistani objective.
Sharif had a similar meeting with British Prime Minister Tony Blair
in London. Significantly, Pakistani Army Chief of Staff Gen. Parvez
Musharraf said he would abide by any decision that Prime Minister
Sharif took, an essential ingredient in any negotiation, since Pakistan’s
army has deposed prime ministers in the past to settle internal
crises.
Although right-wing religious groups and other hard-liners predictably
opposed the Washington agreement and launched a national campaign
to support the “freedom fighters” in Kargil, the meetings in Washington
and London had a calming effect in both Islamabad and Delhi. A lead
story in the July 12 Times of India read: “The directors-general
of military operations (DGMO) of the two countries met on Sunday
and agreed on the modalities of de-escalation, including sector-wide
cessation of ground and air operations to facilitate the mujahedeen’s
disengagement.” The language of the joint communiqué was very
significant. It acknowledged that the men who had occupied the Kargil-Daars
hilltops were not Pakistani soldiers, as India had alleged, but
were mujahedeen, or Kashmiri freedom fighters. However, on
July 18, the Indian army chief, Gen. V.P. Malik, still insisted
on calling the intruders “Pakistan army regulars.”
Nawaz Sharif Addresses Nation
For his part, following his meetings in Washington and London,
Prime Minister Sharif said in a televised broadcast to the nation
on July 12 that he had requested the mujahedeen to withdraw
from Kargil to avert the possibility of a nuclear war with India.
He also implied that he was doing so because of President Clinton’s
assurance that he would take a “personal interest” in resolving
the Kashmir dispute.
Pakistan’s objective to internationalize the Kashmir dispute apparently
has been met, and the Kargil episode very likely has re-ignited
the fire of freedom inside the State of Jammu and Kashmir. But the
voluntary withdrawal of the mujahedeen from their bunkers
takes pressure off the Indian military, who were caught napping
and paid a heavy cost in human lives. The withdrawal suits New Delhi
because, when the snow starts falling, movements by either side
in the area will become impassable regardless of what happens on
the military front.
Pakistan will nag the Clinton administration in coming months to
intervene and give some meaning to the India-Pakistan bilateral
talks. India, concerned about the “personal interest” promise of
Bill Clinton to the Pakistani prime minister, will seek to drag
out the issue for another 18 months until Clinton’s term of office
ends.
If the Indian diplomacy succeeds, that may launch another half-century
of the arms standoff in the subcontinent that has diverted scarce
resources from human resource development projects and the growth
of democracy across the subcontinent. And this time the arms being
brandished are capable of poisoning the entire planet.
Prof. M.M. Ali is a consultant and senior fellow with The Center
for Planning & Policy Studies in the Washington, DC area. |